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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: LIBERALISM, RIGHTS, AND NATURE 
"Next to virtue as a general idea," observes Tocque-
ville, "nothing is so beautiful as that of rights ... No man 
can be great without virtue, nor any nation great without 
respect for rights. 111 Tocqueville's estimate of its beauty 
appears roughly commensurate with the practical power that 
the idea of rights broadly conceived has manifested over 
the past few centuries. The proposition that human beings 
as such possess unalienable rights not only inspired the 
revolutionary movements that swept North America and west-
ern Europe in the late eighteenth century and throughout 
the nineteenth, but in its original, liberal form, it has 
borne the fruit of unprecedented levels of freedom and 
prosperity, and in many cases even political stability, in 
those countries in which it has most firmly taken root. 
Moreover, in conjunction with the principles of human free-
dom and equality, it has indeed become in our own century, 
as its early friends, enemies, and friendly critics alike 
anticipated, 2 a standard of political legitimacy recognized 
1Democracy in America 1.2.6, in Mayer ed. 1969, 237-8. 
2Thus the -doctrine's great pamphleteer Thomas Paine 
proclaims that "Government founded on a moral theory, on a 
system of universal peace, on the indefeasible hereditary 
1 
virtually worldwide, to which even many of the world's most 
despotic regimes feel compelled to proclaim their fidelity. 
Against the backdrop of its practical successes, 
therefore, the widespread theoretical suspicion and even 
contempt that the doctrine of natural and unalienable 
rights has aroused from its very inception must appear all 
the more striking. 3 In the contemporary literature, the 
Rights of Man, is now revolving from west to east by a 
stronger impulse than the Government of the sword revolved 
from east to west. It interests not particular individu-
als, but Nations in its progress, and promises a new era to 
the human race" ( "The Rights of Man" Part 2, in Hook ed. 
1969, 227). Cf. Burke's famous lament that "the age of 
chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, economists, and cal-
culators has succeeded, and the glory of Europe is extin-
guished forever·" (Reflections on the Revolution in France, 
ed. Mahoney 1955, 86; see also the remarks cited by Strauss 
1953, 317-318). Tocqueville, for his part, animated as he 
says by "a kind of religious dread," claims in the intro-
duction to Democracy in America that "the gradual progress 
of equality is something fated ... it is universal and perma-
nent, it is daily passing beyond human control, and every 
event and every man helps it along" (Mayer ed. 1969, 12). 
3The seminal attacks appear in the works of Rousseau 
and Hume. See, respectively, Discourse on the Origin and 
Foundations of Inequality, passim, On the Social Contract, 
especially 1.6-8, 2.3-4, 2.7, and Treatise of Human Nature 
3.1.1. In his Treatise, Hume supplies what has been taken 
commonly as the basis for the general charge that natural 
law doctrines as such are untenable, resting on one or 
another variant of the "naturalistic fallacy." Thus he 
observes that "In every system of morality, which I have 
hitherto met with ... the author proceeds for some time in 
the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of 
a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when 
of a sudden I am surpriz 'd to find, that instead of the 
usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet 
with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or 
an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, how-
ever, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought 
not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis nec-
essary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the 
same time that a reason should be given, for what seems 
2 
clearest indication of this theoretical suspicion and con-
tempt appears in the prevailing intellectual disinclina-
tion, evident especially in the most widely discussed and 
in many respects most ambitious recent reformulations of 
liberal theory, to engage arguments about rights on the 
level of their natural foundations. 4 A similar tendency 
prevails in much of the mass of post-World War II litera-
ture concerning the concept of human rights. 5 The inevit-
altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a 
deduction from others, which are entirely different from 
it• II 
4Ronald Dworkin, for instance, takes the "abstract 
right" to equal concern and respect to be "fundamental and 
axiomatic" or "intuitive" ( 1977, xv, 180,182) . In the sin-
gle most widely discussed case, John Rawls presents his 
principles of justice as constituting an analytically pre-
cise description of a prephilosophic "sense of justice," 
but fails, as several critics have observed, to clarify the 
origin or nature of this sense (1971, 4,46,453-512; cf. 
Bloom 1977, 648-649; Wolff 1977, 182; Schaefer 1979, 12-
18). In his more recent work (1980 and 1985), Rawls stipu-
lates more definitely that his theory applies properly to 
democratic societies alone. Robert Nozick too admits at 
least provisionally his incapacity to treat adequately the 
question of justification, though he derives some comfort 
from the opinion that his model Locke suffered from a sim-
ilar incapacity (1974, 9). Even Bruce Ackerman, who re-
jects intuitionism and presents arguments designed to lead 
persons of divergent political perspectives to accept his 
basic principle of neutral dialogue, ultimately confesses 
that he knows of no mode of neutral argumentation suffi-
cient to defend against all forms of authoritarianism. 
Assent to his principle as well presupposes a particular 
understanding of one's "place in the world" (1980, 360-361, 
3 73) . 
5see the bibliography in Martin and Nickel 1978, and 
the more narrowly focused critical review of the literature 
in Machan 1980. Important works of recent years include 
Feinberg 1980; Finnis 1980; Gewirth 1982; Waldron ed. 1984; 
Donnelly 1985; Meyers 1985; Nickel 1987; Winston ed. 1989. 
3 
able result, attempts at grounding rights in the principle 
of human agency or autonomy notwithstanding, 6 is a wholly 
conventionalist view of the origin or basis of rights. The 
essential difficulty with this view lies in the fact that 
in its emphasis on the foundational character of the fac-
ulty of choice alone, the conventionalist conception of 
rights leaves unsettled not only the particular manner in 
which one should choose to exercise one's rights or free-
dom, but also the nonprudential grounds for choosing to 
limit one's freedom in accordance with the respect of 
others' rights. The larger implication is that the histor-
ical success of the liberal doctrine of rights must appear 
in the decisive respect accidental, explainable by refer-
ence rather to the particular cultural circumstances of the 
countries or peoples who espouse it than to any inherent 
reasonableness in the doctrine itself. 7 
In the remark cited above, Tocqueville unobtrusively 
raises the essential questions. In suggesting that an ap-
6see above all Gewirth 1982, 1-8,20-30; also Hart, in 
Waldron 1984, 77-78; Mackie, in Waldron 1984, 175-8. 
7see Grant 1975, 48-68, who argues ominously that "the 
very decency and confidence of English-speaking politics," 
i.e. of the politics of constitutionally limited government 
and rights in the English-speaking countries, "was related 
to the absence of philosophy" (68). Cf. Machan's critique 
of the "non-cognitivist" theories of rights set forth by 
MacDonald, Melden, Blackstone, and Feinberg, which tend to 
conceive of rights as merely cultural or linguistic arti-
facts (1980, 103-107, 112-115). Donnelly's account (1985, 
31-43) seems to invite a similar criticism. Cf. also Rap-
aczynski's expression of his early view of Locke iri partic-
ular (1987, 14). 
4 
preciation of human virtue provides the proper context for 
praising, for seeing the virtue in, the idea of rights, he 
implicitly reveals, contrary to the contemporary reliance 
on the principle of human autonomy, a grave skepticism with 
respect to our attempts at asserting claims upon or against 
nature without acknowledging at some point nature's claims 
upon ourselves. In accordance with that suggestion, the 
most general premise of the present study is the conviction 
that, notwithstanding the authentic perplexities that the 
task involves, no serious attempt at elucidating the foun-
dations of the principle of human rights, of political lib-
eralism in its most successful form, can avoid a confronta-
tion with the question of nature. By attempting to avoid 
such a confrontation, theorists of liberalism or of rights 
confine their speech to those already committed to their 
principles. Explicitly or implicitly, they conceive of 
assent to those principles as a mere commitment, inherently 
and necessarily nonrational, and thus incapable of resist-
ing radical challenges. We can understand clearly, how-
ever, why powerful majorities or minorities should respect 
the rights of the less powerful, only by understanding what 
it is about us that merits such respect, that makes certain 
rights appropriate to us--only, that is, on the basis of a 
serious inquiry into the nature and natural condition of 
humankind. 
The present study therefore proceeds ultimately from 
5 
an inspiration that is at once theoretical and prescrip-
tive. We hope by pursuing to their theoretical grounds the 
problematic relations among liberalism, rights, and nature 
to gain some insight concerning both the general question 
of political legitimacy and the particular question of the 
legitimacy of our own form of government. our focus, how-
ever, is historical. The second of our major premises is 
the contention that we can best explore these problematic 
relations by focusing on their treatment in the thought of 
the greatest, most philosophically self-conscious exponent 
of a liberal theory of natural rights, John Locke. Though 
this characterization of the core of Locke's theory is not 
uncontroversial among scholarly commentators, the complex-
ity of the issues involved necessitates that our reasons 
for viewing Locke as the paradigmatic natural rights theo-
rist emerge mainly in the course of our exposition. Yet in 
view of the mass of existing literature on Locke's polit-
ical philosophy, it is necessary here for us briefly to 
situate the present study in the context of those that have 
come before it, upon which it attempts to build. 
Three general modes of interpretation are noteworthy 
here. 8 According to the first, Locke is essentially not a 
political philosopher, but rather an ideologist. In its 
less narrowly reductive expressions, this approach is char-
8cf. the earlier reviews of the recent literature in 
Monson 1971, Aarslef 1969, zuckert 1975 and 1978. Cf. also 
the more comprehensive overview in Yelton and Yelton 1985. 
6 
acterized by the attempt at situating Locke's thought with-
in a prevailing intellectual climate or community of dis-
course. 9 Several of its adherents focus in particular on 
Locke's partisan political sympathies, presenting his 
political thought as a rationalization of the interests or 
sentiments of the Whigs, formulated either as an apology 
after the fact of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, lO or 
before it as an expression of a revolutionary aspiration, 
especially of the radical wing of the movement. 11 A more 
narrowly reductive, materialist variant of the ideological 
reading focuses on Locke's economic thinking, presenting 
Locke as an apologist of an emergent English bourgeoisie 
and therefore of a system of class domination concealed and 
9Refraining from "systematic formal criticism," Dunn 
seeks merely "to elucidate why it was that Locke said what 
he said, wrote what he wrote, and published what he pub-
lished in the Two Treatises of Government" (1969, x,6). 
Cf. Tully's similar declaration of his intention (1980, ix-
x). Ashcraft introduces his reading of the historical con-
text of the Two Treatises by offering a general definition 
of a political theory as "a set of structured meanings that 
are understandable only in reference to a specified con-
text, wherein the concepts, terminology, and even the in-
ternal structure of the theory itself are viewed in rela-
tion to a comprehensive ordering of the elements of social 
life" (1986, 5). Cf. Glat 1981, 20-21. 
10stephen 1876, I.114,117; Green 1967 (1879), 76; Lam-
precht 1918, 3,141; Laski 1920, 29, 55; Sabine 1937, 523, 
531,535,537; O'Connor 1952, 205. See the discussion in 
Laslett 1960, 58-61. 
11In recent scholarship, the most influential state-
ment of this argument appears in Laslett 1960, 58-79. See 
also Fox Bourne 1876, I. 466 and II .166; Aaron 1955, 270-
274; Cranston 1957, 207-208; Gough 1973, 25-26,47-48,138-
149; Tully 1980, 53-55; Ashcraft 1980, 37-40, 48~53; Ash-
craft 1986, 530-589. 
7 
legitimated by its emphasis on formal or jural equality. 12 
A second mode of interpretation, in some instances 
partially overlapping the first, holds Locke to be a more-
or-less traditional exponent of a theologically grounded 
natural law theory. Again this thesis admits of some 
variation, deriving especially from the fact that Locke's 
explication of the concept tends to obscure the traditional 
distinction between natural law and divine positive law. 13 
Defenders of the natural law interpretation argue that 
according to Locke, the principles of justice are acts of 
divine legislation, carry divine sanctions, and are acces-
sible to unassisted reason either through its apprehension 
of the natural order of creation, or through its capacity 
to demonstrate the authenticity of a positive revelation. 
In either case, Locke is according to this view a fundamen-
tally Christian writer, grounding his theory either in 
Christian revelation or in a version of natural theology 
that is substantively compatible with and ultimately in-
12seminal in this respect is the work of C.B. MacPher-
son; see especially 1962, 194-2 62. Neal Wood ( 1984) has 
recently criticized MacPherson's argument as unhistorical, 
without, however, rejecting its basic premise. Wood's 
Locke too is an ideologist of a rising English bourgeoisie, 
a champion of an early agrarian form of capitalism. Alan 
Ryan rejects the view that Locke's political thought pre-
sents a justification of class domination, but agrees with 
MacPherson in characterizing it as a "bourgeois" theory 
produced by a "bourgeois mind" (1971, 105). See also 
Shapiro 1986, 128-148. 
13 Lamprecht 1918, 105-109; Aaron 1955, 265-270; Von 
Leyden 1954, 51-58; Gough 1973, 4-20; Rogers 1981, 146-149; 
Colman 1983, 5-7; Shapiro 1986, 100-108. 
8 
spired by Christianity.14 
Both these modes of interpretation tend to depreciate 
the importance of the concept of nature in Locke's polit-
ical thought. In the ideological reading, this deprecia-
tion occurs in the context of a general abstraction from 
any concern with foundational issues; if no human thought 
can transcend the particular historical or cultural horizon 
within which it arises, then it clearly makes little sense 
to attempt to assess on its merits Locke's claim to present 
transhistorical principles of justice or political legit-
imacy.15 A similar conclusion follows from the reading of 
Locke as a fundamentally Christian political thinker, a 
political theologian elaborating the political implications 
of his faith rather than a philosopher elaborating a con-
ception of politics based upon and testable by rational 
14The most emphatic statement of this view is that of 
Dunn, who argues that Locke's moral vision can be rendered 
coherent, if at all, only by reference to an axiomatic, 
"non-rational" but not "irrational" Christian, Calvinist 
faith (1969, 249; more generally, 218-228,245-267). See 
also Ashcraft 1968, 910; Ashcraft 1969; Gough 1973, 1-26; 
Johnson 1978; Parry 1978, 12; Yolton 1985, 50,91. His 
reading of Locke as a bourgeois or proto-bourgeois ideol-
ogist notwithstanding, even Wood affirms that Locke was 
"unquestionably ... a sincere Christian," attempting to elab-
orate a "Christianized egoism" ( 1984, 77; 1983, 28,178) . 
Placing greater emphasis on the grounding of Locke's 
natural law in natural theology are Singh 1961, 105-118; 
Aarslef 1969, 105-116; Tully 1980, 34-50; Colman 1983, 42-
48,138-176, 186-192. 
15see especially Wood's critique of the philosophical 
approach as involving an abstraction from politics (1983, 
1-7; 1984, 1-13) . 
9 
inquiry. His view of the nature of things thus dismissed, 
Locke could be relevant to us only insofar as we share his 
faith or his historical-political circumstances. 16 More-
over, even those who appear to take more seriously Locke's 
claims to lay the foundation of his political thought in a 
more independently rationalist theology tend to ascribe to 
Locke's treatment of the concept of nature only secondary 
importance, and therefore commonly fail to elaborate that 
treatment in its full, potentially radical significance. 17 
16some scholars indeed seem to see in a demonstration 
of Locke's irrelevance to us at least a partial justifica-
tion of the very enterprise of writing about him. Most 
emphatic among these is Dunn, who insists on "the intimate 
dependence of an extremely high proportion of Locke's argu-
ments for their very intelligibility, let alone plausibil-
ity, on a series of theological commitments" no longer 
shared by contemporary societies, with the consequence that 
Dunn "simply cannot conceive of constructing an analysis of 
any issue in contemporary political theory around the af-
firmation or negation of anything which Locke says about 
political matters" (1969, x-xi). Tully similarly seeks to 
show that Locke's political thought "is fashioned within a 
discourse constituted by many conventions and assumptions 
we no longer share" ( 1980, x) . Even Rapaczynski, who by 
his own testimony "clearly believe(s] that Locke's ideas 
are not • 'dead' and that Locke has something to ' say' to 
us," seems to make a decisive concession to the thesis of 
Locke's irrelevance in observing that Locke's "relevance 
for us has more to do with helping to explain how we got to 
where we are in our intellectual predicament than with 
providing us with definitive answers to the problems we 
face" ( 1987, 5) . 
17Though he devotes considerable attention to the 
questions of human nature and the natural human condition 
in Locke, Lamprecht seems content in the end to view 
Locke's hedonism as aberrational in the context of his 
ethical rationalism, or more fundamentally to observe that 
Locke presents a largely novel, modern epistemology along-
side an essentially traditionalist ethical and political 
teaching (1918, 6,75-121). His contentment with the thesis 
of Locke's inconsistency or confusion seems closely related 
10 
A third mode of interpretation places the question of 
nature at the center of Locke's concern. Exponents of this 
reading argue that personal and pedagogical considerations 
suggest to Locke the prudence of presenting his theory in a 
traditional, theological guise, thus partially concealing 
his deeper intention to present a somewhat modified, liber-
alized version of the hedonist natural rights theory of 
Hobbes. 18 In this view, much of the interpretive diffi-
cul ty of Locke's doctrine of natural law disappears once 
to his distrust on principle of the notion of a natural law 
(75-87). Von Leyden displays a similar contentment, based 
on a similar mistrust ( 1954, 43-60, 71-82; 1956, 26-34) . 
Seliger holds that Locke is simply uninterested in explain-
ing the grounds of his claims concerning the law of nature 
(1963, 337-340). More recently, near the end of a lengthy 
and thoughtful study, Colman remarks that Locke's apparent 
rejection of the notion of teleology invites a more formid-
able objection than does his alleged utilitarianism taken 
in itself; yet Colman himself seems to treat that objection 
as an afterthought, sketching the basis of a response to it 
in scarcely three pages (1983, 240-242). In claiming that 
Locke's moral rationalism depends upon a "view of nature as 
rational and purposive" or of "the natural world as a world 
where everything has its function," Grant (1987, 38-39) is 
aware of the difficulties that Locke's epistemology and his 
account of the state of nature may pose for such a view, 
yet seems uninterested in confronting those difficulties 
exhaustively. Her intention not to subject Locke to the 
most radical challenges is perhaps indicated in the fact 
that she addresses her study to "anyone who does not wish 
to abandon the premise of liberal theory--human freedom ... " 
( 11) . 
18see above all Strauss 1953, 165-166,202-251, and 
Strauss 1959, 197-220. See also Cox 1960; Goldwin 1972; 
Zuckert 1974, 1978, and 1979; Mansfield 1979 and 1989, 185-
211; Wallin 1984; Pangle 1988. As Cox points out ( 1960, 
21-28), the Straussian reading of Locke as an esoteric Hob-
bist represents to a considerable extent a recovery and 
elaboration of a view set forth by several of Locke's con-
temporaries, especially John Edwards, Richard West, and 
Edward Stillingfleet. 
11 
one understands that Locke's is most basically a theory of 
natural rights, and as such requires no superhuman legis-
lator, nor any otherworldly sanction. It claims only hypo-
thetical obligation and finds its basis in a fixed struc-
ture of natural human passions or motivations. By virtue 
of its seriousness about the concept of nature, therefore, 
Locke's political thought carries potentially great rele-
vance to contemporary concerns. Yet there remains a diffi-
culty in conceiving of it as a viable alternative, deriving 
not from its rootedness in the realm of history or of 
faith, but from the substance of Locke's account of polit-
ically relevant nature. In accepting the fundamentals of 
Hobbesian psychology and epistemology, according to this 
view, Locke renders his thought ultimately incapable of 
resisting the radical implications of Hobbes' principles, 
namely the reduction of nature to a realm of nonteleolog-
ical necessity, leaving human beings to manifest their 
humanity not by rational conformity with the order of 
nature, but rather by rebellious, willful, ultimately 
nihilistic assertions of autonomy.19 
Of these three general approaches to the study of 
Locke's political thought, the present study is most sympa-
thetic and indebted to the third, in the most fundamental 
19This implication of the "esoteric" Locke is stated 
in a particularly forceful manner in Wallin 1984, espec-
ially 148-158. Cf. Strauss 1953, 248-251; Strauss 1959, 
170-173; Strauss 1983, 186-187; Caton 1983, 5-11; West 
1988, 3, 21-29. 
12 
respect to the seriousness of its general approach to the 
concept of nature, and therefore to its treatment of Locke 
as a genuine philosopher, not as an ideologist or a polit-
ical theologian. In taking seriously Locke's professions 
of philosophy or his conception of the aim of rational in-
quiry as knowledge of the nature of things, we implicitly 
reject the ideological conception of thought as essentially 
rooted in and bounded by its historical circumstances. In 
defense of that rejection, it suffices here for us to point 
out that that conception can and must be turned upon itself 
in a manner that renders absurd or arbitrary in principle 
any attempt at interpretation of a historical text, or for 
that matter of any kind of text or body of data. If we 
presume the ideological character of thought as such, then 
we must apply that presumption to our own thought as well, 
and acknowledge our own reading as no more than the pro-
jection of an ultimately inscrutible will, indefensible 
against any other. 20 In the present context, therefore, it 
seems safest to approach Locke with an attitude of openness 
to the possibility that Locke is in the end justified in 
his claims to insight into the nature or natural condition 
of humankind, and therefore to assess those claims on the 
basis of the evidence and argumentation that he supplies in 
their defense. We might well conclude, upon completing 
20see Strauss 1959, 26-27, 54-55; Strauss 1983, 177, 
183. 
13 
such an assessment, that Locke's thought is shaped in im-
portant or even decisive respects by historical influences 
of which he was not fully conscious. The point is that we 
should assent to such claims as conclusions, or as the most 
plausible explanations of the otherwise unaccountable pre-
sence of errors, ambiguities or omissions on Locke's part, 
not as premises that serve to foreclose serious inquiry 
into Locke's intention and the adequacy of his arguments. 21 
The difficulty involved in the reading of Locke as at 
bottom a political theologian, on the other hand, appears 
upon consideration of the widely acknowledged inadequacy of 
the arguments that he presents in defense of his ostensible 
position. 22 So glaring and even curiously emphatic are the 
incompleteness and inconsistency of these arguments that it 
21rn distinguishing my own from the ideological ap-
proach, in other words, I share the opinion of Ruth Grant: 
" ... though it is necessary to know why an author wrote what 
he did and for what audience (in order to avoid ahistorical 
errors at the very least), it is also necessary to consider 
whether what the author says makes sense. Locke himself 
argues for the necessity of making political and moral ar-
guments and for the possibility of reaching the truth about 
political principles on the basis- of argument. When an 
author makes his case in the form of an argument, it de-
serves to be considered for its cogency as an argument, and 
particularly so in this case" (1987, 10). See also Tarcov: 
"If ... we hope to learn something from Locke, then the ver-
dict of confusion ought to be only our last resort and we 
had better explore other avenues of interpretation" (1981, 
200) . 
22 For various perspectives on the difficulties in 
Locke's theological arguments, see Strauss 1953, 202-226; 
Strauss 1959; Cox 1960, 45-62; Laslett 1960, 92-96,101,106; 
Ashcraft 1969, 203-208, 214-223; Dunn 1969, 94-95,187-194, 
and 1984, 65ff, 84ff; Helm 1973; Bluhm et al 1980; Yol ton 
1985, 76-91,98. 
14 
seems most doubtful that they proceed from mere inadver-
tency. It seems most likely that the prominence of such 
arguments in the forms in which Locke presents them repre-
sents instead a rhetorical or pedagogical stratagem, that 
Locke intends them to point his more inquiring readers 
beyond at least the more dogmatic of his theological asser-
tions. We might add, however, that despite this divergence 
in approach, the focus of the present study should retain 
some interest for at least some of those persuaded by the 
more traditional reading, insofar as Locke's appeals to 
natural theology, pursued to their logical conclusion, 
require supplementation by an account of the natural order 
accessible to the understanding. 
Yet to say that we are most sympathetic and indebted 
to the reading of Locke as an esoteric Hobbesian is not 
necessarily to endorse that reading without qualification, 
but only to agree that it contains the deepest and most 
challenging critique of Locke's political thought. Accor-
ding to the seminal argument of Strauss in particular, the 
difficulties into which Locke's Hobbesian paternity leads 
him are both psychological and epistemological in charac-
ter. Locke's assent to the basic principles of Hobbesian 
psychology commits him to a conception of human nature so 
egoistic as to imply a natural disinclination on the part 
of individuals to perform the acts of civic devotion or 
sacrifice necessary to sustain any political society. This 
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apparent disproportion between human nature and the demands 
of justice at least calls into question the naturalness of 
the latter. 23 still more fundamental are the epistemolog-
ical difficulties. On the basis of Locke's denial of the 
naturalness of ideas of species or kinds, Strauss reasons 
that what Locke denominates "the law of nature" or "natural 
rights" cannot be genuinely natural at all, instead repre-
senting nothing more than a mental construct, the mind's 
imposition of order upon an external world naturally or 
natively experienced as disorder. Insofar as Lockean epis-
temology is similar to that of Hobbes, Locke too must 
choose between reducing humanity and its works to II a mere 
phantasmagoria, 1124 or separating strictly his political 
theory from his epistemology and thus rendering its basis 
unclear. For these reasons, according to Strauss, Lockean 
natural right as a variant of modern natural right culmi-
nates in a "crisis. 1125 Locke can hardly provide for us any 
23strauss 1953, 237,239,248. Cf. Goldwin: "Can the 
principle of self-preservation provide the basis for the 
development of patriotism, public spirit, and especially 
the sense of the duty to give up wealth and even life in 
defense of one's country? Locke is profound and comprehen-
sive on the reasons for founding political society, but 
those reasons turn out to be such that he is prevented by 
their very character from considering in what direction 
society should develop after the founding is secure" (1972, 
483) . 
24strauss 1953, 230,249; Strauss 1959, 178. See also 
Cox 1982, xliii; Zuckert 197 4, 562-563; Miller 1979, 173-
181; Wallin 1984, 148-158. 
25strauss 1953, 252. 
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positive assistance in resolving our contemporary confu-
sions, in this view, because Locke himself is an important 
progenitor of those confusions. 
On the basis of a thorough consideration of Locke's 
treatments of the problems raised by this formidable chal-
lenge, we attempt in the course of the following chapters 
to defend a partial but significant revision of its main 
conclusions. In this respect the present study can be 
characterized perhaps most simply as an application of 
Tarcov' s suggestion of the existence of a "non-Lockean 
Locke1126 to Locke's treatment of foundational issues. Our 
general contention is that Locke attempts to correct the 
tendency of premodern thought to contribute to political 
immoderation, while avoiding in the decisive respect a 
surrender to the principle of willfulness that he seems to 
recognize as the animating principle of pure modernity; his 
assent to the principles of philosophical modernity is in 
significant respects more qualified, more genuinely ambig-
uous, and more prudential than his most powerful critics 
26see Tarcov 1983 and also 1984, especially 209-211. 
Cf. Horwitz 1979, 153-156. The present work bears some 
similarity also to the work of Rapaczynski (1987, 113-217), 
whose reading of Locke as an essentially secular thinker 
whose conception of nature culminates in the principle of 
moral autonomy indicates his considerable agreement with 
the Straussian reading, though he rejects outright the 
imputation to Locke of a Hobbesian nihilism. I am sympa-
thetic to Rapaczynski's attempt at uncovering a more gen-
uinely moral foundation of Lockean politics, but skeptical 
of his opinion that the modern principle of moral autonomy 
or self-production can constitute such a foundation. 
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have maintained. Resisting the absorption of his thought 
into that of his more radically modern predecessors and 
successors, we find that while those critics rightly call 
attention to the difficulties involved in the arguments on 
which Locke tends to rely in establishing his principles, 
the presence of a nonexoteric, philosophically serious pre-
modern or classical strain in Locke can nonetheless supply 
the basis for a nonideological, nonprudential, rationalist 
assent to the Lockean principles of natural rights. 27 
The development of this argument proceeds within the 
following sequence of chapters. The second chapter repre-
sents an exercise in ground-clearing. Its purpose is to 
establish the meaning of Locke's doctrine of natural rights 
and the manner in which he holds certain rights to be un-
alienable, and then to establish preliminarily the primacy 
of the concept of nature in his political thought by iden-
tifying the difficulties inherent in the prominent alterna-
tive foundational arguments that he proposes or appears to 
propose in the Second Treatise of Government. The third 
and fourth chapters address the issues raised by Locke's 
account of natural science, as elaborated mainly in the 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding. The focus of the 
third is primarily epistemological, centering on the char-
2 7 For this thesis of the existence of a premodern, 
Socratic strain in Locke's thought I am indebted to the 
suggestive discussion in Pangle (1988, 265-275), although 
I will argue that this Socratic strain is more central to 
Locke's intention than Pangle seems to hold. 
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acter and implications of Locke's critique of doctrines of 
the existence of natural sorts or species and of formal and 
final causality generated by the premodern or Scholastic 
teleological science. The fourth addresses the extent to 
which Locke, in reaction against the latter view, assents 
to the more modern "corpuscularian," mechanistic or mater-
ialist view of nature as a realm of purely nonteleological 
necessity. 
Having argued in the preceding two chapters that a 
rather flexibly empirical attention to the compilation of 
"natural history" constitutes the substance of Locke's main 
approach to natural science, we turn in chapters five and 
six to consider in its specifically moral and political 
relevance the account of the natural condition of humankind 
that Locke constructs by means of this approach. In chap-
ter five we attempt to show how Locke's own somewhat atten-
uated, modernized teleology yields an account of the state 
of nature very similar to that of Hobbes. In chapter six 
we attempt to show, however, that Locke's Hobbesian account 
represents a self-consciously partial account of the nat-
ural condition, that it is best understood within the con-
text of the larger human condition of "mediocrity" or in-
betweenness, upon the recognition and respect for which the 
attainment and preservation of moderate, rational politics 
depends. We reconsider in conclusion the basis and extent 
of Locke's divergence from the premodern, especially Pla-
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tonic tradition of natural right, explaining the peculiar 
mysteriousness of the foundations of Locke's political 
thought as his deliberate response to the rhetorical diffi-
culties that he confronts in consequence of his overriding 
sensitivity to the fragility of human reason. In the end, 
the manner in which Locke diverges from the Platonic tradi-
tion may well represent a one-sided identification of and 
response to the enduring dangers to political rationality; 
yet by laying some emphasis here on the element of that 
tradition that is· preserved in Locke's thought, and there-
with on the breadth of the boundaries of that thought, we 
deny the theoretical, radical character of Locke's diver-
gence, and thus avoid unnecessarily delegitimating Locke's 
political thought as a context for attempts at addressing 
the theoretical problems of political liberalism. 
20 
CHAPTER II 
LOCKE'S DOCTRINE OF NATURAL RIGHTS: 
SOME PRELIMINARY CLARIFICATIONS 
In the "Preface" to the Two Treatises of Government, 
Locke describes somewhat ambiguously the general character 
and purpose of the work. He claims to write in order "to 
establish the Throne of our Great Restorer, Our Present 
King William; to make good his Title, in the Consent of the 
People," and "to justifie to the World, the People of Eng-
land, whose love of their Just and Natural Rights, with 
their Resolution to preserve them, saved the Nation when it 
was on the very brink of Slavery and Ruine" (TT "Preface," 
171). 1 The work is then, as many commentators have argued, 
1Throughout the text, we will cite Locke's works as 
follows. Of the Conduct of the Understandinq will be cited 
as CU, followed by paragraph number. The Correspondence of 
John Locke (Clarendon, 1976) will be cited as CJL, followed 
by letter number. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
will be cited as ECHU, followed by book, chapter, and para-
graph numbers. A Letter Concerning Toleration will be 
cited as LCT, followed by page number from the James Tully 
edition (Hackett, 1983). Questions Concerning the Law of 
Nature will be cited as LN, followed by question and page 
numbers from the edition of Robert Horwitz et al. (Cornell, 
1990). On the Reasonableness of Christianity will be cited 
as RC, followed by paragraph number. Some Thoughts Concer-
ning Education will be cited as STCE, followed by paragraph 
number. The Two Tracts on Government will be cited as 
either ETG (English tract) or LTG (Latin tract), followed 
by page number from the Philip Abrams edition (Cambridge, 
1967). The Two Treatises of Government will be cited as 
TT, followed by treatise and paragraph numbers. The re-
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an occasional work, written in order to explain and to 
defend, and probably in large part to encourage a particu-
1ar political action. 2 But Locke's description implies 
that the Two Treatises is more than a merely occasional 
work. To put it more precisely, it implies that the Two 
Treatises could not adequately serve its occasional purpose 
without also transcending that purpose: 3 William's acces-
sion is justified insofar as it rests upon popular consent, 
which in turn confers a title to govern only insofar as it 
represents the English people's entrustment to William of 
the care of their "Just and Natural Rights. " The announced 
purpose of the Two Treatises is thus not to "rationalize" 
the events of 1688, but instead to reveal the rationality 
behind the events, or to justify the events by reference to 
their conformity with rational principles. Locke implies 
that the ultimate worth of his defense of a particular set 
of actions rests upon the soundness of his appeal to natur-
spective editions of The Works of John Locke will be cited 
as works 1823, followed by volume and page numbers, or as 
works 1877, followed by volume and page numbers. All un-
derlining indicates Locke's original emphasis, unless 
otherwise noted. 
2see, e.g., Lamprecht 1918, 141; Laski 1920, 29; Aaron 
1955, 270ff; Cranston 1957, 208; Laslett 1960, 59ff; Gough 
1973, 138-144; Ashcraft 1986, 530-591. 
3Thus Aaron 1955, 270: Locke's immediate aim of jus-
tifying the Revolution "is achieved by securing in turn a 
great and fundamental political principle, true ... in 
Locke's opinion, for all well regulated communities every-
where and at all times ... " Also Seliger 1968, 32; Gough 
1973, 138. 
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al, transhistorical principles of justice, or to political 
philosophy. He implies that he cannot finally or adequate-
ly establish William's legitimacy without also establishing 
the philosophic foundation of the theory of natural rights. 
The general purpose of the present study is to take 
seriously Locke's literal claim, and therefore to proceed 
from his appeal to nature to investigate the extent to 
which he can establish a rational foundation for that ap-
peal. But a clear exposition of the theory of natural 
rights must precede any assessment of its soundness. Let 
us then begin at the most general level, with the concept 
of rights. Despite its prominence in the arguments there-
in, Locke offers no explicit definition of the concept of 
rights in the Two Treatises. It is possible, however, to 
extract from his discussion a general definition of the 
concept, subsuming a number of more particular modifica-
tions. In the most general sense, Locke employs the term 
"right" to refer to a morally justifiable claim of free 
disposal over person or goods. Thus, for instance, the 
general right of liberty in the natural, nonpolitical con-
dition refers to the liberty of "all Men ... to order their 
Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as 
they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, 
without asking leave, or depending on the Will of any other 
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Man" (II.4; also 8). 4 
Descending from this level of generality, Locke 
employs the concept of rights in various more particular 
senses. Thus rights may be wholly personal, subjective 
claims or properties, for instance, or they may impose 
relations of obligation between the bearers of rights and 
others. Understood in the former sense, a right implies no 
more than the moral permissibility of a given action; a 
person has a right to perform whatever action is not wrong 
to perform, though that right imposes no obligation on any 
other person. The clearest example of this form of right 
appears in Locke's "strange Doctrine" that individuals in a 
nonpolitical condition may rightfully punish those they 
judge to be in violation of the law of nature (II.9; also 
7,8,13,16). In such cases, the rightful character of the 
act of punishment confers no obligation upon another to 
submit to that punishment. Given the equal rights of all, 
of accusers and accused alike to judge the law of nature in 
the state of nature, there could be no obligation to submit 
to a punishment that one believed to proceed from a faulty 
judgment. 5 More characteristic of Locke's account of jus-
4see also LN I.101: "· .. right [ius] consists in the 
fact that we have a free use of something ... " Cf. Hobbes, 
Leviathan XIV: " ... RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or 
to forbeare ... 11 (ed. MacPherson 1968, 189). 
5This is not to imply that according to Locke all 
judgments in the state of nature concerning the law of 
nature are equally valid. Such an implication would make 
nonsense of Locke's doctrine of resistance, and indeed on 
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tice is a more restrictive conception of rights as engen-
dering interpersonal obligations, as containing notions of 
reciprocity and respect. In this sense he refers to rights 
"that all men may be restrained from invading" (II.7), that 
is, rights that it would be morally wrong or unjust to vio-
late. 
More significantly for present purposes, Locke also 
employs distinctions among kinds of rights according to 
their respective origins. In this regard, the crucial 
distinction is between positive or conventional rights and 
natural rights. A positive or conventional right derives 
from a declaration of the will of a human or divine author-
ity. Thus political power proper consists, for Locke, in a 
"Right of making laws ... for the Publick Good," conferred 
upon public officials by the express or tacit consent of 
the governed (II.3,119,127). 
"Natural right" for Locke is a somewhat more ambigu-
ous and difficult concept, subsuming two further modifica-
Locke's own principle would reveal the propagation of that 
doctrine to be an act of Griminal irresponsibility, in that 
Locke holds the subversion of a legitimate government (i.e. 
by a false allegation of its violation of the natural law) 
to be "the greatest Crime ... a Man is capable of" (II.230). 
The crucial point is this: Locke maintains that, though it 
is in principle possible to arrive at objective judgments 
concerning the application of the laws of nature, there is 
nonetheless an equal right among persons to render their 
own judgments. Though some may be better judges than 
others, it is nonetheless unwise, in Locke's view, to pre-
sume sufficient disinterest on the part of such persons to 
justify ascribing to them a natural right, exclusive of or 
superior to that of others, to judge the dictates of the 
natural laws. Contrast Coby 1987, 10-13. 
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tions of its own. In the most general sense, a right is 
natural in Locke's conception in that it is a property of 
persons in their natural, nonpolitical condition. Among 
natural rights thus understood, some are alienable, their 
retention being incompatible with the existence of polit-
ical society; the individual right to execute the law of 
nature in the state of nature once again provides an exam-
ple (II.128,130). Others appear to be unalienable, their 
retention being not only compatible with, but even neces-
sary to the existence of political society proper. An 
unalienable right by definition could not be rationally 
surrendered; no act of rational consent could oblige a 
human being to accept a condition in which he or she were 
denied the exercise of the right in question. To make such 
a surrender would mean to lower oneself beneath the jural 
level of humanity. An unalienable right would be natural, 
therefore, also in the more restrictive sense that its 
possession would be of the nature or essence of a human 
being. 
This sort of right, the natural and unalienable 
right, constitutes the object of the present investigation. 
Locke seems throughout the Second Treatise to imply a con-
ception of unalienable rights, and some such conception 
would seem ultimately indispensable for his stated design 
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of promoting limited, fiduciary government (II.149). 6 If 
governmental authority derives solely from the rational 
consent of the governed, and if that authority is in its 
nature limited, it would seem to follow that there must be 
some limit to the surrender or transferral of rights to 
which a rational person could agree, in the act of consti-
tuting political society. We must hasten to concede, how-
ever, that Locke never quite speaks explicitly and unambig-
uously of unalienable rights, and that this fact, to say 
nothing of others, may cause thoughtful readers to doubt 
that he ultimately holds any rights to be truly unalien-
able. 7 It is necessary then immediately to identify and to 
define the rights that constitute the core of Lockean jus-
tice, and in the process to ascertain in what sense, if at 
all, Locke conceives of those rights as unalienable. 
6Locke seems to imply a theory of unalienable rights 
at II.23,129,131,135,137,149,1?4,168,172. 
7In addressing the question of unalienable rights, I 
will concentrate on the specific difficulties that arise in 
connection with each of the rights in the Lockean triad. 
It is possible also to raise the question in more general 
terms, however, by calling attention to Locke's occasional 
usage of the term "property" to comprehend the rights of 
life, liberty, and estate, or property narrowly conceived. 
Elsewhere in the Second Treatise, he defines property in a 
somewhat elusive manner as that which "without a Man's own 
consent ... cannot be taken from him" (193), causing the 
reader to wonder whether property as such, material posses-
sions as well as personal rights, can be surrendered by an 
act of consent. What then becomes of these rights, accord-
ing to Locke, upon the formation of political society? In 
what respects can or must political society accommodate, as 
it were in its midst, a continuation of the natural condi-
tion? For various perspectives, see Kendall 1941, 65-79, 
and Kendall 1966; Cox 1960, 106-123; Glenn 1984; Coby 1987. 
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THE LOCKEAN TRIAD 
In his most famous and influential formulations, 
Locke typically refers to a triad of rights, to the rights 
of life, liberty, and estate or possessions, "which I call 
by the general Name, Property" (II.123; also 135,137), as 
cons ti tu ting the core of his theory of justice. 8 Let us 
examine these rights in the order in which he typically 
presents them. In the purely natural condition, the right 
8This triad may not constitute a complete enumeration 
of the natural rights that Lockean governments are obliged 
to preserve. At II.209, for instance, Locke mentions "per-
haps" the endangerment of "Religion" along with that of 
"Estates, Liberties, and Lives" as a legitimate cause for 
resistance. He suggests more definitely in A Letter Con-
cerning Toleration that accusations against the churches as 
nurseries of faction "would soon cease, if the Law of Tol-
eration were once so setled, that all Churches were obliged 
to lay down Toleration as the Foundation of their own Lib-
erty; and teach that Liberty of Conscience is every mans 
natural Right ... " (LCT 51; also 55, and Works 1823, 127). 
Given the extreme difficulty of identifying what remains of 
liberty in a society whose government has the authority to 
compel belief concerning salvation, this statement in the 
Letter must reflect Locke's genuine opinion of the exis-
tence of a natural right of conscience, alienable only to 
the extent required by society's legitimate civil concerns. 
His reluctance consistently to include this right among the 
more prominent natural rights presented in the Second Trea-
tise seems then to reflect an intention on his part to de-
emphasize religion or conscience as a primary motive or 
reason for the formation of political society. He seems 
to see in the assertion of an absolute right of conscience 
a threat to the preservation of civil society greater even 
than that of an absolute right of self-preservation, and 
therefore treats that right as merely one among the numer-
ous possible expressions of human agency, protected insofar 
as its exercise bears an essential relation to agency in 
general, but not necessarily fundamental in itself to the 
human pursuit of happiness. 
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of life signifies the right of self-preservation, or, some-
what more broadly expressed, the right of an individual "to 
do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself 
and others within the permission of the Law of Nature" 
(II.128). 9 Moreover, Locke proclaims in conjunction with 
this right a correlative obligation not to take the life of 
an innocent person (II.16). Upon joining political soci-
ety, one surrenders only partially the purely natural right 
or "power" of self-preservation, only "so far forth as the 
preservation of himself, and the rest of society shall re-
quire" (II.128,129; also 87). This ambiguous qualification 
may appear to preserve the status of the right of life as 
unalienable, at least insofar as it implies that even with-
in the bounds of political society, where the governmental 
executive power is not immediately present to defend mem-
bers against acts of aggression, individual members retain 
the right to judge and to defend themselves against such 
acts: 
... the Law, which was made for my Preservation, where 
it cannot interpose to secure my Life from present 
9rt is noteworthy that throughout the Second Treatise 
Locke employs both "rights" and "powers" in reference to 
self-preservation and to the punishment of criminals in the 
state of nature. (Cf. paragraphs 7,8,11 with 87-88,127-
130, 171.) This terminological ambiguity need signify no 
more, however, than that the efficacy of rights in the 
natural condition depends decisively upon the claimant's 
power, thus underlining the need for conventional means to 
provide more general security. In particular, it need not 
imply that the distinction between assertions of right and 
assertions of power in the state of nature is in principle 
meaningless. Cf. Coby 1987, 9 n.15, and passim. 
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force ... permits me my own Defence, and the Right of 
war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the ag-
gressor allows not time to appeal to our common Judge, 
nor the decision of the Law, for remedy in a Case, 
where the mischief may be irreparable (II .19; also 
176,207) . 10 
Locke's apparent conception of the right of self-
preservation as unalienable raises, however, a potentially 
serious difficulty. One is forced to question whether 
Locke can consistently maintain that this or any other 
right is unalienable, in view of his apparent insistence 
that the advent of political society effects a fundamental 
alteration of the obligations of the consenting individ-
uals. 
The great end of Mens entring into Society, being the 
enjoyment of their Properties in Peace and Safety, and 
the great instrument and means of that being the Laws 
establish'd in that Society ... the first and fundamental 
natural Law, which is to govern even the Legislative it 
self, is the Preservation of the Society. and (as far 
as will consist with the publick good) of every person 
in it. (II. 34) 
In constituting political society, individuals create 
a powerful means for their preservation; in a single act 
they exercise and fortify their right of self-preservation. 
As a necessary condition of that fortification, they oblige 
themselves to preserve the society that will preserve them. 
But the logic apparent in Locke's account of this process 
should not obscure the fact that the individual agents are 
10As Goldwin points out, this means in effect that 
states of nature and of war may commonly occur even within 
the bounds of a functioning political society (1976, 126-
128) . 
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thus effecting a radical change in their juridical condi-
tion. In the state of nature, according to Locke's most 
extreme formulation, everyone "is bound to preserve him-
self, and not to quit his Station wilfully; so by the like 
reason when his own Preservation comes not in competition, 
ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Man-
kind" (II. 6). In this formulation, what Locke commonly 
presents as a right appears as an obligation to preserve 
oneself; 11 the natural "Law of Self-Preservation" is "Fun-
damental, Sacred, and unalterable" (II.149). The law of 
nature or reason thus appears to embody commands or pre-
cepts radically divergent in their substantive practical 
implications, according to whether it applies to the state 
of nature or to the political condition, the condition "of 
all Commonwealths" (II.134). 
In considering these apparently divergent implica-
tions, one cannot avoid wondering how Locke's assertion of 
a social obligation, an obligation to preserve society even 
if it costs one's own life, can be compatible with a con-
11According to Pangle's reading, Locke implies in this 
passage an individual obligation not to risk one's life for 
the preservation of others (1988, 160). This is a possible 
reading, but not the only possible reading of the text in 
question. Locke maintains that individuals have an obliga-
tion not to quit their stations willfully, or arbitrarily, 
but he leaves unclear precisely what it would mean to sac-
rifice one's life willfully or arbitrarily. He does not 
necessarily deny that in some circumstances, the sacrifice 
of one's own life could be rational as opposed to willful, 
and therefore does not necessarily claim that to sacrifice 
one's life for the preservation of another is to · violate 
the law of nature. 
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ception of the fundamental natural rights as unalienable. 
The basic objection can be stated briefly as follows. 
Locke holds that the natural law obligation to preserve 
society encompasses a non-absolute obligation to preserve 
"every person" in society, only "as far as will consist 
with the publick good" (II.134; also 159). According to 
this qualification, those whose preservation is not con-
sistent with the public good have, at best, no absolute 
right to preservation. Now, it is evident that Locke does 
not refer here to criminals as the "persons" whose preser-
vation is inconsistent with the public good; criminals, 
according to Locke, by aggressing against others' property 
or preservation, forfeit their unalienable rights and thus 
in effect their jural status as persons. 12 He seems rather 
to refer to those innocent persons who may be called upon 
to sacrifice their lives for the preservation of the soci-
ety as a whole. Elsewhere in the same chapter, he insists 
emphatically upon the rightfully absolute power of military 
commanders over soldiers: "the Preservation of the Army, 
and in it of the whole Common-wealth, requires an absolute 
12The effect of a criminal action, according to Locke, 
is to declare oneself "to quit the principles of Human 
Nature," and therefore to justify one's treatment by others 
as a beast. The "Criminal. .. may be destroyed as a Lyon or 
a Tyger, one of those wild Savage Beasts, with whom Men can 
have no Society nor Security" (II.10,11; also 16,172,181, 
182,228). The fact that such forfeiture may in some cases 
be partial or temporary (II.24,159,178) does not alter 
Locke's conclusion that cases of extreme, incorrigible 
criminality entail an effectively total forfeiture of jural 
personhood. 
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_Qpedience to the command of every Superiour Officer, and it 
is justly Death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or 
unreasonable of them" (II .139). But would not submission 
to such a power constitute a surrender of one's right to 
judge the conditions of one's own preservation and to act 
in such manner as to secure those conditions? Does not 
Locke's insistence on the legitimacy of such absolute power 
directly contradict his assertion that the right of life is 
an unalienable right? 
One cannot reasonably deny that membership in polit-
ical society, according to Locke, confers upon individuals 
obligations that may transcend and even conflict directly 
with the principle of self-preservation narrowly under-
stood. Upon assuming full membership13 in a Lockean polit-
ical society, individuals cannot retain an absolute right 
in all cases to do whatever may be necessary for their own 
preservation. Understood in such terms, an unalienable 
right of life would indeed destroy the moral basis of 
13It appears that individuals must become full or 
"perfect" members, i.e. through rendering their express 
consent to the societal or governmental authority, in order 
to acquire the strict obligation to preserve the society. 
For according to Locke only the member in the strict sense 
"is indispensably obliged to be and remain unalterably a 
Subject" of the commonwealth. Those who render only their 
tacit consent are subjects only insofar as they find it 
"convenient to abide for some time," and would therefore 
have the option of emigrating in the event of a war 
(II.119-122). See also Grant 1987, 128-136. 
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national defense. 14 From this it need not follow, however, 
that such membership strictly requires an act of total 
alienation, or that Locke cannot consistently speak of 
unalienable rights. The following considerations can serve 
to indicate both the complexity of the issue and the extent 
to which it is capable of resolution. 
In first addressing this question, we must bear in 
mind above all Locke's constant insistence on the fiduciary 
character of political power, or on the fact that, as a 
condition of governmental legitimacy, the natural law obli-
gation to preserve society and its members II is to govern 
even the Legislative it self" (II .134; also 139,142,149, 
195,221,222). Government derives its proper authority from 
the act of alienation or transferral inherent in the con-
sent of its subjects, and therefore possesses no power that 
individuals may not rightfully exercise in the state of 
nature (II.135). One ~ignificant implication of this prin-
ciple is that government, itself in a state of nature in 
relation to other governments, has no right to wage an ag-
gressive war. An act of aggression against another govern-
ment and community would clearly constitute an assertion of 
"Power beyond Right, which no Body can have a Right to" 
(II.199). The event of an unjust war would then raise an 
1 4The charge that Locke effects precisely such a 
destruction is stated or implied by Vaughan 1925, _196ff.; 
Goldwin 1972, 483-484; Pangle 1988, 211-212. See the 
discussion in Chapter VI below, pp. 338-343. 
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interesting question concerning both Locke's doctrine of 
resistance and by implication also his conception of the 
right of self-preservation. Notwithstanding the fact that 
the aggressor government does not directly or designedly 
offend its own subjects or citizens, according to Locke's 
explanation of tyranny the act would appear at least in the 
strict sense sufficient to dissolve the legitimacy of the 
government and the obligations of the subjects. 15 
Locke does not explicitly draw this conclusion. He 
does maintain, of course, that should a government wage 
such a war unsuccessfully, it would be subject to rightful 
conquest by the offended power. But he is quick to add 
that even the authority of just conquerors is limited, if 
only in the respect that it can cover only "those, who have 
15Bearing in mind, of course, that acts of resistance 
or revolution require for Locke judgments of prudence as 
well as of abstract right, one may well doubt that Lockean 
subjects would be in many cases inclined to judge their 
governments illegitimate on the sole basis of actions taken 
against other communities. Judgments of how to respond to 
injustices perpetrated by one's own government must in any 
event be tempered by an assessment of the likelihood of 
replacing that government with another less unjust, and 
especially so in the extreme case in which actions taken to 
unsettle one's own government might serve only to facili-
tate subjection to a vengeful foreign conqueror. Thus the 
Lockean subject might commonly see the advantages of muting 
his protests, of observing his obligations to the rest of 
humankind, in other words, "only when his own Preservation 
comes not in competition" (II. 6). Perhaps implicit in 
Locke's insistence that "a long train of Abuses" is re-
quired for the dissolution of a government, or that the 
people should often bear even "Great mistakes in the ruling 
part," is a recognition that the natural executive power of 
the people includes a power to pardon certain criminal 
actions taken by their government (225; also 210). 
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actually assisted, concurr'd, or consented to that unjust 
force ... over the rest of the People, if there were any that 
consented not to the war ... he has no Power" (II . 179 , 19 6) . 
once again, Locke fails or declines to elaborate what it 
might mean for subjects or citizens to withhold consent 
from an unjust war, but it is nonetheless significant that 
he even mentions explicitly the possibility. However 
forceful his insistence on the rightfully absolute power of 
military commanders, Locke quietly calls attention to a 
significant qualification of that power, implicit in the 
unalienable right of the members of political society to 
judge the justice or injustice of a governmental act of 
war. 
Moreover, even in the case of a just or defensive 
war, where the obligation of individuals to risk and even 
to sacrifice their lives in defense of the community is not 
in itself in question, Locke's assertion of the virtually 
unbounded authority of military commanders seems implicitly 
to admit of a similar qualification. According to its own 
natural law obligation, the legislative power--and there-
fore its agent the military power--must preserve every 
individual member of the society "as far as will consist 
with the publick good," or "as much as possible" (II.134, 
16; also 159). Without imposing upon Locke an excessively 
literal reading, it is possible to infer from this that 
there are limits to the proper authority of military com-
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manders even in the context of a just war, and that such 
authority would not comprehend the gratuitous sacrifice or 
squandering of soldiers' lives. Nor, it would seem, could 
it justify a grossly partial or unequal distribution of 
those sacrifices that are truly obligatory; the justness of 
the surrender that individuals make upon entering political 
society consists in part in the fact that "the other Mem-
bers of the Society do the like" (II.130). On the basis of 
these inferences, we can conclude that al though members 
clearly have no categorical or absolute right, according to 
Locke, to avoid sacrificing their lives in defense of the 
commonwealth, they do retain the right to judge whether 
life-threatening commands are issued nonarbi trarily--that 
is, impartially and according to reasonable military neces-
sity. We can conclude more generally, therefore, that the 
unalienable right of life must signify not an absolute 
right to preserve one's life, but rather an absolute right 
to judge whether the power that may claim disposal over 
one's life is an arbitrary or a legitimate power. 16 By "a 
Law antecedent and paramount to all positive Laws of men," 
the members of political society have "reserv'd that ulti-
mate Determination to themselves ... to judge whether they 
have just cause to make their Appeal to Heaven. And this 
16Grant, 1987, 131-132. 
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Judgment they cannot part with ... " (II.168) . 17 Locke's 
insistence upon the rightfully absolute power of civil gov-
ernment represents not an affirmation, but to the contrary 
a denial that governmental power is inherently arbitrary or 
without moral limit. The foundation of Locke's doctrine of 
justice is the principle that individuals possess by nature 
certain unalienable rights: "A Man ... cannot subject him-
self to the Arbitrary Power of another" (II.135) . 18 
17 Similarly, the fact that the right to judge the 
legitimacy of governmental power rests immediately with 
"the People," and therefore with "the Majority" (168; also 
95-99), does not imply that the individual's alienation of 
rights to society or to the majority is absolute. Locke 
clearly holds that the oppression of individuals or minor-
ities activates a right of resisting, and therefore that 
majorities as well as governments are in principle capable 
of injustice. He simply doubts as a practical matter that 
such resistance could be effective, if a majority (or at 
least a substantial minority) fails to support it (168, 
208). 
18one might object that this conclusion depends upon 
an abstraction from Locke's very emphatic demand for sol-
diers' "absolute" or "bl ind Obedience" to even or espec-
ially "the most dangerous or unreasonable" command, on 
penalty of hanging "for the least Disobedience" (II.139). 
In view of the fact that such blind obedience would be sim-
ply irreconciliable with an unalienable right of judging 
questions of legitimacy--upon which Locke insists with 
equal emphasis--! am inclined to view the demand for uncon-
ditional military obedience as an instance of deliberate 
rhetorical extremism on Locke's part, intended to underline 
the absolute seriousness with which the members should re-
gard their obligation to defend the community. There can 
be no questioning, of course, that in his acute sensitivity 
both to the strength of the desire for self-preservation 
(I.86,88) and to the dangerous propensity for partiality 
that distorts individuals' judgments of their own cases 
(II.13), Locke seeks to avoid creating the impression that 
individuals are free to make minute particular calculations 
as to whether their personal sacrifices would decide the 
outcome of a given military engagement, or whether govern-
mental demands for personal sacrifice fall in an absolutely 
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The status of the right of life as unalienable may 
yet appear questionable, however, in the light of its rela-
tion to the natural right of liberty, which Locke also pre-
sents as unalienable. "The Natural Liberty of Man, 11 as 
Locke explains it, "is to be free from any Superior Power 
on Earth, and not to be under the Will or Legislative 
Authority of Man, but to have only the Law of Nature for 
his Rule" (II.22; also 4,123). The "Liberty of Man. in 
society." on the other hand, "is to be under no other Leg-
islative Power, but that established, by consent, in the 
Common-wealth ... " Such liberty consists then in the lib-
erty "to follow my own Will in all things, where the Rule 
[of a legitimately established legislative power] pre-
scribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, un-
certain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man" (II.22). 
The practical or constitutional corollary of this 
principle of liberty is Locke's constant insistence upon 
the consent of the governed as a necessary condition of 
governmental legitimacy: "And this is that, and that only, 
which did, or could give beginning to any lawful Government 
equal or random manner on all fit members of society. I 
believe that in this uncompromising assertion of military 
obligation, Locke intends not to deny the unalienable right 
to judge questions of legitimacy, but rather to guide the 
manner in which that judgment is exercised. He asserts 
quite forcefully that members must accept their obligation 
in circumstances of military necessity to risk or even sac-
rifice their lives in defense of the community, while he 
indicates more quietly (in regard to this specific issue) 
that no one need feel obliged to submit to the truly arbi-
trary, wanton, gratuitous squandering of human life. 
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in the world" (II.99). 19 Locke may seem, however, to hold 
onlY an extremely loose conception of consent, apparently 
implying that at least where the freedom to emigrate is 
guaranteed, the mere fact of one's presence, let alone res-
idence in a given territory is sufficient to constitute a 
declaration of presumptive or tacit consent to the author-
ity governing that territory. 
And to this I say, that every Man, that hath any 
Possession, or Enjoyment, of any _part of the Dominions 
of any Government, doth thereby give his tacit Consent, 
and is as far forth obliged to the Obedience to the 
Laws of that Government, during such Enjoyment, as any 
one under it; whether this his Possession be of Land, 
to him and his heirs for ever, or a Lodging only for a 
Week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the 
Highway; and in Effect, it reaches as far as the very 
being of any one within the Territories of that 
Government. (II.119) 
Whatever may be the difficulties inherent in this 
doctrine of consent, 20 they do not justify the conclusion 
that, natural rights rhetoric notwithstanding, Locke sets 
forth an ultimately conventionalist, perhaps Hobbesian 
account of the right of liberty. The crucial test of the 
unalienable character of this natural right consists in a 
consideration of whether, as a practical matter, it can be 
violated by government so as to activate a right of resis-
tance on the part of subjects; it would be superfluous or 
19Also II.15,87,95,104,106,112,117,119-122,134,171, 
175,192,198,227. 
20see especially Hume, "Of the Original Contract" (ed. 
Aiken 1948, 356-372); also Dunn 1969, 126-147; Gough 1973, 
52-79; Zvesper 1984; Grant 1987, 122-128. 
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practically meaningless to speak of a natural, unalienable 
right that can never be violated and therefore need never 
be def ended. Hobbes, of course, holds that there is no 
unalienable right of liberty, and therefore that no claim 
to liberty could ever serve as a sufficient justification 
for an act of resistance. The basis of this doctrine is 
his denial that the distinction between commonweal th by 
institution and commonwealth by acquisition carries any 
practical significance; since coercion is consistent with 
consent, all governments in the world, one way or another, 
govern with the consent of their subjects. 21 But unlike 
Hobbes, Locke strongly denies the compatibility of coercion 
with consent (especially II.176,186), and is therefore able 
to hold that there is indeed a distinct right of liberty 
whose violation can serve as a sufficient justification for 
resistance. 
One could perhaps infer this even from his account of 
tacit consent, insofar as the mere presence of an individ-
ual in a given territory could conceivably constitute a 
tacit declaration of consent only if it resulted from a 
meaningful choice. A government that denied the freedom of 
emigration could not be presumed to bear the consent of its 
subjects. Would it therefore rule arbitrarily and illegit-
imately? However that might be, the practical significance 
21Leviathan, chs. 14,19,20,21,29, 
Conclusion" (ed. MacPherson 1968, 198, 
261-270, 369-370, 718-722). 
"A Review, and 
239-240, 251-257, 
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of the right of liberty need not rest on mere inference. 
In his discussion of the nature and consequences of govern-
mental usurpation, Locke describes a pure usurpation as 11 a 
kind of Domes tick Conquest, 11 which effects II a change only 
of Persons, but not of the Forms and Rules of the Govern-
ment" (II .197). He maintains further that such an act is 
sufficient in itself to dissolve governmental legitimacy, 
irrespective of whether the government is guilty of any 
actual violence against its subjects' persons or property: 
Whoever gets into the exercise of any part of the 
Power, by other ways, than what the Laws of the 
Community have prescribed, hath no right to be obeyed, 
though the Form of the Commonwealth be still preserved; 
since he is not the Person the Laws have appointed, and 
consequently not the Person the People have consented 
to. (II.198; also 134,141,192,196,212,214-218). 
This is not to deny that subjects may elect in some 
cases not to exercise their right of resistance against a 
usurper. Rational Lockean action is seldom a matter of 
strict adherence to the theoretical doctrine of legitimacy, 
but often depends in addition on prudential judgment. Sub-
jects may very well, and usually do, choose to legitimate 
the power of a usurper, even of a conqueror, by a declara-
tion of consent (II.20,178,192,198). But what is primarily 
significant for the present discussion is that governmental 
legitimacy requires meaningful consent; that Locke provides 
at least one class of examples illustrating the failure to 
meet that requirement; and that in the event of such fail-
ure subjects are clearly within their rights to resist the 
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power of government on the ground of liberty alone. 
The implication that Locke's affirmations of an una-
lienable right of liberty are not merely rhetorical leads 
us in turn, however, to consider the relation between the 
right of liberty and the right of life, and therewith to 
confront in another form the question of the status of 
these rights as unalienable. Understood in the sense 
indicated, the right of liberty as unalienable would seem 
to be capable, at best, of an uneasy coexistence with that 
of life. To assert a right of liberty distinct from that 
of self-preservation would mean, as illustrated above, to 
assert a right to resist the power of a government held to 
be illegitimate on grounds of pure (nontyrannical) usurpa-
tion. It would thus mean to assert the right to risk one's 
life in defense of one's liberty, even in the absence of 
any clear or immediate danger to one's own preservation. 
The case of a pure usurpation would thus appear to render 
questionable the proposition that both self-preservation 
and liberty are natural and unalienable rights. Let us 
assume a case in which a usurper steadfastly refused to 
provide an opportunity for popular consent. It would seem 
that in response to such a usurpation, subjects could 
choose to defend liberty for its own sake, thereby risking 
their lives, or they could choose self-preservation, there-
by failing to assert their right to free government, to 
government by the consent of the governed. But how, in 
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such a case, could they exercise both rights simultaneous-
ly? And if they could not, could Locke maintain that both 
rights are unalienable? Do the rights of life and liberty 
constitute the bases of alternative doctrines of natural 
rights in Locke's thought, rather than elements of a single 
doctrine? 22 
It seems clear that Locke refuses to subordinate the 
right of liberty to that of self-preservation. At the same 
time, he denies that the right of liberty can be understood 
to be simply independent of the right of self-preservation. 
For I have reason to conclude, that he who would get me 
into his Power without my consent, would use me as he 
pleased, when he had got me there, and destroy me too, 
when he had a fancy to it: for no body can desire to 
have me in his Absolute Power, unless it be to compel 
me by force to that, which is against the Right of my 
Freedom, i.e. make me a Slave. To be free from such 
force is the only security of my Preservation: and 
reason bids me look on him, as an Enemy to my Preserva-
tion, who would take away that Freedom, which is the 
Fence to it ... (II.17; also 18,23). 
Locke seems thus to deny that there is an authentic tension 
between the rights of self-preservation and liberty. The 
right of liberty, according to this statement, is a corol-
lary of the right of self-preservation. In the absence of 
liberty, preservation cannot be secure. Locke insists, in 
effect, that the members of political society act according 
to the suspicious, defensive presumption that, with respect 
to their own well-being, the will of a nonconsensual ruler 
is "inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary" (II.22), and 
22cf. Grant 1987, 88-98; Pangle 1988, 262-265. 
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therefore that they regard any threat to their liberty as 
containing in itself a direct threat to their preservation. 
He thus resolves or avoids a tension between the two rights 
not by reducing the right of liberty to the status of a 
means to self-preservation, but rather by enlarging his 
conception of the latter so that it comprehends the defense 
of liberty as well as that of mere life. Self-preserva-
tion, according to Locke, evidently means preservation of 
oneself in freedom; if it referred to the preservation of 
mere, biological life, then it would be absurd to demand, 
in circumstances presenting no immediate threat to their 
biological survival, that individuals risk their lives in 
order to preserve them. Such a demand appears to Locke not 
as paradoxical or absurd, but to the contrary as a dictate 
of rationality, only in the light of his enlarged concep-
tion of self-preservation.23 
The natural right of property requires a bit more 
elaboration, inasmuch as Locke employs the term "property" 
23 rndeed Locke at one point goes so far as to suggest 
somewhat ambiguously that in extreme, desperate circumstan-
ces, it may be rational not only to risk, but actually to 
sacrifice one's life in the name of liberty. Should a 
slave find that "the hardship of his Slavery (note that 
Locke refers specifically to the hardship of slavery, of 
unfreedom, not to the merely physical hardship of labor] 
out-weigh the value of his Life, 'tis in his Power, by 
resisting the Will of his Master, to draw on himself the 
Death he desires" (II.23}. Cf. Windstrup 1981, 171-174; 
Glenn 1984; Coby 1987, 8-9. For further discussion of the 
rationality, in Lockean terms, of both the acts of aliena-
tion and the assertions of unalienable rights that Locke 
appears to insist upon, see chapter VI below, pp. 338-385. 
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to refer, even in its more narrow signification, to both 
the object and the act of appropriation. Locke speaks of a 
natural right of property as consisting in "a private Do-
minion, exclusive of the rest of Mankind" (II. 26), over a 
particular resource in the natural, prepolitical condition. 
This particularized property right derives from the act of 
mixing one's labor with any portion of nature's common, 
unappropriated resources, subject to the limitations im-
posed by the law of nature. Everyone has by nature "a 
Property in his own Person," in the "Labour of his Body, 
and the Work of his Hands" (II.27). The act of mixing that 
labor with any portion of nature's commons effects an ex-
tension of the sphere of one's personal property or domin-
ion. 
In this way, the right of property as applied to a 
particular object derives from and depends upon a more 
basic right of property as appropriation, upon a prior 
right of mixing one's labor with a portion of nature. 24 
One has a natural right thus to mix one's labor and approp-
riate, according to Locke, in that such a right is neces-
sary to one's preservation. But Locke insists that this 
appeal to self-preservation, which justifies and therefore 
circumscribes the right of appropriation, must not be un-
derstood restrictively. The law of nature does not imply 
24cf. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins and Founda-
tion of Inequality. Part Two (ed. Masters 1964, 158). 
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that appropriation is permissible only to the extent neces-
sary to preserve mere life. Rather, inasmuch as "preserva-
tion" in this context comprehends more broadly the "Support 
and Comfort" as well as the maintenance of biological life, 
the law of nature according to Locke permits and indeed 
even requires appropriation of as "much as any one can make 
use of to any advantage of life before it spoils" (II.25, 
26,31). The natural right of property "in the Beginning" 
signifies most fundamentally the right to appropriate from 
the natural commons whatever one can use without endanger-
ing the preservation of others (II.27,31,33,36,46). 
In considering the fate of the property right in the 
wake of the advent of political society, let us conceive of 
property first as ownership of a particular object. Locke 
holds that the earliest, most basic function of government 
with respect to this right is to settle claims "which La-
bour and Industry began" (II.45; 38,50), claims that pre-
date government. But it is clear that such claims of prop-
erty in particular goods cannot exemplify an unalienable 
right of property; it is clearly within the proprietors' 
rights to alienate such claims by consent, whether par-
tially to government in the payment of taxes, or wholly to 
others in private contractual exchanges (II.138,140). 25 
25Moreover, to read Locke's claim of an unalienable 
right of property as referring only to particular proper-
ties acquired in the state of nature and carried over into 
civil society would be to make nonsense of its allegedly 
universal character. For if Locke does not assume that 
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What is unalienable in the natural right of property 
must therefore inhere in its more basic form as a right of 
appropriation. Yet this right too seems to undergo serious 
modification in the transition to civil society. After the 
advent of civil society, the right of property or estate 
can no longer derive directly from the act of laboring in 
the natural commons; 26 within the bounds of an established 
community, all land is either the private property of indi-
viduals or is "the joint property of this Countrey, or this 
Parish" (II.35), and therefore can be appropriated only by 
consent, or in conformity with the positive law. This 
modification of the original right of appropriation applies 
particularly to "some parts of the World, (where the In-
crease of People and Stock, with the Use of Money) had made 
Land scarce" (II.45), or where "the Invention of Money ... 
introduced (by Consent) larger Possessions, and a Right to 
them" (II.36). For this reason Locke emphasizes that only 
in the past, "in the first Ages of the World," the "Law Man 
everyone in the state of nature succeeds in acquiring a 
significant portion of property, then such a narrow reading 
of the content of this right would serve to validate C.B. 
MacPherson's well-known objection that at least the Lockean 
property right applies not universally but instead only to 
a particular class, to the relatively few "Industrious and 
Rational" acquirers (II. 34) . See MacPherson 1962, 236-251. 
26Locke does refer to "the Ocean" as "that great and 
still remaining Common of Mankind" (II. 30) , implying that 
the original mode of appropriation is not entirely a thing 
of the past. 
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was under, was rather for appropriating" (II.35,36) . 27 The 
members of civil society, especially those of an advanced 
or fully civilized society, can in most cases appropriate 
no longer directly from nature, but instead only by means 
of contractual exchanges. The original law of appropria-
tion "would still hold" if the invention of money had not 
"introduced (by Consent) larger Possessions, and a Right to 
them" (II.36, emphasis supplied; also 45,50,85). 
This mediation of the right of appropriation by 
mutual consent or contract, by agreements whose validity, 
interpretation, and enforcement depend upon positive law, 
clearly indicates the conventional aspect of that right in 
the context of civil society. Locke appears even to stress 
this conventionalism, in declaring that "in Governments the 
Laws regulate the right of property, and the possession of 
land is determined by positive constitutions" (II.50; also 
42,45,138). It would be incorrect to infer, however, that 
the right of appropriation in civil society is wholly or 
even decisively conventional. In the original condition of 
common ownership, "Man (by being Master of himself, and 
Proprietor of his own Person, and the actions or Labour of 
it) had still in himself the great Foundation of Property" 
(II.44); and notwithstanding his usage of the past tense, 
27Also II.32,37,38,44,45,46,51. On this point, as 
well as in the following general discussion of the Lockean 
property right, I am indebted most heavily to the works of 
Strauss and Pangle. On the particular point, see Strauss 
1953, 237-238; Pangle 1988, 161-164. 
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it is evident that in Locke's view, individuals in contem-
porary civilized society still do have in themselves the 
foundation of property, indeed to a much greater extent 
than they did in the beginning. Human labor constitutes 
the great foundation of property, for Locke, not in its 
primitive expression as a gathering faculty, but rather in 
its more mature, revealing expression as the faculty that 
produces or creates material wealth. Labor "makes the far 
greatest part of the value of things, we enjoy in this 
World" (II.42), according to Locke, above all by virtue of 
its capacity, through the application of "Invention and 
Arts" (II.44), to multiply its own productive powers. Thus 
conceived as the power to produce value, human labor is the 
fundamental property that creates all more particular forms 
of property. Irrespective, therefore, of the availability 
of any natural commons--irrespective of the ultimate conse-
quence of the liberation of individuals' acquisitive facul-
ties, introducing "larger Possessions, and a Right to 
them"--everyone upon entering political society possesses 
at least this property, and at least this much is govern-
ment charged with the task of preserving. 
For the preservation of Property being the end of 
Government, and that for which Men enter into Society, 
it necessarily supposes and requires, that the People 
should have Property. without which they must be sup-
pos'd to lose that by entring into Society, which was 
the end for which they entered into it, too gross an 
absurdity for any Man to own (II.138; also 40). 
Possessing this natural property in their own labor 
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power, individuals become members of political society in 
order to secure governmental protection for the development 
and the rational disposal of that labor power. Still, it 
is necessary to consider how in this context individuals 
can convert their personal property in their labor power 
into forms of property more directly useful for their 
preservation and comfort, and to consider the nature of 
government's obligation to promote or assist this process 
of conversion. There can be no doubt that Locke views the 
contractual exchange of one's labor power for a wage as 
compatible, at least in ordinary cases, with the right of 
disposal over one's own person and labor. 28 "Their Persons 
are free by a Native Right, and their Properties, be they 
more or less, are their own. and at their own dispose ... 11 
(II.194; also 2,28,29,77,85). But the question arises 
whether or to what extent this right of self-disposal is 
subject to rational limitation. In his account of human-
kind's original alteration of the natural condition of com-
mon (purely potential) ownership, Locke appears to imply an 
ordinary conjunction of the productive powers· of labor, 
such as they were, and its acquisitive powers. In the 
"first Ages," in other words, when laboring consisted 
predominantly or exclusively in gathering, one ordinarily 
produced and acquired in a single act. But in the context 
28see the effective refutation of Tully's argument to 
the contrary (1980, 135-154) by Neal Wood (1984, 73-92). 
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of civil society, this appears at least in many cases no 
1onger to hold true. The "Servant" or wage-laborer, or 
indeed anyone who is not self-employed, who is able to ap-
ply labor power only to materials owned by another, ac-
quires not immediately in the act of producing, but instead 
only mediately, with the level of acquisition in such cases 
determined by the contractually established level of rent 
or wages (II.194). 
The question then arises concerning the degree to 
which Lockean justice permits persons with property only in 
their own labor power to alienate their native "Title to 
the product of [their] honest Industry." In his brief 
discussion in the First Treatise of the right and duty of 
charity, Locke recognizes that economic inequalities may 
give rise to relationships no less coercive in their effect 
than those based on inequalities in more direct forms of 
power. 
As Justice gives every Man a Title to the product of 
his honest Industry, and the fair Acquisitions of his 
Ancestors descended to him; so Charity gives every Man 
a Title to so much out of another's Plenty, as will 
keep him from extream want, where he has no means to 
subsist otherwise; and a Man can no more justly make 
use of another's necessity, to force him to become his 
Vassal, by with-holding that Relief, God requires him 
to afford to the wants of his brother, than he that has 
more strength can seize upon a weaker, master him to 
his Obedience, and with a Dagger at his Throat offer 
him Death or Slavery. (TT I.42) 
Locke's condemnation of the practice of thus taking advan-
tage of the necessitous seems unmistakable, as does by 
implication also his denial that such manipulation could 
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create any obligation on the part of its object. All the 
more mysterious, then, is the immediate sequel, wherein he 
appears to minimize considerably the implication of the 
preceding paragraph. He intended in the latter, he seems 
to declare now, only to argue that the practice of such 
manipulation by the wealthy 
would not prove that Propriety in Land ... gave any 
Authority over the Persons of Men, but only that 
Compact might; since the Authority of the Rich 
Proprietor, and the Subjection of the Needy Beggar 
began not from the Possession of the Lord, but the 
Consent of the poor Man, who preferr'd being his 
Subject to starving. (I.43; emphasis added.) 
It is necessary to observe that Locke does not thus 
imply a judgment of the legitimacy of such subjection, but 
only that, if it were legitimate, that legitimacy would 
derive from compact or consent, not from the prior inequal-
ity of ownership. Nonetheless, this equivocation concern-
ing what is, in any event, a severely limited duty of char-
ity29 compels us to question whether Locke holds all such 
contracts valid and thus mutually obligatory, regardless of 
the real inequalities that may underlie them. It compels 
us to question, the ref ore, whether the natural right of 
property according to Locke reappears in the context of 
civil society as nothing more than an absolute right of 
individual freedom of contract, or even, as MacPherson 
29strauss 1953, 236-237, 246-248; Tarcov 1984, 141-
149; Pangle 1988, 143-144, 161-162, 169. For contrary 
views, see Dunn 1969, 204-228; Tully 1980, 131-154. 
Seliger (1968, 173-179) seems to occupy a middle ground. 
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charges, as an ultimately absurd unalienable right to 
alienate one's freedom. 30 
In exploring the basis of this charge, one can hardly 
deny that after a certain point in the evolution of civil 
society, according to the account in the Second Treatise, 
the natural law command to leave enough and as good in 
common for others is in its strict sense superseded by the 
advent of conditions making it rational to appropriate 
beyond what is of direct use for oneself and one's family. 
This does not mean, however, that Locke attempts to justify 
unlimited individual appropriation without regard for its 
social consequences. The spirit of the old sufficiency 
limitation persists, of necessity, in the context of Lock-
ean civil society. It is plain in Locke's view "that Men 
have agreed to disproportionate and unequal Possession of 
the Earth" (II.50; also 36). Such agreement or consent is 
by definition a rational act; it would make no sense to 
claim that an irrational creature could make a binding 
agreement, or that a rational creature could incur an obli-
gation by an irrational agreement. "(No] rational Creature 
can be supposed to change his condition with an intention 
to be worse" (II.131). The agreement among human beings or 
among "the Civiliz'd part of Mankind" (II.30) to drop the 
strict sufficiency limitation and accept the consequent 
widening of material inequality could not be a valid agree-
30MacPherson 1962, 246. 
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ment unless it held forth a reasonable promise of improved 
conditions for all. Locke holds that the reasonableness of 
this promise is already evident in a comparison between 
conditions in his own country, in which land is for the 
most part privately (and unequally) owned, and those in 
America, whose resources remain in general unimproved: "a 
King of a large fruitful Territory there feeds, lodges, and 
is clad worse than a day Labourer in England" (II.41). The 
implication is that according to Locke, no government or 
political-economic regime can c·laim legitimacy that pro-
motes or permits the systematic impoverishment of its mem-
bers. 
It is in keeping with this principle that Locke 
stresses the importance, but also the limitations, of the 
principle of freedom of contract as constitutive of the 
property right of individuals in civil society. The ameli-
oration of the natural condition of material scarcity or 
penury depends upon the rational application of the poten-
tially immense productive powers of human labor (II.32,40-
44). But the natural condition offers at best incomplete 
incentives for individuals to develop significantly the 
productive powers inherent in their own labor. Therefore 
"the increase of lands and the right employing of them is 
the great art of government;" Locke declares it proper to 
the rational, or indeed "wise and godlike" prince "by es-
tablished laws of liberty to secure protection and incour-
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agement to the honest industry of Mankind against the op-
pression of power and narrownesse of Party" (II.42). More 
specifically, given that human beings are unequal in their 
capacities and inclinations to labor productively, it is 
the task of a Lockean government to protect and encourage 
the activity of the productive, or "Industrious and Ration-
al" portion of humanity (II.34), and by implication to pro-
mote the enlargement of that class. To be sure, the ful-
fillment of this task as Locke understands it will require 
on the part of government a considerable respect for the 
principle of freedom of contract, insofar as that principle 
facilitates the mobility and the rational employment of 
labor and capital according to the laws of the market. It 
will require the protection of profits gained through the 
productive investment of fairly acquired capital, but it 
will require no less urgently the countervailing protection 
of the individual laborer's "Title to the product of his 
honest Industry" (I.42). It will require that the contract 
between laborer and employer preserve, not sunder the con-
nection between the laborer's productive and acquisitive 
powers. The "spirit of capitalism" does indeed find an 
early expression in the Two Treatises, 31 provided that it 
be understood as the spirit of a rationally regulated cap-
italism. The power of government, as Locke repeatedly in-
31strauss 1953, 246. Cf. also MacPherson 1962, 194-
262 with Seliger 1968, 141-208. 
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sists, is to be employed for "the Regulating and Preserving 
of Property" (II.3, emphasis added; also 120,139). 32 
From all this it is evident that Locke's account of 
justice in political society neither requires nor permits 
the total alienation of one's natural right of property or 
appropriation, whether by the fundamental social contract 
or by particular agreements among the members. Whatever 
the ambiguity of his discussion, Locke does in the final 
analysis indicate sufficiently his insistence upon tran-
scending the bare principle of individual freedom of con-
tract in order to effect a more meaningful guarantee of the 
right of property or appropriation for all members of civil 
society. The right of nature persists within civil society 
as the right to develop one's capacity for "honest indus-
try," one's productive-acquisitive faculty, 33 and therefore 
to judge the legitimacy of government according, among 
other criteria, to its performance in protecting the devel-
opment of this faculty against its coercion, mutilation or 
exploitation by others. 
32see I.41, where Locke rejects absolute monarchy as 
imcompatible with the "the great Design of God, Increase 
and Multiply ... " It would be unreasonable, in view of this 
design, to make humankind "depend upon the Will of a Man 
for their Subsistence, who should have power to destroy 
them all when he pleased ... " It would seem that conformity 
with the same design would require Locke to condemn as well 
such relationships of absolute dependence and willfulness 
when they involved not rulers and subjects, but instead 
private owners and laborers in civil society. 
3 3The term is Strauss'(1953, 246). 
57 
Seen in this light, the prominence that Locke accords 
the conventional aspect of property rights in civil society 
appears intended to underline the need for caution on the 
part of subjects who may appeal to such rights in judging 
the dissolution of governmental authority. 34 He considers 
it prudent to counsel such caution in view of the consider-
ation that, although government is indeed obliged to pro-
mote material improvement through the protection and en-
couragement of honest industry, the principles that govern 
its attempts at fulfilling that obligation tend to be pru-
dential and variable in nature, belonging to the "art of 
governing men" rather than to the more theoretical doc-
trine of governmental legitimacy. 35 Locke seems to advise 
subjects to suffer quietly a certain degree of innocent 
34 rf so, Locke's treatment of this issue could be seen 
as part of a more general attempt at stressing the limited 
potential of the doctrine of unalienable individual rights 
for unraveling the social fabric. Cf. note 20 above, and 
also his disclaimer concerning the power of the doctrine in 
cases of "manifest" but isolated "Acts of Tyranny," II.208: 
"For if it reach no farther than some private Mens Cases, 
though they have a right to defend themselves, and to re-
cover by force, what by unlawful force is taken from them; 
yet the Right to do so, will not easily ingage them in a 
Contest, where they are sure to perish; it being as imposs-
ible for one or a few oppressed Men to disturb the Govern-
ment, where the Body of the People do not think themselves 
concerned in it, as for a raving mad Man, or heady Male-
content to overturn a well-settled State ... " 
3511 Politics contains two parts very different the one 
from the other, the one containing the original of socie-
ties and the rise and extent of political power, the other, 
the art of governing men in society" ( "Some Thoughts Con-
cerning Reading and study For a Gentleman," in Axtell, ed., 
1968, 400). See Tarcov 1984, 5-7. 
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governmental bungling in economic matters, and to take as a 
violation of trust only a willful, deliberate, systematic 
assault on their capacities or opportunities honestly to 
improve their material conditions. The ultimate, noncon-
ventional, if necessarily somewhat imprecise standard for 
Lockean subjects to judge the question of legitimacy lies 
in whether government acts "to destroy, enslave, or design-
edly to impoverish the Subjects" (II.135). 
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THE QUESTION OF FOUNDATIONS 
Having thus defined the core triad of rights that 
substantiate Locke's doctrine of justice, we can now begin 
to address questions more directly pertinent to our inqui-
ry, questions concerning the basis of the doctrine. How 
can Locke justify his claim that justice consists in the 
securing of life, liberty, and property, insofar as is 
possible, for all? By what virtue or by what dispensation 
do human beings merit the protection of these rights? Why, 
according to Locke, do we merit the protection of these 
rights and not others? How are we capable of knowing the 
answers to these questions? To this partial enumeration 
one could add many other questions of at least equal diffi-
culty. It is best to beg in, however, by considering the 
various suggestions that Locke makes concerning the basis 
of his doctrine, immediately upon introducing it in the 
Second Treatise. 
The first such suggestion appears to constitute less 
an argument, in the strict sense of the term, than a pre-
emptive proposition that no genuine argument is necessary 
for the establishment of the natural rights doctrine. 
Locke begins by presenting the principles of political 
justice or legitimacy as corollaries of his understanding 
of the natural condition of humankind: "To understand 
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political Power right, and derive it from its Original, we 
must consider what state all Men are naturally • II in ... 
(II.4). More precisely, he presents those principles as 
corollaries of the fundamental principle of natural human 
freedom and equality: 11 ••• Reason ... teaches al 1 Mankind, 
who will but consult it, that all being equal and indepen-
dent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, 
Liberty, or Possessions" (II.6). Concerning the basis of 
this principle of natural freedom and equality itself, he 
offers the following: 
there being nothing more evident, than that Creatures 
of the same species and rank promiscuously born to all 
the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same 
faculties, should also be equal one amongst another 
without Subordination or Subjection ... (II.4) 
What is initially noteworthy in this brief, ambiguous 
remark is that in using the phrase "nothing more evident," 
Locke may appear to rest the principle of equal natural 
rights on a self-evident proposition, a proposition known 
intuitively to be true. That he intends at least to pre-
sent this appearance is more strongly evident in the imme-
diate sequel, wherein he offers rhetorical support for his 
claim by appealing to the authority of "the Judicious 
Hooker," who according to Locke regards the principle of 
natural human equality "as so evident in itself, and beyond 
all question ... 11 (II. 5). 36 
36see also II.11, where Locke appears to go beyond the 
principle of intuition or self-evidence to imply that know-
ledge of at least one of the precepts of natural right is 
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The suggestion, however, that Locke's doctrine of 
natural rights is or could be grounded in a self-evident 
principle of natural equality, or for that matter in any 
self-evident moral principle, involves several insuperable 
difficulties. The first appears in the fact that, through-
out the Essay Concerning Human Understanding and especially 
in its first book, Locke launches a thorough and systematic 
attack on a very closely related argument. In the wake of 
this attack, it is very difficult to see how the case for 
natural rights could be sustained on the basis of an appeal 
to a moral intuition, and similarly difficult to believe 
that Locke could intend such an appeal as the basis of his 
most serious argument; he nowhere offers a defense of the 
principle of moral intuitionism against the arguments with 
which he himself assails it. 
The outlines of the relevant portions of this attack 
are as follows. The Essay's chapter entitled "Of the De-
grees of Our Knowledge" contains an explanation of the con-
cept of self-evidence or intuition. Intuitive knowledge, in 
Locke's understanding, carries the highest degree of cer-
tainty of which the mind is capable. It is "irresistible;" 
or was innate in human beings; as the story of Cain and 
Abel illustrates, in Locke's reading,-the proposition that 
there is a natural right to punish or even to destroy crim-
inals was written, at least at that time, "so plain ... in 
the Hearts of all Mankind." On innatism as the basis of 
knowledge of Lockean natural right, see Laslett 1960, 94-
95. On self-evidence as the basis, see Yolton 1958, 479-
482,487-489; White 1978, 10-59. For an argument similar to 
the one presented here, see Zuckert 1987, 329-334. 
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it "forces itself immediately to be perceived ... and leaves 
no room for Hesitation, Doubt, or Examination" (ECHU 
4.2.1). Intuitions are simply and immediately compelling. 
Insofar as we are rational, we assent to them upon recogni-
tion, as soon as we grasp the meanings of the relevant 
terms. They neither require nor allow any ratiocinative 
defense or justification; a claim of intuition is in effect 
a claim that a given proposition is beyond argumentation, 
that one must simply recognize it and assent to it. There-
fore, to assert that a self-evident proposition constitutes 
the foundation of morality or justice would be to assert 
that the foundation of morality or justice is unquestiona-
ble. 
Locke argues that assertions of this kind are above 
all false; useless if not false; and in any event danger-
ous. They are false in that it is hardly absurd, but to 
the contrary perfectly possible and sensible to inquire 
concerning the reasoning underlying any moral proposition: 
"I think, there cannot any one moral Rule be propos'd, 
whereof a Man may not justly demand a Reason: which would 
be perfectly ridiculous and absurd, if they were innate, or 
so much as self-evident" (ECHU 1.3.4; emphasis partly sup-
plied). From those who would yet maintain a doctrine of 
unquestionable moral principles, Locke demands a clear 
specification of the criteria whereby we could identify a 
given proposition as properly intuitive or self-evident. 
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rn view of the absence of precisely such criteria, he 
raises an objection fatal to the practical utility of the 
doctrine of innate principles, and by implication no less 
fatal to that of the doctrine of self-evident moral truths: 
.•. if it be the privilege of innate Principles, to be 
received upon their own Authority, without examination, 
I know not what may not be believed, or how any one's 
Principles can be questioned. If they may, and ought 
to be examined, and tried, I desire to know how first 
and innate Principles can be tried; or at least it is 
reasonable to demand the marks and characters, whereby 
the genuine, innate Principles, may be distinguished 
from others; that so, amidst the great variety of Pre-
tenders, I may be kept from mistakes, in so material a 
point as this ... From what has been said, I think it is 
past doubt, that there are no practical Principles 
wherein all Men agree; and therefore none innate. 
(1.3.27; also 1.3.14,20,26,27) 
The absence of validating criteria points, moreover, 
to the peculiar dangerousness of assertions of unquestion-
able moral principles, lying in their peculiar susceptibil-
ity to authoritarian abuse. Locke is acutely sensitive in 
this respect to the potential implications of both intui-
tionism and innatism, as applied to morality: "Nothing can 
be so dangerous, as Principles thus taken up without ques-
tioning or examination; especially if they be such as con-
cern Morality, which influence Men's Lives, and give a 
biass to all their Actions" (ECHU 4.12.4). 37 rt is of the 
greatest practical importance that moral principles be 
rationally defensible; to accord any moral principles a 
privileged exemption from the requirement of rational sup-
37on the authoritarian implications of the principle 
of self-evidence or intuition, see White 1978, 14-20. 
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port would be to invite the degeneration of moral discourse 
into sheer arbitrariness, into a mere contest of opposing 
wills. Underlining the practical urgency of this danger, 
according to Locke, is the fact that "great numbers are 
ready at any time to seal with their Blood" the principles 
they most cherish (ECHU 1. 3. 27, also 26): a state of 
theoretical or intellectual war tends to culminate in a 
state of actual war, of war in the most literal sense. 
Moreover, the difficulties inherent in Locke's ini-
tial suggestion extend beyond those general difficulties 
that beset any claim to intuitive knowledge of moral prin-
ciples. An additional problem concerns his specific, if 
still somewhat ambiguous assertion of the principle of 
natural moral equality. In his initial formulations con-
cerning the ground of his doctrine of political legitimacy, 
Locke leaves it unclear whether he means that there is 
nothing more evident than the fundamental fact of human 
species equality, or instead that there is nothing more 
evident than that the principle of natural moral equality 
is an implication of that fundamental fact, however the 
latter be established. 38 Whatever his intention on that 
point, it is evident that the power of intuition alone is 
38cf. II.4, where Locke appears to hold that there be 
"nothing more evident" than the inference of natural moral 
equality from the given, more basic fact of species equal-
ity, with II.5, where Locke attributes to Hooker the more 
ambiguous opinion that "This equality of Men by Nature" is 
"so evident in it self, and beyond all question ... " 
65 
insufficient to establish the truth of either proposition. 
If we take for granted that there is such a thing as the 
human species, then we are indeed committed to assent to 
some conception of human equality, as contained already in 
the definition of what is human. But why should we take 
this for granted? In response to the proposition that 
human species equality is a self-evident truth, one might 
reasonably ask: Equal in what respects? By what criteria, 
by reference to what common properties or faculties, are we 
to define what is human? Moreover, even if we were in 
possession of an adequate definition of the species, the 
proposition of natural human moral equality might not nec-
essarily or self-evidently39 follow. We would be required 
to ask further: Of what moral significance are those com-
mon, defining properties or faculties? How are we to de-
cide whether human beings constitute a single species, in 
the morally most decisive respects? 
Surely no intuition, but instead only the most care-
ful, exhaustive empirical investigation can provide for us 
the answers to such questions. Locke's own somewhat cryp-
39Locke applies the notion of intuition to all propo-
sitions whose truth or falsity is immediately perceptible; 
thus it can apply not only to the first principles of 
reasoned arguments, but also to any proposition appearing 
anywhere in the course of a given argument, so long as it 
follows immediately from its previously established prem-
ises. "Now, in every step Reason makes in demonstrative 
Knowledge. there is an intuitive Knowledge of that Agree-
ment or Disagreement, it seeks, with the next intermediate 
Idea, which it uses as a Proof" (ECHU 4.2.7). 
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tic reference to "Creatures of the same species and rank 
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, 
and the use of the same faculties" (II.4) appears to con-
firm this conclusion. Knowledge of those "advantages" and 
"faculties" simply does not arise intuitively, but must be 
acquired through empirical investigation. In order to know 
the law of nature, one must consult "Reason," or become "a 
studier of that Law" (II. 6, 12) . 40 In this way, a careful 
consideration of Locke's initial suggestion of intuition or 
self-evidence as the mode of knowledge proper to the prin-
ciples of justice leads to the conclusion that the justi-
fication of those principles requires an argument of an 
altogether different order. 
Almost immediately after making that initial sugges-
tion, Locke does indeed offer an additional and radically 
different suggestion, although in this case too he seems 
initially to abstract from and yet ultimately to imply the 
need for an empirically grounded account of human nature. 
He indicates the main thrust of this alternative founda-
tional argument as follows: 
For Men being all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent, 
and infinitely Wise Maker; All the Servants of one 
Sovereign Master, sent into the World by his order 
and about his business, they are his Property, whose 
Workmanship they are, made to last during his, not 
one another's Pleasure. (II.6) 
According to this argument, the status of human beings as 
40strauss 1953, 225; Colman 1983, 178. 
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God's workmanship and therefore God's property imposes on 
each a set of obligations that can be summarized as the 
corollaries of the basic duty to preserve oneself and, 
subject to certain qualifications, to preserve the rest of 
humankind as well (II.6). Natural rights must then derive 
from human beings' obligations as God's creatures; we can 
surrender our natural rights only to the extent that we 
thereby enhance the preservation of ourselves or of society 
or of the rest of humankind, because our lives and persons 
are not our own property, but are only entrusted to us by 
God. 
This "workmanship thesis" rests apparently upon a 
considerable body of textual evidence, 41 and in the opinion 
of several scholarly commentators expresses Locke's deep-
est, authentic intention with respect to the foundation of 
morality and justice. 42 Neither in the Second Treatise nor 
in any other work, however, does Locke present a system-
atic, detailed elaboration of the claim that the principles 
of justice derive from the status of human beings as God's 
workmanship. Instead he forces his readers to construct or 
to reconstruct the relevant arguments, insofar as it is 
possible, out of the partial or fragmentary suggestions 
41see I.30,53,86; II.6,56,79; ECHU 4.3.18, 4.13.3. 
42The most elaborate statement of this argument ap-
pears in Tully 1980, especially 3-4, 34-51. See also Las-
lett 1960, 106; Colman 1983, 187-190; Shapiro 1986, 96-108; 
Ashcraft 1987, 35-47. 
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that he scatters throughout his works. The following are 
the basic issues involved in that claim. If Locke would 
prove that divine workmanship or creation is the basis of 
natural rights, then he must demonstrate not only that God 
exists, but also that God has created and legislated for 
humanity, and that the securing of natural and unalienable 
rights constitutes the fulfillment of God's legislative 
design. 43 Locke must demonstrate the manner and the sub-
stance, at least with respect to the question of justice, 
of God's revelation of His intentions for human beings. 
In his various discussions of the matter, Locke con-
siders two possible modes of divine revelation. God could 
reveal His intentions either directly, by a positive, imme-
diate declaration of His will to a particular person or 
persons at a particular historical moment, or indirectly, 
through an order or logic inherent in His creation and in 
principle apprehensible by rational persons at all times 
and places. 44 On the basis of a somewhat selective, imper-
fectly literal reading of the Lockean corpus, one could 
receive the impression that Locke holds God's intentions to 
43 see the description of the law of 
I.101, V.159, VIII.211. Cf. Strauss 1953, 
Strauss 1959. 
nature at LN 
202-204; also 
44 For Locke's discussion of positive revelation, see 
especially ECHU 4.18, where he uses the term "revelation" 
to refer exclusively to acts of particular, immediate, 
historical revelation. Elsewhere, however, Locke makes no 
strict separation between revelation and natural know-
ledge; see, for instances, ECHU 4.19.4, and cu 23. 
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be adequately revealed or rationally accessible through 
either of these possible modes of communication. With 
regard to the first, for instance, Locke occasionally pro-
claims the truth or the authenticity of Christianity as the 
positive revelation of God's will, 45 and proclaims similar-
ly that the New Testament contains or provides the ground 
for the true morality. 46 With regard to the second, Locke 
proclaims in his earlier as well as his later works that 
God's intentions are indeed accessible to the mind unas-
sisted by any positive revelation, whether through an order 
manifest in his creation47 , or more simply as implicit in 
the related facts of the existence of an intelligent God, 
and human dependence on that God. 
As several commentators have observed 48 I however, 
Locke fails to provide demonstrative support for either of 
these claims, despite his own insistence on the need for 
such support. With respect to the former, for instance, he 
insists that revelation be subjected to the test of reason, 
45ECHU 3.9.23; RC 237,239,240; Works 4.96, 6.144-45, 
356,424. 
46works 1823, 3.296; STCE 185; RC 239-245. 
47cf. LN I.95-97: "there is nothing in all this world 
so unstable, so uncertain that it does not recognize au-
thoritative and fixed laws which are suited to its own na-
ture." Also RC 143; ECHU 1.2.25, 2.1.15, 2.7.4, 2.10.3. 
48cf. Strauss 1953, 202-226; Strauss 1959; Cox 1960, 
45-62; Laslett 1960, 92-96,101,106; Ashcraft 1969, 203-208, 
214-223; Dunn 1969, 94-95,187-194, and 1984, 65ff,84ff; 
Helm 1973; Bluhm et al 1980; Yolton 1985, 76-91,98. 
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that it is both possible and necessary to distinguish 
authentic from inauthentic claims to revelation: "Whatever 
GOD hath revealed, is certainly true; no Doubt can be made 
of it. This is the proper Object of Faith: But whether it 
be a divine Revelation or no, Reason must judge ... " (ECHU 
4.18.10; also 4.16.14, 4.18.6, 4.19.3,10,14; von Leyden 
1954, 275-277). · How then can reason make this judgment? 
Locke observes that "the holy Men of old, who had Revela-
tions from GOD, had something else besides that internal 
Light of assurance in their own Minds, to testify to them, 
that it was from GOD." This "something else" consisted in 
the "outward Signs," the "visible Signs" or miracles that 
they were given in order to persuade themselves and others 
of the authenticity of God's message (4.19.15; also Works 
1823, 7.135,138). How then can reason identify the truly 
miraculous, or distinguish authentic miracles from other 
forms of "extraordinary Signs" (4.19.16)?49 
At this point Locke becomes quite elusive. He breaks 
off his discussion of the relation between reason and faith 
without even confronting directly the question concerning 
the authentication of miracles, excusing himself only with 
the strikingly unhelpful addendum that he is 
49A complete discussion of the issue of miracles would 
address also a prior question, namely, whether or how one 
could establish confidence in the actual occurrence of an 
extraordinary event, let alone in its miraculous character. 
For Locke's somewhat ambiguous statements on this question, 
see ECHU 4.15.6,4.16.9,10,13,14. 
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far from denying, that GOD can, or doth sometimes 
enlighten Mens Minds in the apprehending of certain 
Truths, or excite them to Good Actions by the immediate 
influence and assistance of the Holy Spirit, without 
any extraordinary Signs accompanying it. But in such 
Cases too we have Reason and the Scripture, unerring 
Rules to know whether it be from GOD or no ... Where 
Reason or Scripture is express for any Opinion or 
Action, we may receive it as of divine Authority ... 
(4.19.16) 
In other words, Locke concludes the Essay's discussion of 
reason and faith by claiming either that we should simply 
assume the divine authority of Scripture, that is, assume 
the truth of the proposition whereof he has encouraged us 
to demand a reasoned demonstration, or that we should 
recognize the divine authority of any proposition for which 
reason is "express," although he provides for us no satis-
factory explanation of how reason can authenticate the 
specific claim of Scriptural revelation. 50 
50rn "A Discourse of Miracles" (1702), Locke offers a 
loose or permissive definition of a miracle as "a sensible 
operation, which, being above the comprehension of the 
spectator, and in his opinion contrary to the established 
course of nature, is taken by him to be divine" (ed. Ramsey 
1958, 79). He justifies the permissiveness of this defini-
tion at least in part on utilitarian grounds: a more 
strict definition of miracles as "operations contrary to 
the fixed and established laws of Nature," or, stricter 
yet, as "such divine operations as are in themselves beyond 
the power of all created beings," would mean that "the use 
of them would be lost, if not to all mankind, yet at least 
to the simple and illiterate (which is the far greatest 
part) ... " Since "the philosophers alone, if at least they 
can pretend to determine" the (physical) laws of nature, 
and no one can determine the extent of the power of the 
beings created above humankind but beneath the level of 
God, Locke doubts "whether any man learned or unlearned, 
can in most cases be able to say of any particular opera-
tion ... that it is certainly a miracle" (86). Against the 
related objections that the more permissive definition 
relativizes miracles and therefore invalidates them as 
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Let us turn then to consider the basis of Locke's 
alternative claim that divine revelation is accessible in 
principle to all rational creatures through an order or 
logic inherent in God's creation. At times Locke suggests 
in this vein the possibility of an apparently simple, al-
most entirely nonempirical deduction, holding that the bare 
fact of creation by an intelligent God can suffice as the 
basis of a demonstration of God's intentions (ECHU 4.3.18, 
4.13.3). We can construct or reconstruct the outlines of 
this argument as follows. Human beings possess an intui-
tive awareness of our own existence and intelligence; human 
existence is not eternal, but had a beginning; if it is 
impossible that intelligent could evolve from unintelli-
gent being, then it follows ultimately that human beings 
testimony of divine revelation, he contends that "the 
carrying with it of a greater power than appears in opposi-
tion to it" can serve as "a sufficient inducement" to iden-
tify "any extraordinary operation" as a miracle (82). In 
cases in which miracles are alleged to attest opposing or 
contradictory "missions," in other words, the truth lies 
with the manifestation of the greater supernatural power. 
But this response itself raises a number of difficult ques-
tions. How are we to judge cases in which there is no 
direct opposition, or none at all, between "extraordinary 
operations"? In cases wherein there is such opposition, is 
the mere fact of superior power sufficient to establish 
divinity, or is a certain minimum degree of power required? 
How does one judge precisely the degrees of power exhibit-
ed? Would not such judgment itself presuppose knowledge of 
the power of nature's resistance to supernatural forces, 
and thus presuppose knowledge of the laws of nature? Locke 
directly addresses none of these questions, commenting only 
that "perhaps" the authentication of miracles by their 
apparent superior power, "as it is the plainest, so it is 
also the surest way to preserve the testimony of miracles 
in its due force to all sorts and degrees of people" {86). 
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must be the creatures of an eternal being of superior power 
and intelligence, which we may call "God" (4.10.2-7); be-
cause human beings are created by and dependent upon God, 
human beings are God's property, subject to his dominion 
and obliged to obey His commands (I.52-54; II.56); an in-
telligent God could only have created intelligently, pur-
posively; therefore human beings are obliged to preserve 
themselves and their species, or not willfully to destroy 
themselves or others (II.6). The fundamental natural law 
and right of preservation would thus derive from the fact 
of God's creation. 
Once again, however, one might question the complete-
ness of this reasoning. From the bare premise of God's 
purposive creation, how much can we really infer concerning 
the substance of God's purposes or commands? In elaborat-
ing the obligation of self-preservation, Locke indicates 
that each is bound "not to quit his Station wilfully" (TT 
II.6); but how does the principle of workmanship alone aid 
us in determining what constitutes willfulness or arbitrar-
iness in the eyes of God? Locke's own reasoning concerning 
the case of animals calls attention to the question. God 
is no less Creator of the "inferior creatures" than of 
human beings. But Locke maintains unambiguously that human 
beings may rightfully destroy any inferior creature "where 
some nobler use, than its bare Preservation calls for it" 
(II.6; also I.85-87). Is it then inconceivable that a su-
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premely intelligent and wise Creator could intend for human 
beings as well some "nobler use" than their bare preserva-
tion? The argument from the fact of purposive creation ap-
pears thus incomplete, in leaving unclear the full content 
of God's intentions or commands for human beings, or the 
specific end in view of which natural rights are to be pro-
tected. 
It is perhaps in view of this incompleteness that 
Locke immediately supplements or elaborates the workmanship 
argument by calling attention again to the basis of natural 
jural equality; human beings are by nature equal in rights, 
Locke now states, by virtue of the unity and dignity of the 
species, "being furnished with like Faculties," and "shar-
ing all in one Community of Nature" (II.6). He thus again 
prompts the reader to ask: What specifically are these 
"like Faculties," these "same advantages of Nature?" Why 
does the sharing in them constitute human beings, in the 
juridically decisive respect, "Creatures of the same spe-
cies and rank" (II. 4)? How are God's intentions or com-
mands for human beings revealed in the order of creation, 
in the nature and natural condition that God provides us? 
Having reached these questions, we have travelled a 
full circle, in a sense, in order to come to a preliminary 
conclusion. The initially divergent paths onto which Locke 
guides his readers in the search for the basis of justice 
do converge, but prematurely, short of the ultimate desti-
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nation. Through a careful examination of the "workman-
ship" argument as well as of the apparent appeal to self-
evidence, we come finally and inescapably to confront the 
question of nature. Whether one begins with philosophy or 
theology, or inclines toward the primacy of rights or of 
law, Locke renders it impossible fully or adequately to 
understand the substance of his theory of justice without 
understanding what, finally, is the nature to which he 
holds the rights of life, liberty, and property appropri-
ate.51 
51cf. in this respect the work of Geraint Parry, who 
argues that Locke's political theory can and must be under-
stood apart from its "theological substructure." The basis 
of this argument is the opinion that "Neither Locke's theo-
logy nor his epistemology entails his political conclu-
sions" ( 1978, 13) . The basis of the present attempt at 
abstracting, to a considerable extent, the substance of 
Lockean justice from Lockean theology is the opinion that 
that very theology invites such an abstraction. As Mans-
field puts it, Locke "leaves one trail for the sceptical 
and another for the pious, the latter more plainly marked 
but leading in circles, so that eventually the pious will 
have to follow the sceptics' trail if they wish to get any-
where" (1979, 29). See also Strauss 1953, 202-230; Strauss 
1958; Zuckert 1979; Colman 1983, 6, 177-186; Pangle 1988, 
131-171. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL SCIENCE I: 
NATURE AND EMPIRICISM 
We have seen how Locke's foundational suggestions in 
the Second Treatise converge ultimately in an invitation to 
his readers to regard human species equality as the deci-
sive factual or empirical basis of the principle of natural 
human jural equality. In keeping with that work's charac-
teristic abstraction from any serious, thematic treatment 
of foundational issues, however, Locke again declines to 
trouble its readers with any attempt at elaborating the 
concept of human species equality or defending the jural 
principle that he derives from it. 1 We are forced to 
return to the Essay Concerning Human Understanding in order 
to explore the foundations of the arguments adumbrated in 
the Second Treatise. 
Yet precisely herein lie the serious difficulties. 
Having refused until death to acknowledge his authorship of 
the Two Treatises, Locke has left us no explicit statement 
of his view of the two works' relation to one another. In 
introducing the Essay. however, he does claim that his 
1see chapter VI below, note 118 and accompanying text. 
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basic purpose of inquiring "into the Original, Certainty, 
and Extent of humane Knowledge" is an essentially moderate 
one: "If we can find out, how far the Understanding can 
extend its view ... we may learn to content our selves with 
what is attainable by us in this State" ( 1.1. 2, 4) . More 
particularly, he claims that his account in no way implies 
the insufficiency of human knowledge for governing our 
"great Concernments"; it in no way involves a repudiation 
of the notion of natural law (1.1.5; also 1.3.13; 2.28.11). 
From virtually the moment of the Essay's publication to the 
present day, critics have expressed skepticism concerning 
such claims. Commentators of widely varying interpretive 
approaches have agreed, particularly with respect to the 
question of the natural law, that the relation between the 
Two Treatises and the Essay is problematical. As we have 
indicated in the preceding chapter, much of this discussion 
focuses on the adequacy of Locke's establishment of the 
requisite theological foundations for such a law. But 
surely that issue is no more problematic than the two 
works' respective treatments of the concept of nature. 
Some scholars concerned with the relationship between the 
two works have argued explicitly or implicitly that the 
Essay's empiricist epistemology entails a radically de-
structive analysis of all claims to knowledge of natural 
species, and therewith undermines the Second Treatise' 
78 
undefended claim to such knowledge. 2 If this is true, then 
viewed in the light of its treatment of natural science 
thus understood, it is not only unsurprising that, as again 
several commentators have observed, 3 the Essay fails to 
elaborate and indeed barely mentions the concept of natural 
law. The argument of the Essay would culminate in the 
destruction not only of natural law as law, but more broad-
ly of any doctrine of morality or justice that claims a 
foundation in nature. What Locke gives with one hand, he 
seems to take away with the other. To Peter Laslett's well 
known judgment that "The Essay has no room for natural law" 
(1960, 94), we would be required to add that the Essay has 
no room for natural rights either. 
It would be fruitless to deny that a substantial body 
of textual evidence can be adduced in support of the con-
clusion that Locke in the Essay not only fails to defend 
but indeed undermines his own doctrine of natural rights. 
The aim of the present work is nonetheless to contest that 
conclusion, and by reassessing the evidence and the argu-
mentation that seem to support it, to advance a somewhat 
more sympathetic interpretation of Locke than those most 
influential among contemporary scholars. In this and the 
2strauss 1953, 230,249; Von Leyden 1956, 26-27; 
Laslett 1960, 92-98; Dunn 1969, 22-26, 80-83; Miller 1979; 
Wallin 1984; Pangle 1988, 206-209; West 1988, 3,21-29. 
3Lamprecht 1918, 80ff; Laslett 1960, 94-95; Von 
Leyden, 1954, 13, and 1956, 26. 
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chapters that follow it, we will attempt to show that the 
author of the Essay is neither a radical conventionalist 
nor simply confused, but rather a proponent of a moderate, 
constructive, genuinely empirical epistemology that is 
consistent with a probabilistic defense of natural rights. 
As we hope also to show, however, it is in the nature of 
Locke's presentation that his ultimate moderation comes to 
sight most clearly through a thorough consideration of his 
apparent extremism. In order adequately to establish our 
own interpretation, therefore, it is necessary for us first 
to do justice to the contrary readings by presenting the 
relevant textual evidence in its most challenging forms. 
We will begin by reconstructing in detail the Essay's em-
piricist account of natural science, especially with a view 
toward elaborating the most extreme, corrosive consequences 
for morality that that account could entail. 
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THE ESSAY'S DESTRUCTIVE EMPIRICISM 
In his "Epistle to the Reader," Locke announces with 
notable apparent modesty4 his intention to perform in the 
Essay only a critical, preparatory task. With considerable 
emphasis, he renounces any aspiration to the attainment of 
"the true Knowledge of Things," declaring himself content 
instead to attempt nothing more than a preparation for true 
philosophy thus understood: "' tis Ambition enough to be 
employed as an Under-Labourer in clearing ground a little, 
and removing some of the Rubbish, that lies in the way to 
Knowledge" (Nidditch ed. 1975, 10). Let us then begin at 
the beginning of the work, with the most prominent piece of 
ground-clearing. Locke devotes the Essay's first book to 
an elaboration of its most famous argument, namely his 
refutation of the doctrine of innatism according to which 
"there are in the Understanding certain innate Principles; 
some primary Notions ... as it were stamped upon the Mind of 
Man, which the Soul receives in its very first Being ... " 
(1.2.1). He maintains to the contrary that no notions or 
principles are inborn, that the understanding is at birth 
or prior to experience wholly unfurnished, "white Paper, 
void of all Characters ... " ( 2. 1. 2; also 1. 2 .15) . In its 
4cf. Aaron 1955, 74-82; Mandelbaum 1964, 52; Wood 
1983, 2,41-64; Nidditch 1985, xviii; Pangle 1988, 133,269-
270. 
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original unfurnishment or unprovidedness it is like the 
earth as a whole, and its subsequent development, also like 
that of the earth as a whole, consists in a process of 
cultivation. The seeds or "materials" employed in this 
process of mental cultivation, the basic building-blocks of 
knowledge, Locke calls "ideas." Somewhat loosely defined, 5 
11 idea" in Locke's usage refers to "whatever is meant by 
Phantasm, Notion, Species, or whatever it is, which the 
Mind can be employ'd about in thinking" (1.1.8). 
According to the fundamental principle of Locke's 
empiricism, the human understanding can possess ideas and 
hence propositions not through any kind of innate inscrip-
tion, but only through experience or acquisition. More 
specifically, according to Locke, the twin "Fountains of 
Knowledge, from whence all the Ideas we have, or can natur-
ally have, do spring," are the mental experiences of sensa-
tion and reflection (2.1.2). Sensation, as Locke initially 
defines it, is the perception or observation of external 
objects, whereas reflection is perception of the internal 
operations of one's own mind (2.1.2-5,24; also 2.9). 
Yet these initial definitions, especially that of 
sensation, require an immediate and crucial modification. 
Viewed from a perspective of epistemological realism or 
common sense, among the most arresting claims of Lockean 
5on the ambiguities in Locke's usage of this term, see 
especially Ryle 1968 ( 1933), 16ff. Cf. Greenlee 1977; 
Colman 1983, 76-83. 
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empiricism is the contention that we do not immediately 
perceive objects as such, but instead only collections of 
discrete ideas. What Locke calls our "substance" ideas, 
our ideas of things or objects existing external to and 
independent of the understanding, are not objects of our 
original or immediate perceptions (1.4.18), but instead are 
mental constructions. While we might commonly or uncritic-
ally believe that we perceive directly a human being, for 
instance, what we actually perceive directly, according to 
Locke, is a number of discrete ideas: a certain figure, 
various colors, perhaps a certain texture, the capacities 
of animation and speech, and so forth. At the root of this 
contention lies Locke's crucial distinction between simple 
and complex ideas. Simple ideas in Locke's account are 
truly the basic building blocks or "the Materials of all 
our Knowledge" (2.2.2). They are "unmixed" or "uncompoun-
ded," incapable of analysis into any other, simpler ideas, 
and hence incapable of definition; the understanding can 
neither create nor destroy them (2.2.1,2; also 3.4.4,7,11). 
They are the only "givens," the only objects of direct per-
ception, the understanding's only immediate points of ac-
cess to the external world. 
By means of this distinction, Locke extends and re-
fines his analogy between the original human material and 
intellectual conditions, or between the activities of la-
boring and thinking. Out of the basic materials of simple 
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ideas, we make complex ideas: "Ideas thus made up of sev-
eral simple ones put together, I call Complex." Thus ac-
cording to Locke the understanding not only perceives sim-
ple ideas, but also "labors" upon them, employs its powers 
of combining, comparing, and abstracting "either to unite 
them together, or to set them by one another, or wholly 
separate them," in order to make further ideas (2 .12 .1). 
By its own industry, the understanding progresses from sim-
plicity to complexity, from a condition of relative scar-
city to an abundance of ideas, virtually infinite in number 
and endless in variety ( 2. 12. 3; 2. 1. 2) . "Man' s Power, " 
declares Locke, is "much-what the same in the Material and 
Intellectual World" (2.12.1; also 2.2.2). 
The decisive question here concerns just how far 
Locke wishes to extend the analogy between thinking and 
laboring. A careful reading of the all-important fifth 
chapter of the Second Treatise reveals that the productive 
power of human labor as Locke there conceives it is not 
only quantitatively immense, but also nearly exclusive. 
The activity of human laboring, the production of value out 
of nature's provision, constitutes in other words a virtual 
creation ex nihilo: "Nature and the Earth furnished only 
the almost worthless Materials, as in themselves" (II. 43; 
also 32,37,38,41,42,45). 6 The radically creative character 
6cf. Strauss 1953, 235-249; Goldwin 1972, 460-470; 
Zuckert 1979, 71-74; Mansfield 1979, 30-32; Tully 1980, 
116ff; Wood 1984, 51-67; Pangle 1988, 141-145, 161-167. 
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of labor in this description indicates clearly enough what 
is suggestive and troubling in this assimilation of think-
ing to material labor. Locke readily grants, of course, 
that just as we "can do nothing towards the making the 
least Particle of new Matter, " so too "it is not in the 
Power of the most exalted Wit, or enlarged Understanding 
... to invent or frame one new simple Idea in the mind ... " 
(2.2.2). But of what significance is this concession, in 
light of his insistence in the Second Treatise (37,40-43, 
48) that nature contributes to the process of production 
virtually nothing of real value, that virtually everything 
of value must be of human creation, must be a product of 
human labor? Precisely what is the worth of nature's pro-
vision to the human understanding? To what extent, accord-
ing to the argument of the Essay. does the external world 
depend for its orderliness upon the creative powers of the 
human understanding or the human mind? It is obvious that 
a world consisting in a mere aggregation of discrete simple 
ideas would be an unintelligible and therefore uninhabita-
ble world, and would thus correspond to the unimproved 
material world the Second Treatise describes as "waste." 
Is this the world that, according to the Essay. the under-
standing originally or naturally confronts? Does nature 
provide no 
attempts at 
world? 
significant guidance or discipline 
rendering an orderly, intelligible 
for our 
external 
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The answer to such questions lies in Locke's account 
of the process by which we construct complex ideas. All 
complex ideas, in Locke's scheme, are either modes, sub-
stances, or relations. Modes are complex ideas that refer 
not to independently existing things, but instead to the 
qualities or attributes or modifications of such things. 
As Locke defines them, they are "such complex Ideas, which 
however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of 
subsisting by themselves, but are considered as Dependences 
on, or Affections of Substances" (2.12.4). Substance ideas 
are ideas that refer to independently existing things; they 
are "such combinations of simple Ideas, as are taken to 
represent distinct particular things subsisting by them-
selves" (2 .12. 6). Ideas of relation derive from the power 
of the understanding to "carry any Idea, as it were, beyond 
it self ... to see how it stands in conformity to any other" 
(2.25.1). Indeed Locke seems to imply that these ideas are 
virtually indistinguishable from the exercise of that 
power; ideas of relation consist in "the consideration and 
comparing one Idea with another" (2.12.7). 
Locke's discussion of our ideas of substances reveals 
most fundamentally his estimate of the worth of the natural 
provision and therefore of the true character and extent of 
human knowledge. That is to say, inasmuch as this discus-
sion above all constitutes the basis of his critique of the 
notion of natural species or kinds and therewith of the 
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possibility of a strict science of nature, it underlies his 
often-repeated judgment of the natural and in important 
respects irremediable darkness and narrowness of the under-
standing.7 For the same reason, it would seem to imply his 
most fundamental philosophical challenge to the theory of 
natural rights. According to Locke's argument, we form the 
most general idea of substance, the idea of "pure Substance 
in general" (2.23.2), in a kind of mental reflex, in an 
ordinarily unconscious response to our perception of dis-
crete simple ideas. Just as we are unable to conceive of 
an effect independent of a cause, an action or passion 
independent of an agent or patient, or an adjective inde-
pendent of a noun, so also we are unable to imagine "how 
these simple Ideas can subsist by themselves." We there-
fore "accustom ourselves, to suppose some Substratum, 
wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result ..• " 
(2.23.1). When we perceive a simple idea of color, or of 
solidity, or of pleasure or pain, for instance, we find it 
necessary to suppose the existence of some being or thing 
that feels the pleasure or pain, or that bears the quality 
of solidity or of the given color. Similarly, in forming 
complex ideas of particular substances, we commonly notice 
7Locke describes the understanding as a "dark room," 
as "not much unlike a Closet wholly shut from light, with 
only some little openings left" (2 .11. 17), as "narrow" 
(2.23.28), with its reach falling "exceeding short of the 
vast Extent of Things" (1.1.5), and so forth. See also CU 
43, Works IV.359,361. 
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that several simple ideas seem to "go constantly together," 
to coexist over time, and we consequently suppose that such 
ideas are somehow ontologically or necessarily united, that 
they exist as common qualities of a single object (2.23.1). 
More importantly, we observe not only particular sets of 
coexisting ideas, but also patterns of coexistence. By 
"collecting such Combinations of simple Ideas, as are by 
Experience and Observation of Men's Senses taken notice of 
to exist together, 11 we form not only ideas of particular 
substances, but also ideas of "particular sorts of Substan-
ces" (2.23.3; also 2.23.6,7,8, 2.31.6, 3.3.13, 3.6.1). We 
form ideas of spiritual substances in the same way that we 
form ideas of corporeal substances (2.23.5) . 8 
Locke refers to our formation of substance ideas as a 
supposition, even as a merely customary supposition. We 
make this supposition because we can only conceive of the 
simple ideas in our experience in relative terms--as some-
how "depending" on, or "inhering" or "resting" or "subsist-
ing" in, or "flowing" from, or being "produced" by some-
thing else, something more real or fundamental in nature 
(e.g. 2.23.1,2,3,6,8). The variety of his language not-
withstanding, it is clear that Locke is describing a cause-
effect relation; we conceive of a given substance as the 
seat of efficient causation, the cause of both the exist-
8But cf. 4.3.6, and the discussion in chapter IV 
below, pp. 187-205. 
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ence and the coexistence or union of simple ideas (2.23.6). 
Thus "rightly considered," simple ideas become present to 
our perceptions by virtue of "nothing but [the] Powers" 
inherent in substances "to produce those Ideas in us" 
(2.23.7). "Power," as Locke explains, 
being the Source from whence all Action proceeds, the 
substances wherein these Powers are, when they exert 
this Power into Act, are called causes; and the Sub-
stances which thereupon are produced, or the simple 
Ideas which are introduced into any Subject by the 
exerting of that Power, are called Effects. (2.22.11) 
Locke uses the terms "real constitution," 11 internal 
constitution," and "real essence" to refer to the causal 
entity that, as we suppose, constitutes the existential 
foundation of our ideas of substances. He allows that it 
is "past Doubt, there must be some real Constitution, on 
which any Collection of simple Ideas co-existing, must 
depend" (3.3.15). But in order for our ideas of substances 
to be truly more than mere suppositions of the existence of 
"something ... ! know not what" (2.23.2,15), we must be able 
to identify the specific real constitutions or essences 
that underlie those ideas. We must be able to identify the 
specific causal relationships that make ontologically nec-
essary the unions of particular sets of ideas in substances 
or sorts of substances ( 2. 31. 6) . And this, according to 
Locke, we simply cannot do. Even if we had access to a 
comprehensive accounting of all the qualities and proper-
ties of a given substance, we could not then be certain of 
the status of any quality as causally "primary," and hence 
89 
could not acquire knowledge of the real essence of the 
substance in question, for the simple reason that we are 
incapable of knowledge of cause-effect relations. 
In the brief chapter d.evoted specifically to these 
relations, Locke explains that we acquire ideas of cause 
and effect as inferences from the observation "that several 
particular, both Qualities, and Substances begin to exist; 
and that they receive this their Existence, from the due 
Application and Operation of some other Being" (2.26.1). 
He indicates in the immediate sequel, however, that such 
inferences are in the strictest sense illegitimate; they 
are "experimental" rather than "scientifical," insofar as 
we conceive these ideas "without knowing the manner of that 
Operation" whereby one being brings into existence a new 
quality or substance (4.3.26; 2.26.2). If we do not know 
the manner of such operations, then for all we know, what 
we are observing may be no more than accidental associa-
tions. We are "destitute of Faculties to attain" knowledge 
of "the internal Constitution, and true Nature of things" 
(2.23.32), in that we are incapable of genuine knowledge of 
causation. This incapacity in itself is sufficient basis 
for Locke's conclusion that a genuine science of nature is 
necessarily beyond the reach of the human understanding. 9 
9cf. 4.3.29: "The Things that, as far as our Obser-
vation reaches, we constantly find to proceed regularly, we 
may conclude, do act by a Law set them; but yet by a Law, 
that we know not: whereby, though Causes work steadily, 
and Effects constantly flow from them, yet their Connexions 
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But the difficulties we confront in attempting to 
construct ideas of substances and sorts of substances 
according to patterns in nature are not limited to our 
ignorance of causal relations. Absent knowledge of their 
causal cores, according to Locke, we can acquire "no other 
Idea of those Substances, than what is framed by a collec-
tion of those simple Ideas which are to be found in them" 
(2.23.3). This means that our ideas of substances are 
necessarily "inadequate," in that they can never provide 
more than a "partial, or incomplete representation of those 
Archetypes to which they are referred" ( 2. 31. 1, 6) . They 
are necessarily inadequate in that it is simply impossible 
to render a comprehensive accounting of all the qualities 
or properties of any given substance; "whatever Collection 
of simple Ideas [the mind] makes of any Substance that 
exists, it cannot be sure, that it exactly answers all that 
are in that Substance" (2.31.13; also 2.31.10, 3.6.19, 
3.9.13, 4.6.14). 
Moreover, at least in most cases they are inadequate 
in a more practically troubling respect. Locke presents 
his destructive analysis of our ideas of substances with 
and Dependancies [sic] being not discoverable in our Ideas, 
we can have but an experimental Knowledge of them. From 
all which 'tis easy to perceive, what a darkness we are 
involved in, how little 'tis of Being, and the things that 
are, that we are capable to know ... as to a perfect Science 
of natural Bodies, (not to mention spiritual Beings,) we 
are, I think, so far from being capable of any such thing, 
that I conclude it lost labour to seek after it." 
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the explicit intention of discrediting the Aristotelian-
scholastic doctrine of natural sorts or species, 10 accor-
ding to which not the human understanding but instead 
"Nature," as Locke puts it, "sets the Boundaries of the 
species of Things," generating particular beings to partake 
in one of a finite number of real essences "and so become 
of this or that Species" (3.6.30, 3.3.17; also 3.3.9; 
3.6.14,24; 4.6.4). He insists that in order for this doc-
trine to be true, the boundaries between species of natural 
beings must be perfectly clear and precise, or in other 
words, that each member of the species manifest constantly 
and invariantly all the properties essential to that spe-
cies: "it is as impossible, that two Things, partaking 
exactly of the same real Essence, should have different 
Properties, as that two Figures partaking in the same real 
Essence of a Circle, should have different Properties" 
(3.3.17) . 11 In Locke's view, the manifest difficulty with 
this doctrine lies in the fact that, quite apart from the 
problem of determining which among a set of shared quali-
10on Locke's view of scholasticism, see especially 
Gibson 1917, 182-204. 
llcf. 2.19.4, where, in denying that thinking is the 
essence rather than the action of the soul, Locke holds 
that "the Operations of Agents will easily admit of inten-
tion and remission; but the Essences of things, are not 
conceived capable of any such variation." See also 3.6.8. 
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ties or powers are properties and which mere accidents, 12 
many particular members of what we take to be the same 
species manifest with a considerable degree of variance the 
qualities or powers supposedly definitive of those species; 
nature's productions very often simply do not fall within 
the precise boundaries of our species ideas. 
Professing, for instance, an intention to show the 
probability that there exist "more Species of intelligent 
creatures above us, than there are of sensible and material 
below us," Locke offers a provocative statement or restate-
ment13 of the traditional conception of earthly creation as 
a great chain-of-being: 
All quite down from us, the descent is by easy steps, 
and a continued series of Things, that in each remove, 
differ very little one from the other. There are 
Fishes that have Wings, and are not Strangers to the 
airy Region: and there are some Birds, that are 
Inhabitants of the Water ... There are Animals so near of 
kin both to Birds and Beasts, that they are in the 
middle between both ... There are some Brutes, that seem 
to have as much Knowledge and Reason, as some that are 
called Men: and the Animal and Vegetable Kingdoms, are 
so nearly join'd, that if you will take the lowest of 
one, and the highest of the other, there will scarce be 
perceived any great difference between them; and so on 
12Thus 3.9.17: 11 ••• no one can shew a Reason, why some 
of the inseparable Qualities, that are always united in 
nature, should be put into the nominal Essence, and others 
left out." 
13on Locke's employment of the concept of the great 
chain of being, cf. Lovejoy 1966 (1936), especially 67-
98,227ff with Yolton 1970, 33, and 1985, 109ff. Lovejoy 
implies that Locke's employment of the principle of the 
plenitude of creation points to the undermining of the 
doctrine of natural species, while Yolton sees in it an 
affirmation of natural species distinctions, the apparent 
continuity of their boundaries notwithstanding. 
93 
til we come to the lowest and the most inorganical 
parts of Matter, we shall find every-where, that the 
several Species are linked together, and differ but in 
almost insensible degrees. (3.6.12) 
The appropriate metaphor for this conception of the 
natural order would seem to be less a great chain than per-
haps a braided rope of being, whose "segments" upon close 
observation blend imperceptibly one into another. Seeming-
ly with a certain eagerness, Locke describes the "frequent 
Productions" of--what we commonly call, employing our con-
ventional species class if ications--"Monsters, in all the 
Species of Animals, and of Changelings, and other strange 
Issues of humane Birth" (3.3.17; 3.6.22ff, 4.4.13ff).14 
Moreover, in illustrating the errant or anarchic character 
of nature's processes of production, he places special 
emphasis on the difficulties manifest in any attempt at 
defining human beings by reference to some supposed natural 
species or real essence. We commonly identify human beings 
14Most commentators seem to accept Locke's earnestness 
in transmitting these accounts, though some also share the 
judgment of the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury that these passages 
reveal an oddly 'credulous Mr. Locke' (Quoted in Harrison 
and Laslett 1971, 29; cf. Mackie 1976, 87-88). Such 
stories do seem to hold a certain fascination for Locke, 
but it is not clear that he assents to them quite so credu-
lously as is commonly believed. At 3.6.23, for instance, 
he states conditionally that "if History lie not, Women 
have conceived by Drills" (emphasis supplied). And in the 
immediately preceding paragraph he draws attention in a 
somewhat more pointed manner to the questionable authority 
of his source: "There are Creatures, as 'tis said, (sit 
fides penes Authorem, but there appears no contradiction, 
that there should be such) that with Language, and Reason, 
and a shape in other Things agreeing with ours, have hairy 
Tails ... " (3.6.22). 
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by reference both to a common shape or figure and to the 
possession of certain common faculties, pre-eminently 
rationality (2.12.6; 3.3.10; 3.6.3,26; 4.4.16; 4.6.15; 
4.7.16; 4.17.1; Works 1823, 4.74,378). But according to 
Locke these qualities do not constantly and invariantly 
coexist in nature's production. "There are Naturals 
amongst us, that have perfectly our shape, but want Reason, 
and some of them Language too" (3.6.22). Conversely, there 
are also cases of beings innately or naturally disfigured 
to the point of being virtually unrecognizable as human, 
yet unquestionably in possession of rationality. Such was 
the "Abbot of st. Martin, " who as a child "was very near 
being excluded out of the Species of Man, barely by his 
Shape," despite his possession of "such Parts, as made 
him," upon their development, "capable to be a Dignitary in 
the Church" (3.6.26). Nor is Locke willing to concede that 
we can reliably determine who or what is by nature human by 
reference to the fact of generation; "for if History lie 
not," he reports, "Women have conceived by Drills; and what 
real Species, by that measure, such a Production will be in 
Nature, will be a new Question" (3.6.23). At times Locke 
seems simply and categorically to deny that any scheme of 
classification could account neatly for all of nature's 
productions, leaving no particular instances to straddle or 
permeate species boundaries. He certainly insists that 
"there is no such thing made by Nature, and established by 
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Her amongst Men," as "precise and unmovable" species-
boundaries. The latter are "made by Man, with some lib-
erty" (3.6.27; also 3.5.9). 
However commonly or even in a sense naturally we may 
employ it, 15 the scholastic presumption that our ideas of 
substances and species adequately represent an order inher-
ent in nature according to this account manifests an epis-
temological false-consciousness. Because the real essences 
or "substantial forms" supposedly uniting members of spe-
cies are in fact "wholly unintelligible" to us (3.6.10), it 
is clear in Locke's view "That our distinguishing Substan-
ces into Species by Names, is not at all founded on their 
real Essences" (3.6.20). Instead, our ideas of species can 
refer intelligibly only to "nominal essences," to abstract 
ideas formed of necessarily incomplete collections of coex-
isting simple ideas (3.6.7,9,21,24; 2.31.8,13; 3.3.9). Thus 
what we may presume to be natural appears, on closer anal-
ysis, to be primarily conventional in origin. These ab-
stract ideas or nominal essences "are made by the Mind, and 
not by Nature: For were they Nature's Workmanship, they 
could not be so various and different in several Men, as 
experience tells us they are" (3.6.26). Locke's analysis 
culminates in the demand that we surrender as "wholly use-
15Though we "know nothing" of the real essences of 
things, declares Locke, yet "there is nothing more ordi-
nary, than that Men should attribute the sorts of Things to 
such Essences" (2.31.6; also 3.10.21). Cf. Zuckert 1974, 
562. 
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1ess" and even pernicious our aspiration to classify things 
~
according to their real, natural essences as opposed to the 
nominal essences that are the products of our own under-
standings (3.3.17; also 2.31.8, 3.3.13, 4.6.4, 4.4.17). 16 
From all this it appears that Locke's assimilation of 
thinking to laboring is quite thorough indeed. Leo Strauss 
summarizes the effects of this teaching as follows: 
From now on, nature furnishes only the almost worthless 
materials as in themselves; the forms are supplied by 
man, by man's free creation. For there are no natural 
forms, no intelligible "essences" ... There are, there-
fore, no natural principles of understanding: all 
knowledge is acquired; all knowledge depends on labor 
and is labor. ( 1953, 249) . 
Surveying the damage thus wrought by Locke's critique of 
the doctrine of natural species, one must wonder how the 
Second Treatise' natural rights theory can possibly endure 
16Locke's rejection of the doctrine of natural species 
may appear to rest on ontological as well as epistemologic-
al grounds. "'Tis true, 11 he concedes, "every Substance 
that exists, has its peculiar Constitution, whereon depend 
those sensible Qualities, and Powers, we observe in it" 
(3.6.13). But this apparently refers to real constitutions 
as the bases only of the attributes of particular beings, 
not of the properties shared by all the members of a common 
species or kind; he repeatedly affirms that "All Things, 
that exist, being Particulars ... "General and Universal, 
belong not to the real existence of Things; but are the 
Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding" ( 3. 3. 1, 11; 
also 3.3.6, 4.7.9, 4.17.8). Inasmuch, however, as he holds 
that "the principium Individuationis ... is Existence it 
self, which determines a Being of any sort to a particular 
time and place incommunicable to two Beings of the same 
kind" (2.27.3), it is difficult to know the extent to which 
Locke takes the particularity of all things as decisive 
against the possibility that nature makes things with com-
mon species essences. A discussion of a different version 
of the argument that Locke's critique is ontologically 
oriented appears in chapter IV below, pp. 161-186. 
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such a direct assault upon its foundations. Eugene Miller 
comments more specifically that "Rousseau is noted for 
having blurred the line between the human and the subhuman, 
but Locke pushes at least as far as would his successor the 
argument against a natural ground for fixing this line" 
(1979, 177). How can we know human beings as the subjects 
or proprietors of natural rights, if we cannot know with 
any degree of reliability what a human being by nature is? 
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THE DEMONSTRATIVE SCIENCE OF MORALITY 
In view of the foregoing critique of natural species 
and natural science, we may find all the more ominous the 
fact that the design of the Essay seems to indicate a de-
liberate attempt on Locke's part to avoid the appearance of 
a thematic or primary concern with questions concerning 
morality. It is no wonder, as John Colman observes, that 
scholars have often viewed the Essay's discussions of 
ethical issues "as merely an intellectual by-product of the 
pursuit of [Locke's] major scientific interests" (1983, 
1). 17 For not only does Locke decline in his brief account 
of the history of the Essay to disclose the fact, noted by 
his friend James Tyrrell, that the "very remote" subject of 
the discussion that originated the Essay concerned 'the 
Principles of morality, and reveald Religion' (ECHU "Epis-
tle to the Reader," 7; Nidditch ed. 1975, xix) , he also 
organizes the work so as to indicate a virtually complete 
abstraction from moral questions. Not a single chapter 
heading in the entire Essay announces a direct concern with 
moral issues; the discussions of morality that do arise are 
commonly presented as peripheral to or merely illustrative 
17similarly, Wood complains of a tendency among most 
students of the Essay "to overlook the fact that Locke 
wrote not only for the sake of technical philosophic analy-
sis but also to help men act more effectively in the world 
of practical affairs" (1975, 71; also 1983, 1-7). 
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of the main topic under consideration. 18 
In fact, however, Locke by no means completely sub-
merges his concern with moral questions in the Essay. In 
its introductory chapter, he corrects to some extent the 
impression one might receive from its dedication and table 
of contents; he admits that an intention to show that "our 
Business here is not to know all Things, but those which 
concern our Conduct ... was that, which gave the first Rise 
to this Essay concerning the Understanding" (1.1.6,7). 
Moreover, unquestionably cognizant of the unsettling infer-
ences that some might draw from his epistemological argu-
ments, he subsequently reassures his readers that the work 
in no way undermines the foundations of morality. "Morali-
ty is the proper Science. and Business of Mankind in gener-
al; (who are both concerned, and fitted to search out their 
Summum Bonum,) ... 11 (4.12.11). Properly directed, the "Can-
dle, that is set up in us, shines bright enough for all our 
Purposes" (1.1.5). Indeed, Locke goes so far as to insist 
that the argument of the Essay not only does not destroy 
the foundations of morality, but to the contrary establish-
es them more securely than ever before. 
18The most striking example of this appears at 
2. 21. 72, where Locke expresses a hope that he "shall be 
pardon'd this Digression" into the question of human lib-
rty, which occupies virtually the whole of the Essay's 
single longest chapter. See also 2.28.4-17. Nidditch 
refers to Locke's "ironic masking of his priority of con-
cern with conduct over scientific inquisitiveness•i ( 1975, 
xviii). 
101 
... I am bold to think, that Morality is caoable of 
Demonstration ..• wherein I doubt not, but from self-
evident Propositions, by necessary Consequences, as 
incontestable as those in Mathematicks, the measures of 
right and wrong might be made out, to any one who will 
apply himself with the same Indifferency and Attention 
to the one, as he does to the other of these Sciences. 
(3.11.16; 4.3.18) 
Let us then explore the grounds for this remarkable 
proposition. Locke's suggestion of an analogy between 
ethics and mathematics rests decisively on the contention 
that the main constituents of moral discourses are not the 
ideas and names of substances, but rather those of modes, 
in particular mixed modes, and relations. 
To conceive rightly of Moral Actions, we must first 
take notice of them, under this two-fold Consideration. 
First, As they are in themselves each made up of such a 
Collection of simple Ideas. Thus Drunkenness, or Ly-
ing, signify such or such a Collection of simple Ideas, 
which I cal 1 mixed Modes ... Secondly. our Actions are 
considered, as Good, Bad, or Indifferent; and in this 
respect, they are Relative, it being their Conformity 
to, or Disagreement with some Rule, that makes them to 
be regular or irregular, Good or Bad: and so, as far as 
they are compared with a Rule, and thereupon denom-
inated, they come under Relation. (2.28.15) 
Of primary importance in this regard are the complex 
ideas that Locke calls "mixed modes." As Locke defines it, 
a mixed mode (in distinction from a simple mode) is a mode 
"compounded of simple Ideas of several kinds," such as, for 
example, the idea of "Beauty, consisting of a certain com-
position of Colour and Figure, causing delight in the 
Beholder" (2.12.5). Mixed modes supply "the greatest part 
of the Words made use of in Divinity, Ethicks, Law, and 
Poli ticks, and several other Sciences" ( 2. 2 2. 12) . Like 
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ideas of substance, they are general, standing for "sorts 
or Species of Things" 
(among other things) 
(3.5.1). They enable us to classify 
kinds of actions: " .•. Power and 
Action make the greatest part of mixed Modes" ( 2. 2 2. 12) . 
They are the complex ideas by which we define such concepts 
as (to use Locke's examples) justice, sacrilege, adultery, 
murder, and parricide, among innumerable others. (See ECHO 
3.5 passim.) In addition, and in contrast to substances, 
mixed modes are formed "very arbitrarily. made without 
Patterns, or reference to any real Existence" ( 3. 5. 3) . 
They are formed, that is, without any necessary supposition 
that their constituent ideas constantly coexist, or indeed 
have ever coexisted in the world external to the mind. 
They have "no particular foundation in Nature" (3.5.10). 
They consist in "fleeting, and transient Combinations of 
simple Ideas, which have but a short existence any where, 
but in the Minds of Men" (2.22.8). They are essentially no 
more than hypothetical constructs or definitions. With 
regard to the idea of murder, for instance, Locke asks 
rhetorically: 11 for what greater connexion in Nature, has 
the Idea of a Man, than the Idea of a Sheep with Killing, 
that this is made a particular Species of Action, signified 
by the word Murder, and the other not? 11 ( 3 . 5 . 6) . In the 
mass of ideas, or of more-or-less transient associations of 
ideas that the world presents to human perception, the 
action of killing claims many objects in addition to human 
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beings (and, we might add, is performed as well by many 
subjects or agents other than human beings). The formation 
of the complex idea to which we refer the name "murder, " 
the combining of the ideas of killing and innocence and 
human being, is therefore a free act of the understanding, 
an act of abstraction no more compelled by the desire to 
represent faithfully an external order than would be the 
formation of any of the other literally innumerable possi-
ble combinations of ideas that our experience suggests to 
us. When we frame an idea of stealing, or of murder, we 
are in effect positing that if or when someone takes anoth-
er's property without the latter's consent, or if or when 
someone intentionally kills an innocent human being, we 
will consider in combination all the simple ideas that are 
constituents of such an action, forming a single complex 
idea of that kind of action and attaching to it a single 
name. 
More fundamentally, Locke argues that the fact that 
"this sort of complex Ideas may be made, abstracted, and 
have names given them, and so a Species be constituted, 
before any one individual of that Species ever existed" 
puts beyond doubt the essentially arbitrary or voluntary 
character of their formation (3.5.5). For those who see in 
Locke an authentic moral-political radical ism, this point 
is of decisive significance. The arbitrary or hypothetical 
character of mixed-mode ideas implies that the names of 
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mixed modes function not merely as designations of particu-
lar actions, but are in an important sense constitutive of 
particular actions: "in mixed Modes ... it is the Name that 
seems to preserve those Essences, and give them their 
lasting duration" (3.5.10, also 11). 19 As Locke explains 
it in his own terminology, this means that our "complex 
Ideas of Modes, being voluntary Collections of simple 
Ideas, which the Mind puts together, without reference to 
any real Archetypes. . . are, and cannot but be adequate 
Ideas" ( 2 . 31. 3) . Because they are themselves archetypes, 
not ectypes or "copies" (2. 31.12ff.), and thus are not 
intended to represent "things really existing," the dis-
tinction between real and nominal essences is irrelevant to 
them (3.3.18). Since they are nothing but products of the 
understanding, mixed-mode ideas are in principle perfectly 
definable (3.11.15); indeed in a sense our definitions of 
them must be perfect definitions, must be "not capable of 
any Deformity, being made with no reference to any thing 
but [themselves]" (2.30.4). It is ultimately for this 
reason, according to Locke's argument, 
... that moral Knowledge is as capable of real Certainty, as 
Mathematicks. For Certainty being but the Perception of 
the Agreement, or Disagreement of our Ideas; and Demonstra-
tion being nothing but the Perception of such Agreement, by 
the Intervention of other Ideas, or Mediums, our moral 
Ideas, as well as mathematical, being Archetypes them-
selves, and so adequate, and complete Ideas, all the Agree-
ment, or Disagreement, which we shall find in them, will 
19cf. Aronson and Lewis 1970, 195-196; Miller 1979, 
178-184. 
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produce real Knowledge, as well as in mathematical Figures. 
(4.4.7) 
To the extent that the terms of moral propositions 
consist in the names of mixed modes and relations, of ideas 
that are perfectly, precisely definable, it is in principle 
possible to construct a deductive or demonstrative system 
of ethics. Ethical science would then involve simply the 
settling of the relevant definitions, the formulation of 
rules to designate particular sorts of actions as right or 
wrong, virtuous or vicious, and the judgment of individual 
cases to determine the character of actions and their con-
formity with the relevant rules. 
Furthermore, in anticipation of the objection that it 
would be absurd to conceive of an ethical system without 
also conceiving of the subjects of its rules, and therefore 
that the presence of substance ideas in any ethical system 
is unavoidable, Locke maintains that the "Names of Substan-
ces, if they be used in them, as they should, can no more 
disturb Moral, than they do Mathematical Discourses." In 
moral discourses conducted in a fully self-conscious man-
ner, the natures or definitions of substances are "not so 
much enquir'd into, as supposed." In employing the concept 
of "Man" as a being "subject to Law," for instance, Locke 
argues that 
We mean nothing by Man, but a corporeal Rational 
Creature: What the real Essence or other Qualities of 
that Creature are in this case, is no way considered. 
And therefore, whether a Child or Changeling be a Man 
in a physical Sense, may amongst the Naturalists be as 
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disputable as it will, it concerns not at all the moral 
Man, as I may call him, which is this immoveable un-
hangeable Idea. a corporeal rational Being. (3.11.16) 
we may frame arbitrarily the relevant substance idea, in 
other words, merely by gathering together the qualities 
constitutive of moral agency or personhood, in abstraction 
from whether such qualities actually characterize beings 
existing in nature. It would seem then that in an act of 
resignation in the face of the impenetrable mysteriousness 
of our substance ideas, Locke is forced to construct in the 
Essay a doctrine of morality upon a foundation wholly dif-
ferent from that supposed in the Second Treatise. Thus he 
argues that the darkness or narrowness of human understand-
ing, however frustrating to our aspiration toward a com-
plete, genuine science of nature, constitutes in the end no 
truly serious incapacity, in that it does not incapacitate 
us for moral knowledge. We might even experience a recog-
nition of this unilluminable darkness as liberating; Locke 
professes to regard moral inquiries as "most suited to our 
natural Capacities" (4.12.11), as ultimately more fruitful 
than discourses in "natural Philosophy" (3.11.17), precise-
ly because they require, according to this argument, no 
such nonhypothetical, natural foundation. 20 
20Among "the main ideological objectives of the 
Essay," writes Tully, is "to prove the potential certainty 
and scientific status of moral and political knowledge and 
to illuminate its superiority over knowledge of the natural 
world" ( 1980, 26; see in general 8-34) . Cf. Grant 1987, 
12-51. 
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This suggestion of the possibility of a demonstrative 
science of ethics raises questions that have troubled vir-
tually all those who have commented on it. 21 If we may 
leave aside for the moment the general question of the 
unity or coherence of Locke's thought, of particular impor-
tance here is the question of the foundation of the pro-
posed mixed-mode morality. With respect to the formation 
of moral ideas and names, Locke claims that "what liberty 
Adam had at first ... the same have all Men ever since had" 
(3.6.51). In principle, in other words, we are all in a 
mental state of nature, a state of "perfect Freedom" to 
frame moral ideas as we will; in stark contrast to his 
apparent conception of nonhuman or physical nature as a 
realm of pure determinacy, Locke may seem to conceive of 
the natural human condition as one of perfect freedom or of 
free creativity. But like the state of nature described in 
the Second Treatise--in fact these two states of nature are 
in some sense the same--this condition of perfect mental 
freedom is an untenable condition. Absent any regulating 
principle, such liberty would engender a condition "like 
21The most common objections focus on the trifling 
character of the propositions that could be generated in 
such a system, on the incapacity of a purely definitional 
system of ethics to provide an adequate account of moral 
obligation, and, as we will see presently, on the tendency 
of such a system to collapse into relativism. Cf. Gibson 
1896, 38, 50; Lamprecht 1917, 76, 78; Von Leyden 1954, 55; 
Aaron 1955, 262-4; Ashcraft 1969, 210ff; Gough 1973, 8; 
Parry 1978, 3; Miller 1979, 181; Milton 1981, 140; Dunn 
1984, 65ff,84. 
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that of Babel" (3.6.28), inevitably involving precisely the 
inconveniences that move rational human beings to quit the 
state of nature in the Second Treatise' account. 22 Locke 
imagines an interlocutor rendering the objection as fol-
lows: 
... if moral Knowledge be placed in the Contemplation of 
our own moral Ideas, and those, as other Modes, be of 
our own making, What strange Notions will there be of 
Justice and Temperance? What confusion of Vertues and 
Vices, if every one may make what Ideas of them he 
pleases? (4.4.9) 
Mindful of the claim that our moral definitions are 
in the decisive respect the products of the understanding, 
made "very arbitrarily." one must ask in the spirit of the 
Two Treatises: Who frames and who authorizes these defini-
tions? According to what standards, or in pursuance of 
what ends, are they made? In the Essay's discussion of 
moral relations, Locke observes that the "Laws that Men 
generally refer their Actions to, to judge of their Recti-
tude, or Obliquity, seem to me to be these three. 1. The 
Divine Law. 2. The Civil Law. 3. The Law of Opinion or 
Reputation ... " (2.28.7). Of the three as Locke describes 
them here, only the divine law can facilitate judgments 
concerning which actions are "in their own nature right and 
wrong"; the contents of the others are in the decisive 
respect relative to "the several Nations and Societies of 
22cf. TT II.13,20,123,125,127,128. 
that "much of Locke's text does leave 
objection that he "has given an account 
private language" (1983, 110; 107-137). 
Colman observes 
him open" to the 
of an essentially 
Men in the World" (2.28.10). 
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Locke thus insists upon 
preserving some notion of a true law against which all 
human laws may be measured, and thus resists endorsing 
outright the relativistic proposition that there can be no 
measure of right and wrong or of virtue and vice save the 
various definitions proceeding from the "different Temper, 
Education, Fashion, Maxims, or Interest of different sorts 
of Men ... " (2.28.11) .23 Yet in this insistence upon the 
"eternal and unalterable nature of right and wrong," he may 
seem merely to reproduce the conundrum with which he left 
the readers of the Second Treatise. The "Divine Law" is 
promulgated, he repeats, "by the light of Nature, or the 
voice of Revelation" (2.28.8) .24 If, as we have shown 
above, 25 he fails to explain how we can prove the authen-
ticity of a claim to revelation, and if he believes that 
knowledge of nature is beyond the grasp of the human under-
standing, then how does he propose to defend the distinc-
tion between the rational and the actual in morality, be-
tween the true, divine or natural law and the purely human, 
23see Locke's response to this objection of Lowde, 
appended as a footnote to ECHU 2.28.11, and also his letter 
to Tyrrell of 8/4/90. 
24see also ECHU 4. 3 .18 and 4 .13. 3, where Locke sug-
gests that the notion of an intelligent Creator is suffic-
ient to serve as a first principle in a demonstration of a 
nonrelative system of ethics. 
25see ch. II above, pp. 69-72. 
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conventional laws? 26 
Locke observes that in actuality we tend to construct 
moral ideas neither wholly arbitrarily or without reason, 
nor to represent "the truth and extent of Things, " but 
rather according to "the use of common Life," or to serve 
our own convenience ( 3 . 5. 7 , 2 . 2 8. 2) . 2 7 This appears to 
mean no more than that in framing or acquiring such ideas 
and rules, we rely upon the common usages of our respective 
communities ( 2. 2. 9, 3. 5. 15) • 28 What is significant here, 
however, is that Locke at times appeals to common usage not 
only as the actual standard, but also as "the Rule of Pro-
priety" ( 3. 9. 8; also 2. 3 O. 4) , as the proper or rational 
26Grant appears ultimately to rest her case for the 
"reasonable and serious" character of Locke's defense of 
the possibility of demonstrative moral knowledge upon the 
fact that we are the "workmanship of the Supreme Being" 
whose will the law of nature expresses; yet she concedes 
that "A great deal more would have to be said and demon-
strated before Locke's position could be considered a 
complete and persuasive ethical theory," and that "Locke's 
theological claims particularly require further argument" 
(1987, 26,48). 
27cf. Miller's observation that "Locke's position is 
not far from the view that language is 'practical 
consciousness'" (1979, 181). 
28Thus Locke affirms the practical primacy of both the 
civil law and the law of opinion relative to the divine 
law. The civil law "no body over-looks," just as "no Body, 
that has the least Thought, or Sense of a Man about him, 
can live in Society, under the constant Dislike, and ill 
Opinion of his Familiars"; whereas the "Penal ties that 
attend the breach of God's Laws, some, nay, perhaps, most 
Men seldom seriously reflect on" (2.28.9,12). On the sig-
nificance of Locke's estimate of the great power of the 
desire for esteem to bind individuals to their fellows and 
to their communities, see Tarcov 1984, 101-107, 137-141; 
Pangle 1988, 221-229. 
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standard for regulating the formation of moral ideas and 
rules. "For Words, especially of Languages already framed, 
being no Man's private possession .•. Men ... must also take 
care, to apply their Words, as near as may be, to such 
Ideas as Common Use has annexed them to" (3.11.11). On the 
basis of this apparent belief in the adequacy of common 
usage as a regulatory standard, Locke the moral philosopher 
might superficially appear to be an ancestor of Edmund 
Burke, in espousing a form of moral conservatism rooted in 
the conviction that there is wisdom embodied in the tested 
traditions of various communities, and that therefore moral 
innovations are generally to be eschewed. He does caution 
that II in Places, where Men in Society have already estab-
1 ished a Language amongst them, the signification of Words 
are [sic] very warily and sparingly to be alter'd" (3.6.51; 
also 4.4.10). 
As a moment's reflection shows, however, from this 
apparent assertion of the adequacy of common usage arises 
the central difficulty in Locke's account of a "demonstra-
tive" ethical science. That we form moral ideas and words 
according to our convenience means that we do so more-or-
less self-consciously according to perceived need or de-
sire. But if our ignorance of species essences is insup-
erable, then it would be impossible for us to frame such 
ideas on the basis of a universal or natural standard of 
needs or desires. Locke admits that common usage is at 
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best relative to communities or cultures and that it 
therefore provides "but a very uncertain Rule ... a very 
variable standard" for the regulation of moral discourse 
(3.11.25; also 3.9.8). If the standard of common usage is 
ultimately relativistic, then its regulatory capacity is 
ultimately illusory; reliance upon the radically conven-
tional standard of common usage could resolve none of the 
problems proceeding from the unregulated construction of 
moral ideas, because it could provide no means of adjudi-
cating the differences between opposing ethical systems. 
Insofar as our formation of substance and species ideas is 
arbitrary, our formation of moral ideas must be arbitrary 
as well. It is true, of course, that Locke distinguishes 
common or civil from philosophic usage (3.9.3), and thereby 
suggests the possibility of improving upon the former by 
appealing to the latter. Given, however, that mixed-mode 
ideas "have no certain connexion in Nature; and so no set-
tled Standard, any where in Nature existing, to rectify and 
adjust them by" (3.9.5), it would seem to follow that this 
improvement can consist in no more than an analytical clar-
ification of the moral ideas in common use, involving no 
critical assessment of their basic content ( 3. 11. llff. ) . 
If Locke indeed holds that the decisive difference between 
civil and philosophic usage of moral language consists 
merely in the superior precision or exactness of the latter 
(3.9.3), then Locke must affirm the necessarily conven-
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tional or historical character of all moral discourse, 
civil and philosophic alike.29 
At this point it would seem that the Essay's ostensi-
bly reassuring moral conservatism reveals itself to be 
merely the decent drapery of a profound radicalism lying at 
the heart of Locke's adoption of the standard of common 
usage. 30 His apparent counsel of deference to the accepted 
usages of one's community dissolves upon contact with his 
apparent affirmation of the basic conventionalism of those 
usages. What authority can be claimed for a body of common 
usage that "reduces it self at last to the Ideas of partic-
ular Men'' (3.11.25)? 31 Locke's account of a demonstrative 
science of ethics culminates, according to this argument, 
in a renewal of the paradoxical Hobbesian partnership of 
authoritarianism and revolutionary radicalism. If Locke 
conceives of moral and political science as a matter of 
pure, arbitrary definition, does he not then reduce that 
science to a counsel of submission to the authority of the 
most powerful definer? And if the basis of that authority 
29Absent a convincing argument for the existence of a 
legislating God, according to Ashcraft, Locke's proposal of 
a demonstrative science of ethics must sink into a "morass 
of total relativism" (1969, 211). Cf. Parry 1978, 34. 
30cf. Strauss' objection to the ostensible conserva-
tism of Burke (1953, 311-323). 
31cf. 3.11.12: Immediately after recommending a 
deference to common usage, Locke excepts those who "in the 
Improvement of their Knowledge, come to have Ideas differ-
ent from the vulgar and ordinary received ones ... " 
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is purely conventional, consisting decisively in the power 
of the defining or commanding will, then could there be any 
motive or ground for submitting to it, other than the tim-
idity of those who believe themselves insufficiently power-
ful to command? Conversely, would not a purely def ini-
tional, conventional political science thus embolden the 
rebellious or revolutionary aspirations of all those suf-
ficiently proud or rash to believe themselves capable of 
commanding? 
The argument of the Essay thus reveals, in this view, 
the deeply radical significance of Locke's conception in 
the Second Treatise of the natural condition as a condition 
of waste or unprovidedness, 32 and of his corollary descrip-
tion of the law of nature as "unwritten, and so nowhere to 
be found but in the minds of Men" (TT II.136). 33 Notwith-
standing Locke's ostensible reassurances, it would seem 
that the constructive activity of Lockean humanity as homo 
faber is if anything more prominent in the sphere of moral-
ity than in that of physical nature. 34 Applied in the 
32For Pangle Locke's critique of innatism or his 
affirmation of the mind's natural unprovidedness thus 
amounts to a "denial of all moral first principles'' (1988, 
176ff). Cf. Vaughan 1925, 139,163ff; Wallin 1984, 155-156. 
33cf. Strauss 1953, 226-230. 
34Thus a younger Locke observes that the laws of 
nature are "hidden and unperceived," akin to wealth "which 
has been hidden in the darkness" and "must be excavated 
with great labor" (LN I.111; II.135). On the Lockean human 
being as homo faber, see Wood 1983, 34,157ff. On the re-
lated concept of workmanship as the central principle of 
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former sphere, Locke's apparently modest counsel that we 
rest "in a quiet Ignorance of those Things ... beyond the 
reach of our Capacities" (1.1.4) loses altogether its 
appearance of modesty. All law is purely human or positive 
law; no person's or party's definition of justice can be 
said to be intrinsically superior, truer, than another's. 
In Jeffrey Wallin's forceful distillation of the signifi-
cance of this teaching, according to Locke's Essay "the 
discourse of politics, hitherto naively thought to be con-
stituted by disputes over justice and the common good, can 
be better understood as a battle of wills regarding the 
question of whose mental image of justice is to prevail •i 
(1984, 154). 35 The naked essence of Lockean politics, 
viewed in the light of this reading of the Essay. is 
nothing but will-to-power. 
Lockean morality, see Tully 1980, 3,22-42,109ff,12lff. 
35see also Strauss 1953, 248-251; zuckert 1974, 561-
563; Miller 1979; West 1988, 21-29. 
THE DEFENSE OF NATURAL HISTORY 
In attempting to formulate a response to this read-
ing, it is worthwhile for us to begin by noticing what we 
might call the strikingly "anti-Lockean" character of the 
teaching thus attributed to Locke. In the light of this 
reading of the Essay. the philosopher with a reputation 
perhaps unsurpassed as a teacher of rational liberty and of 
resistance to arbitrary power appears instead to deny that 
any particular conception of justice could be superior in 
truth or rationality to any other, and thus to espouse the 
most unrestrained moral and political willfulness. The 
same Locke who insists against the evils of extreme par-
tisanship that "there cannot be a more dangerous thing to 
rely on" than "the Opinion of others" (ECHU 4 .15. 6; also 
4.12.4), and who warns that it is no "small power it gives 
one Man over another, to have the Authority to be the Dic-
tator of Principles ... " ( 1. 4. 24) , nonetheless proposes a 
science of ethics that would have the effect of reducing 
all conceptions of justice to expressions of pure partisan-
ship, and thereby provides theoretical support for asser-
tions of absolute and arbitrary power. The same Locke who 
affirms that "civil government is the proper remedy for the 
inconveniences of the state of nature" (TT II .13) also 
effectively undermines the distinction between the natural 
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and political conditions by implying that in the latter no 
less than in the former, the cardinal virtues are force and 
fraud. The argument of the Essay according to this view 
undermines virtually all the principles Locke professes to 
hold dear, all the principles that he has gained enduring 
honor by publicly defending. 
Those who find in Locke's work such fundamental and 
flagrant inconsistencies tend to explain them in either of 
two ways. The more traditional, mainstream explanation 
holds that Locke is simply confused; as John Dunn expresses 
it, Locke's thinking is "profoundly and exotically incoher-
ent" (1969, 29). Similar is the opinion of Peter Laslett, 
who concludes sweepingly that "all thinkers are inconsis-
tent," and who nonetheless finds the case of Locke extra-
ordinary: "Locke is, perhaps, the least consistent of all 
the great philosophers" (1960, 103, 95). Some commentators 
imply further that Locke is not only confused, but is also 
aware of and embarrassed by his confusions; Wolfgang Von 
Leyden believes, for instance, that Locke's failure to 
elaborate fully his proposed science of ethics reflects the 
fact that he was at a loss to do so (1954, 74-75), while 
Dunn more recently argues that after a series of abortive 
attempts at s,uch an elaboration, Locke in hopeless resigna-
tion simply gave up this aspiration by 1694 ( 1984, 66, 
84).36 
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Pursuing this reading still further, Laslett even 
suggests that the contradictory relation between the Essay 
and the Two Treatises "may have been one of the reasons why 
Locke was unwilling to be known as the author of both 
books" ( 9 5 ) . 
The alternative account, recovered37 and made promi-
nent in recent years by Leo Strauss, explains the difficult 
relation between the Essay and the Two Treatises by refer-
ence to a more coherent intention on the part of Locke to 
address those works to distinct audiences: 
Above all, the accepted interpretation does not pay 
sufficient attention to the character of the Treatise; 
it somehow assumes that the Treatise contains the 
philosophic presentation of Locke's political doctrine, 
whereas it contains, in fact, only its "civil" presen-
tation. In the Treatise, it is less Locke the philoso-
pher than Locke the Englishman who addresses not philo-
sophers, but Englishmen. (Strauss 1953, 220-221) 38 
But if the Essay presents the truth underlying the civil 
presentation of the Treatise, then it would seem to follow 
that the latter's accounts of natural laws and natural 
36A somewhat milder statement of the thesis that 
Locke's failure to elaborate fully his proposed ethical 
science reflects an incapacity on his part appears in Parry 
1978, 33ff. 
37The suspicion that Locke is a self-concealed fol-
lower of Hobbes and Spinoza was widespread in the 1690s and 
beyond. See Works 1823, 4.471 for Locke's response to 
Stillingfleet's charge to this effect. Cf. idem 8.420-421. 
For a more general accounting of the charges leveled 
against the Essay by Locke's contemporaries, see Yol ton 
1956, especially 144-166; also Cox 1960, 19-28. 
38For Locke's distinction between civil and philo-
sophic discourse, cf. ECHU 3.9.3,8,15, with TT II.52, and 
I.109. See also Zuckert 1974. 
119 
rights are alike merely civil or exoteric, that the Essay's 
apparent demolition of ontologically based theories of 
morality or justice represents Locke's authentic intention: 
"In a word, the law of nature is 'a creature of the under-
standing rather than a work of nature' ; it is 'barely in 
the mind, ' a notion, and not 'in the things themselves'" 
(1953, 229-230). 39 The implication seems to be that in 
place of the Locke of the traditionalists--muddled even to 
the point of tragedy (Dunn 1984, vi-vii), but well inten-
tioned and thus comparatively benign--we confront according 
to the Straussian reading a positively perverse and even 
nihilistic Locke, a Locke inspired by an insight into the 
"demonism of values," whose public rejection of political 
willfulness paradoxically represents in itself nothing more 
than a self-conscious assertion of political willfulness. 
As we proceed in elaborating a somewhat different 
view of Locke, we will have occasion to acknowledge the 
considerable merits of each of these readings; at present, 
however, in beginning to lay the foundation for that alter-
native view, it is necessary to point out some possible 
difficulties. Of the more traditional critics, for in-
39strauss' references are to ECHU 3.5.12. See also 
West 1988, 3,21-29; Wallin 1984; Miller 1979. On the basis 
of the natural law, Tully also reads the Two Treatises in 
the light of the Essay, but he stops short of drawing the 
nihilistic conclusion implicit in the Straussian reading. 
In his view, Locke's employment of the language of natural 
law is based upon a self-conscious historicism that circum-
scribes moral discourse by "the constitutive and regulative 
ideas of a given culture" (1980, 22-30). 
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stance, we might question the likelihood that a thinker who 
is sufficiently competent to elaborate a thoroughgoing, 
radical critique of the old Aristotelian-Scholastic episte-
mology and natural philosophy could be at the same time 
incapable of seeing that that critique dissolved the foun-
dation of his own ethical and political thought. 40 Or, 
furthermore, if he were aware of such an inconsistency, how 
likely is it that a writer so evidently fastidious about 
his published work as Locke41 would not attempt to correct 
it? And finally, if for whatever reason Locke desired to 
advance a doctrine of natural law that he knew he could not 
defend, how likely is it that this desire could overpower 
his respect for the truth in the writing of one work, but 
not the other? 
The esotericism thesis renders a subtler and more 
philosophically formidable Locke, one far less captivated 
by intellectual fashion or custom than the Locke of the 
traditionalists. Yet here too questions linger. Of these 
the most significant concerns whether the attribution to 
Locke of a fundamentally nihilistic epistemology can render 
an adequate account of Locke's moral and political inten-
tions as they are manifested both in his writings and in 
his more direct engagements. In view of the facts that he 
40cf. Strauss 1953, 220: Locke's alleged inconsisten-
cies "are so obvious that they cannot have escaped the 
notice of a man of his rank and his sobriety." 
41see Laslett 1960, 19-22,164. 
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not only presented himself as the great enemy of all gov-
ernmental authoritarianism and willfulness; that he not 
only explicitly recognized that the power to define moral 
rules implies the power to dominate; but also, and above 
all, that he placed himself in mortal danger in the service 
of the cause of rational liberty; is it not strange to 
suggest that Locke believed, deep down, that justice is 
wholly definitional or conventional, or that there is ulti-
mately no ground for any distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate government or between rational and irrational 
consent? In view of such facts, we might well wonder 
whether the proponents of the esotericism thesis in the end 
view Locke as a fully self-conscious nihilist or instead 
merely find in his work a nihilistic strain that points not 
to a coherent intention, but only to a deeper inconsistency 
than the traditionalists allege--an inconsistency that pro-
ceeds fundamentally not from a half-hearted embrace of the 
teaching of Hobbes, perhaps tinged with a Christian bad 
conscience, but rather from a nearly whole-hearted adoption 
of that teaching and therewith of its own peculiar diffi-
culties.42 
42Though he seems at several points to imply such a 
charge, Strauss does not openly accuse Locke of harboring a 
nihilistic intention. On the other hand, he does not 
overtly accuse Locke of inconsistency, but one might easily 
infer such a charge from the fact that in the matter of the 
natural law, according to Strauss, Locke "followed the lead 
given by Hobbes" (1953, 221), whom Strauss accuses of fun-
damental inconsistencies of his own (1953, 267-281; 1959, 
182,191,196). This ambiguity has marked some of the writ-
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It is by no means impossible, of course, that Locke's 
political thought really does suffer from confusion at one 
level or another, or that Locke really was a nihilist who 
by some unaccountable intention espoused exoterically a 
relatively moderate but ultimately groundless doctrine of 
natural rights liberalism. The present reconsideration 
originates less in a certainty of the erroneousness of such 
readings than in a kind of principled caution with respect 
to their endorsement. Nathan Tarcov maintains that "If ... 
we hope to learn something from Locke, then the verdict of 
confusion ought to be only our last resort and we had 
better explore other avenues of interpretation" (1981, 
200) . To this we might add that this relegation of the 
"verdict of confusion" to the status of an interpretive 
last resort should apply equally well to the verdict of 
Lockean arbitrariness. The ref ore, we come once again to 
raise the question: Is there no reasonable alternative to 
believing that the mature Locke's career-long devotion to 
the cause of free government proceeded from a mere personal 
or partisan idiosyncrasy, that it represented, whether he 
ing on Locke by Strauss' students or followers as well. 
Thus Miller refers to the "enormous" difficulties in the 
attempt at finding in Locke a coherent account of natural 
law (1979, 187), and Hiram Caton views Locke's teaching as 
an incoherent attempt at diluting the implications of the 
philosophy of power that is the defining element of modern-
ity (1983, 8-9); while Wallin and Thomas West clearly em-
phasize Locke's role as a progenitor of nihilism, and ap-
pear to attribute to him a higher degree of self-conscious-
ness as such (Wallin 1984, especially 153-157; West 1988, 
especially 22,26). 
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understood it or not, a mere irrational "commitment"? 
Abundant textual and bibliographic evidence establishes 
clearly Locke's awareness of the diversity of moral concep-
tions, both theoretical and historical, among thinkers and 
actual communities, and thus of alternatives to his own 
conception. 43 Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate 
either that he believed in the short-term or long-term 
inevitability of victory for the doctrine of just govern-
ment that he espoused, or that such a consideration might 
have influenced him, had he so believed. Does this not 
suggest that Locke chose, and thus preferred to espouse his 
particular doctrine of justice? And if so, then what are 
the grounds for this choice?44 Why or in what sense did 
43 For some comparatively benign, theoretical examples 
of such diversity, see ECHU 1. 3. 5, 4 .12. 4. Some of the 
more spectacular and grotesque examples appear in ECHU 
1.3.9,10,13; TT I.54-60; LN IV.145-151, VII.177-201. See 
more generally the bibliographic information in Harrison 
and Laslett 1971. 
44 rt would not yet do justice to the element of choice 
in his espousal of (what we now know as) political liberal-
ism merely to establish somehow, in modification of the 
arguments of MacPherson and Wood, that Locke intends to 
rationalize the interests of an ascendant capitalist class. 
If it is the effect of his epistemology to deny in princi-
ple that a "capitalist" conception of justice could be any 
more defensible than any other conception of justice, then 
his espousal of such a conception must again reduce ulti-
mately to a mere idiosyncrasy, or to a failure to reflect 
upon the accidental character of his association with that 
class. Pangle suggests intriguingly that Locke's political 
thought does indeed proceed from an intention to advance 
the interests of a particular class, but that the class in 
question comprises the philosophers; yet even this inten-
tion, according to Pangle, remains arbitrary at least from 
the point of view of Locke's reader, in that Locke fails or 
declines to render an account of the experience of the 
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Locke apparently believe that he could erect a defensible 
doctrine of justice or legitimacy on the basis of his 
understanding of nature or of human knowledge? 
In reassessing the significance of Locke's critical 
analysis of our ideas of species, it is useful for us to 
begin with a partial concession. It is no part of the 
present purpose to deny, in the face of the plain words of 
his text, that Locke does emphatically reject the old doc-
trine of natural species. The question of interest here 
concerns not the fact that he does this but rather his 
broader intention. Locke places great emphasis on his 
critique, elaborating it with unusual vigor; he gives the 
impression that he considers its rejection to be of great 
importance. If in fact he intends to create such an 
impression, then in order for us to understand the precise 
nature, scope and (possible) limitations of his critique, 
we must understand why he believes it important to render 
this critique, what purpose he intends it to serve. 
Locke believes he shall be pardoned for dwelling so 
long on the question of essences, "because the Faults, Men 
are usually guilty of in this kind, are not only the 
greatest hinderances of true Knowledge; but are so well 
thought of, as to pass for it" (3.5.16). As this remark 
indicates, the faults with which Locke is concerned neither 
originate in nor are limited to the scholastic philoso-
philosopher as such (1988, 264-275). 
phers. 
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Nonetheless, the manner in which these influential 
faults constitute such profound hindrances of the advance-
ment of learning comes most clearly into view when we 
consider his critical analyses of the doctrines of sub-
stance and natural species in the context of his more gen-
eral critique of the teachings of Scholasticism. Like his 
predecessors Bacon and Hobbes, 45 Locke is uncompromising 
concerning the pernicious general influence of the scholas-
tic "Men of Argument" (3.11.3) over the universities of the 
day. Moreover, he maintains that the errors of the latter 
concerning species and essences ultimately represent only 
particularly important instances of the fundamental error 
of the scholastic philosophy. In holding "that the several 
Species of Substances had their distinct internal substan-
tial Forms; and that it was those Forms, which made the 
distinction of Substances into their true Species and Gen-
era" (3.6.10), Locke's scholastics hold that there exists a 
direct correspondence between the (properly cultivated) 
understanding and the external, natural world. They hold 
that natural species essences not only exist, but are in 
principle perfectly intelligible to us; our names and 
definitions of various kinds of substances constitute 
perfectly adequate representations of the order of things 
articulated in nature. In this respect 1 ike those who 
45cf. Leviathan chs. 8, 46, 4 7; "The Great Instaura-
tion"; The New Organon, I, I-XXXVII (in Anderson 1960). 
126 
possess only a purely prescientific or commonsense under-
standing of the world, they erroneously "suppose their 
words to stand also for the reality of Things" (3.2.5; also 
2.13.18, 3.9.5, 3.10.14ff., 3.11.6, 4.4.17, 4.7.15; cu 29). 
It is not difficult to see why Locke blames this 
supposition, however benign it may be in its everyday mani-
festations, for the obstruction of scientific progress. 
For in treating their names of substances and species as 
though they were authorized by nature itself, or in Locke's 
terminology as though they were themselves "archetypes" and 
not "ectypes" or copies, the scholastics must render them-
selves obtuse to the need to refine or correct their defi-
nitions by reference to empirical reality. The result of 
their fundamental error is then a particularly dogmatic 
attempt at grounding natural science in "the bare Contem-
plation of ... abstract Ideas" (4.12.9), or in a barren, ab-
stract rationalism according to which the careful deduction 
of the consequences of applying one's "maxims" or "princi-
ples" to one's received substance or species ideas can 
somehow yield genuine knowledge of nature (4.7.llff., 
4. 8. 9ff.) . Given the natural variations among different 
individuals' substance and species ideas, a conception of 
natural science as nothing but a body of deductions based 
upon the application of maxims to those ideas is bound to 
produce considerable dispute or dissensus. Moreover, by 
virtue of its very abstraction, or of the fact that its 
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supposed discoveries proceed purely from deductive reason-
ing, the scholastic natural science tends to carry an un-
reasonable expectation of demonstrative certainty as its 
proper yield. Given further, therefore, this demand for 
certainty that is a concomitant of any deductive science, 
it follows that the scholastic natural science will produce 
virtually infinite and endless disputes, in direct propor-
tion to its tendency to inflate the dogmatic "confidence of 
mistaken Pretenders to a knowledge that they had not" 
(3.8.2; also 3.6.49, 3.10.21). Its likely culmination, ac-
cording to Locke, will be its own collapse into a "perfect 
Scepticism" or an extreme epistemological willfulness 
(1.1.7; 3.10.22). 46 
What we are suggesting is that Locke fashions his 
critique of the methods and doctrines of the scholastics 
with a view toward preparing a remedy for what he takes to 
be their more pernicious consequences. For such a disease 
46Nor should this account of the generally pernicious 
effects of the scholastic teaching obscure its potential 
for producing more particular evils as well. Locke fears 
that to be overly assured of the adequacy of one's idea of 
humanity, for instance, is to be tempted all too often to 
use that idea to define out of humanity beings deficient in 
one quality or another. We mentioned in the preceding 
chapter his account of the alarming case of the eminently 
rational Abbot of St. Martin, whose native disfigurement 
brought him as a child "very near being excluded out of the 
Species of Man" by those entrusted with his care (3.6.26). 
At least a part of Locke's intention is clearly to insist, 
on grounds of compassion or "humanitarianism," that our 
ideas of species and of the human species in particular are 
far from precise enough to provide a basis for deciding 
questions of entitlement to baptism, let alone of life or 
death (3.6.27, 3.11.20, 4.4.14ff.). 
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as Locke diagnoses, an assertion of the insuperable arbi-
trariness of all our claims to knowledge of the external 
world would surely constitute a highly peculiar remedy. 
The present contention is rather that the therapeutic pur-
pose he intends it to serve limits the destructive charac-
ter of his critique; Locke's critique becomes fully intel-
ligible only if we take seriously his stated intention 
thereby to remove the greatest hindrance of the acquisition 
of "true knowledge" and to prevent the collapse of science 
into "perfect Scepticism." It is in the context of his 
complaints against the philosophers of the schools that we 
should understand the profession of modesty or moderation 
with which he introduces the Essay. Repudiating as the 
product of an intellectual vice the undiscriminating scho-
lastic demand for certainty in all fields of inquiry, Locke 
cautions that "we shall then use our Understandings right, 
when we entertain all Objects in that Way and Proportion, 
that they are suited to our Faculties ... and not peremptor-
ily, or intemperately require Demonstration, and demand 
Certainty, where Probability only is to be had ... " ( 1. 1. 5) . 
Similarly, with reference to the closely related quality of 
abstraction in the scholastic natural science, Locke ob-
jects to the practice of "some Philosophers" who would "be-
lieve [their) Reason (for so Men improperly call Arguments 
drawn from their Principles) against their Senses" 
(4.20.10; also 4.3.16). 
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The implication is that Locke's critique of the 
scholastic doctrines of substance and natural species is 
governed by an intention not to assert a new and possibly 
more virulent form of arbitrariness in place of the older 
form, but instead to facilitate a defense of empirical, 
probabilistic reasoning as the basis of a genuine science 
of nature. Having denied the possibility of a strict, 
demonstrative natural science on grounds essentially the 
same as those supporting his rejection of the doctrine of 
natural species, Locke hastens to add that he "would not 
therefore be thought to dis-esteem, or dissuade the Study 
of Nature" ( 4. 12. 11) . The impossibility of demonstrative 
certainty concerning the necessary relations among some 
ideas does not imply the futility of such study; it merely 
means that as compared to inquiries such as mathematics 
that involve ideas that are the mind's own creations or 
archetypes, the proper study of nature differs in its 
methods and in the type of knowledge or assent that it can 
produce. "We must therefore .•. adapt our methods of Enquiry 
to the nature of the Ideas we examine, and the Truth we 
search after" (4.12.7). 47 As Locke understands it, we 
confront in the object of his critique the paradox of a 
doctrine of natural species and by extension of natural 
science that leads its adherents away from nature, away 
47Ryle holds that Locke's major contribution to 
philosophy lies in his division of the sciences (1968 
(1933], 38). Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1094b. 
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from the proper objects of inquiry for a true science of 
nature. He therefore insists repeatedly on the need to 
return to "the Fountains of Knowledge, which are in Things 
themselves" as the proper remedy for the hyper-rationalist 
scholastic abuses (3.11.5; also 3.10.22,25; 3.11.24,25; 
4.4.16,18; 4.8.10).48 The proper method of inquiry into 
the world of nature involves not abstract deductive reason-
ing about names, but rather inductive, probabilistic reas-
oning based upon the careful accumulation of "Experience," 
or "Observation" (4.12.12, also 14; 4.3.16). 49 Choosing to 
employ the contemporary usage, Locke calls this method 
"Natural History." 
Let us consider more carefully Locke's defense of the 
legitimacy and utility of probabilistic reasoning in the 
natural sciences. In view of the fact that we cannot be 
certain of cause-effect relationships, the basic question 
appropriate to the sort of natural science of which we are 
capable concerns the degree of confidence with which we are 
entitled to make experimental or inductive judgments. In 
his discussion "Of the Degrees of Assent," Locke affirms 
48on the revolt of the early modern empiricists or 
proponents of the new "experimental philosophy" against the 
scholastic "orgy of rationalism," see Whitehead 1925, 12-
24, 57ff. On Locke's critique as an instance of this 
revolt, see Mandelbaum 1964, 7-8,53ff; Yolton 1969, 188-
193; 1970, 44-75, especially 54ff; Squadrito 1979, 28-29, 
126. 
49on Locke's insistence upon probabilism over against 
certainty as the standard of assent proper to the natural 
sciences, see Yolton 1969, 189ff; also Shapiro 1983, 3-73. 
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that in several degrees "Probability ... carries so much 
evidence with it, that it naturally determines the Judg-
ment," so that assent that falls short of certainty can 
nonetheless rise decisively above mere "Belief" or "Conjec-
ture" ( 4. 16. 9) • In the lowest of such degrees, Locke ob-
serves that with respect to "things that happen indiffer-
ently ... when any particular matter of fact is vouched for 
by the concurrent Testimony of unsuspected Witnesses, there 
our Assent is ... unavoidable." Providing still firmer 
ground is the corroboration of our own Experience by "many 
and undoubted Witnesses." The testimony of "History giving 
us such an account of Men in all Ages; and my own Experi-
ence .. confirming it," for instance, the truth of the propo-
sition "that most Men prefer their private Advantage, to 
the publick" is extremely probable (4.16.8,7). 
Finally, Locke describes the "first ... and highest 
degree of Probability" in terms that make clear its great 
significance for his account of natural science. When "the 
general consent of all Men, in all Ages, as far as it can 
be known, concurrs with a Man's constant and never-failing 
Experience in like cases," Locke holds that we can with 
virtually perfect assurance make judgments concerning par-
ticular matters of fact. Probabilities of this degree 
reach "so near to Certainty, that they govern our Thoughts 
as absolutely, and influence all our Actions as fully, as 
the most evident demonstration" (4.16.6; also 4.20.15ff.). 
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Even if we do not observe the particular events, we can 
"put past doubt" the propositions that fire warmed someone 
and melted lead and that a piece of iron sank in water and 
floated in mercury, because they conform with our constant 
experience and are never controverted. In striking con-
trast to his emphasis in rejecting the naturalness of spe-
cies, Locke maintains here that on the basis of such evi-
dence we can infer that in the highest probability it is in 
the nature of fire and lead so to behave. When we find 
certain occurrences "always to be after the same manner," 
as in the cases of "the stated Constitutions and Properties 
of Bodies," we infer "with reason" that they represent "the 
regular proceedings of Causes and Effects in the ordinary 
course of Nature. 11 This, observes Locke, "we call an 
Argument from the Nature of Things themselves" (4.16.6). 
To what extent does this account of probabilistic 
assent involve a concession to some form of the argument 
for the naturalness of species? Several commentators argue 
either that Locke does not deny the existence of natural 
species, 50 or more positively that Locke ultimately "admits 
that there are natural kinds" (Mackie 1976, 88; Colman 
1983, 124). 51 We must acknowledge that Locke's formulation 
50cf. Gibson 1917, 199-201; Aaron 1955, 204; Yol ton 
1970, 32-33. 
51colman plainly misreads ECHU 3.10.21 as a statement 
in support of the existence of natural species, but he need 
not rely on this passage alone. As Mackie points out, 
Locke provides stronger support for this reading at 3.3.13, 
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may suggest an element of hesitation or ambiguity; to say 
"we call" this an argument from the nature of things is 
clearly less emphatic than to say "this is" an argument 
from the nature of things. Still, the textual and bio-
graphical evidence is substantial in support of the opinion 
that Locke is sincere in his defense of probabilistic 
assent to propositions concerning the properties of things 
in nature. In considering the issue somewhat pragmatic-
ally, he clearly believes that such assent is indispensable 
in the management of everyday living. A complete rejection 
of arguments "from the Nature of Things" or of any empiri-
cally grounded, probabilistic judgment would be not merely 
unwise, in Locke's view, but in fact simply impossible to 
maintain consistently. Let us consider, for instance, a 
certain vegetable or a piece of meat, bearing a certain 
color, texture, flavor, and a known (plant or animal) ori-
gin. Let us assume further that in all or virtually all 
previously observed instances, such qualities have been 
coincident with a nutritional quality. Must our ultimate 
ignorance concerning the relevant real essence produce in 
us a reasonable doubt of the nutritional quality of the 
vegetable or meat before us? 
rooted in common sense: 
Locke's answer is firmly 
and especially at 3. 6. 36, 37. Similar denials that Locke 
effects a radical distinction between the real and nominal 
essences of substances appear in Yol ton 1956, 139; 1970, 
32-34; Von Leyden 1969, 229; Squadrito 1978, 41-59. 
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He that in the ordinary Affairs of Life, would admit of 
nothing but direct plain Demonstration, would be sure 
of nothing in this World, but of perishing quickly. 
The wholesomeness of his Meat or Drink would not give 
him reason to venture on it: And I would fain know, 
what 'tis he could do upon such grounds, as were capa-
ble of no Doubt, no Objection. (4.11.10; also 1.1.5, 
4.2.14, 4.10.2, 4.11.2,3,4,8, 4.14.1; King 1830, 324) 
More important for present purposes than its role in 
ordinary affairs, however, is the function of Locke's 
defense of probabilism in preserving the possibility of a 
science of nature. Locke's seriousness on this point too 
is corroborated biographically both by his fellowship in 
the Royal Society, and by the fact that he not only 
praised, but to one degree or another actively collaborated 
in research with the "Master-Builders" Boyle, Sydenham, and 
Newton, all of whom were exponents of an experimental, 
probabilistic natural science. 52 But would it be any less 
difficult to conduct the research in pursuance of such a 
science than to manage one's ordinary concerns, in the 
absence of at least a tacit, hypothetical supposition of 
the existence of real essences or natural species? It is 
difficult to see, for instance, how the chemist in Locke's 
example who wishes to experiment with gold or sulphur would 
52The first Secretary of the Royal Society, Henry 
Oldenburg, describes its purpose as follows: 'It is our 
business, in the first place, to scrutinize the whole of 
Nature and to investigate its activity and powers by means 
of observations and experiments; and then in course of time 
to hammer out a more solid philosophy and more ample ameni-
ties of civilization' (Quoted in Hunter 1981, 37). On 
Locke's collaborations with Boyle and Sydenham, see Cran-
ston 1957, 88-93. On the relationship between Locke and 
Newton, see especially Rogers 1969 and 1978. 
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acquire a sample for the experiment with out employing a 
hypothetical conception of what the substance under inves-
tigation is, or with out an idea of a set of coexisting 
qualities to which its name refers. (See 4.6.8ff.; also 
3.6.8). Locke does of course grant the necessity of such a 
conception, while clearly insisting that the idea in ques-
tion constitutes merely a nominal, not a real essence. The 
point here, however, is that this nominal essence would be 
of no help whatsoever in designing the experiment unless 
one could reasonably suppose that certain ideas or quali-
ties necessarily, naturally coexist--unless one could reas-
onably suppose, that is, that the nominal essence repre-
sents, however imperfectly, a real species essence in 
nature. In the end it seems simply impossible to conceive 
of a science of nature in any form absent a belief in the 
possibility of making judgments concerning the nature of 
things. The fact that he takes seriously the possibility 
of such a science would seem unavoidably to constitute on 
Locke's part a quiet acknowledgment of the limits of a 
strict empiricism, or to put it another way, of the indis-
pensability and hence reasonableness of adopting as a con-
dition of all further knowing a certain epistemic faith in 
the ultimate orderliness or lawfulness of nature. 53 
53cf. Whitehead's observation that "there can be no 
living science unless there is a widespread instinctive 
conviction in the existence of an Order of Things, and, in 
particular, of an Order of Nature" (1925, 5). 
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Alongside his emphatic arguments for the purely suppo-
sitional or hypothetical character of substance ideas and 
for the false, useless, and pernicious character of the 
doctrine of natural species, Locke yet insists that we do 
not and should not form our ideas of substances and kinds 
simply arbitrarily. 54 
But though these nominal Essences of Substances are 
made by the Mind, they are not yet made so arbitrarily, 
as those of mixed Modes ... the Mind, in making its 
complex Ideas of Substances, only follows Nature; and 
puts none together, which are not supposed to have an 
union in Nature ... For though Men may make what complex 
Ideas they please, and give what Names to them they 
will; yet if they will be understood, when they speak 
of Things really existing, they must, in some degree, 
conform their Ideas to the Things they would speak of: 
Or else Men's Language will be like that of Babel; and 
every Man's Words, being intelligible only to himself, 
would no longer serve to Conversation, and the ordinary 
Affairs of Life... (3.6.28) 
And the same necessity of conforming his Ideas of 
Substances to Things, without him, as to Archetypes 
made by Nature, that Adam was under, if he would not 
wilfully impose upon himself, the same are all Men ever 
since under too. (3.6.51) 
If the premodern doctrine of natural species or sorts were 
completely groundless, then an epistemological willfulness 
in determining or imposing order in the external world 
would be unavoidable. That Locke insists with respect to 
our ideas of the species of substances that it is possible 
and necessary to correct our definitions by reference to 
54As Grant points out (1987, 36), when Locke uses the 
term "arbitrary" to describe the manner in which we form 
some of our complex ideas, he generally means something 
like "non-necessary" as opposed to "unreasonable" or 
"willful." Cf. ECHU 3.4.17 and 3.5.3 with 3.5.6,7. 
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the standard of nature, that "to define their Names right, 
natural History is to be enquired into; and their Proper-
ties are, with care and examination, to be found out" 
(3.11.24; also 3.9.11, 4.4.12), would seem to indicate, 
unless he were guilty of the grossest self-contradiction, 
that he does not intend his critique to imply a total, 
root-and-branch rejection of that doctrine. If our defini-
tions of substance and species names were wholly and neces-
sarily conventional, products of purely arbitrary agree-
ments, then how could they be capable of correction or 
refinement by reference to a standard in nature? 
It would seem that this appeal to nature or natural 
history as the measure of our definitions is tantamount to 
an admission on Locke's part that the doctrine of natural 
species has at least a partial basis in experience. As 
Locke explains it, this basis lies in the fact that "Nature 
in the Production of Things, makes several of them alike: 
there is nothing more obvious, especially in the Races of 
Animals, and all Things propagated by Seed" (3.3.13; also 
3.4.17; 3.6.30,36,37). Locke concedes not only that there 
are phenomenal likenesses among things in nature, but also 
that these phenomenal likenesses probably represent inter-
nal or ontological likenesses: "Nature makes many particu-
lar Things. which do agree one with another, in many sensi-
ble Qualities, and probably too, in their internal frame 
and Cons ti tut ion ... " ( 3. 6. 3 6) . The probability that some 
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causal necessity lies beneath the considerable degree of 
order manifest in the natural world provides the legitimate 
basis of our arguments "from the Nature of Things. 1155 This 
does not necessarily mean that Locke resurrects in a dif-
ferent form the doctrine of natural species. He does not 
and cannot concede the legitimacy of any probabilistic 
inference of the adequacy of our ideas, constructed out of 
phenomenal likenesses, as representatives of real essences 
themselves; for our ignorance of the real essences or in-
ternal constitutions of things coupled with the virtually 
infinite number of ideas that may constantly coexist in a 
given substance render it at least as a practical matter 
impossible that our species ideas could adequately repre-
sent the things to which we refer them. 56 It is for this 
55Ayers maintains that "Locke's recognition of natural 
resemblances is not a concession of any kind in the 
argument against natural species," and accordingly that 
Locke's insistence on the possibility of correcting our 
species definitions expresses merely his desire for greater 
precision in our construction of nominal essences ( 1981, 
257,264-266). Once again, however, it seems to me wholly 
mysterious how Locke could insist that the "Properties" of 
species "are, with care and examination, to be found out" 
(3.11.24), i.e. how he could believe in the possibility of 
refining our nominal essence ideas by observation unless he 
acknowledges the possibility that nature produces things in 
kinds, with constantly coexisting qualities in common. 
56An exception appears at 3.6.37, where Locke states 
that species essences are "of Man's making," and not never, 
but "seldom adequate to the internal Nature of the Things 
they are taken from." Because Locke provides no example of 
a species idea that is adequate to the internal nature of 
its referent, it is difficult to explain this exception. 
At no point, however, does he elaborate any of its possible 
implications or modify the thrust of his critique on this 
basis. 
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reason that Locke urges us to give up the aspiration toward 
final, complete knowledge of natural species essences. But 
the resemblances or "similitudes" of things do make it pos-
sible for us to make more-or-less rough judgments concern-
ing the likelihood that a given set of similar natural 
beings are constituents of a natural species whose precise 
boundaries are unknown to us, and they also make it possi-
ble for us to judge the adequacy of our species ideas rela-
tive to one another, according to their greater or lesser 
accounting of coexisting ideas (3.6.31, 4.6.13). Nothing 
in Locke's argument prevents us, for instance, from judging 
on the basis of our observation of the regular coexistence 
in certain beings of the ideas or qualities of "Life, 
Sense, spontaneous Motion, and the Faculty of Reasoning" 
(3. 3 .10) that such beings are very probably members of a 
common natural species. The real difficulty that moves 
Locke to emphasize the conventional element of species def-
inition concerns not the existence of an "ordinary course 
of Nature," but rather the fact that nature seems "very 
liberal of these real Essences" (3.6.32), or as Mackie puts 
it, that nature "supplies far more (similitudes among 
things] than we use" (1976, 136).57 
57Locke's eager references to the irregularities of 
nature's production--once again, "sit fides penes Author-
em"--for the most part represent only especially striking 
instances of the fact that nature produces a virtual infin-
ity in number and degrees of resemblances among particu-
lars. The key to settling the boundaries among species 
lies in selecting which of these resemblances it is impor-
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However firm, therefore, may be Locke's refusal sim-
ply to resurrect the doctrine of natural species on the 
basis of his defense of probabilism and natural history, it 
is clear that the resemblances or "similitudes" among na-
ture's productions provide the proper foundations for our 
formation of substance and species ideas, and by implica-
tion for the empirically oriented improvement of natural 
science. Locke's suggestion that it is possible and desir-
able to correct experimentally our substance or species 
definitions seems based upon a conception of the relation 
of nominal to real essences as asymptotic, such that 
through diligent experimentation and observation, we are 
entitled to hold our nominal essences as ever-closer, if 
always imperfect, approximations of their corresponding 
real essences.58 Therefore, the fact of our ultimate 
uncertainty about the existence of necessary combinations 
or repugnancies among ideas or qualities in nature does not 
liberate us from any natural discipline in the formation of 
these ideas . Indeed to the contrary, Locke reasons, it 
underlines the need for such discipline: "our Ideas of 
Substances ... must not consist of Ideas put together at the 
tant or useful for us to select and denominate as species 
(cf. 3.6.38). As again Mackie observes, it is this selec-
tivity that above all constitutes the element of human 
workmanship in the construction of species ideas (1976, 
136). To the problem of the grounds for selecting and 
ranking species, especially as it applies to the human or 
moral species, we will return in chapters V and VI. 
58cf. Colman 1983, 124-125. 
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Pleasure of our Thoughts," but "must he such, and such 
only, as are made up of such simple ones, as have been dis-
covered to co-exist in Nature." Thus fanned on the basis 
of careful attention to "Experience and o}::>servation," our 
ideas of substances, "though not, pe:rbaps very exact 
copies" of things in nature, "are yet th~ Subjects of real 
( as far as we have any) Knowledge" of theln'' ( 4. 4. 12) . 59 
We are now in a position to summatiie, to draw some 
more general conclusions, and to dispel at least some of 
the obscurity with which Locke admittedly treats the issue 
of our classifications of substances (3.6.43). To repeat, 
Locke clearly holds that the doctrine of natural species is 
useless as an explanation of how we actua11Y classify nat-
ural substances; he clearly holds that we are ultimately 
ignorant of real natural essences, and clearly wants at 
least to render questionable the existence of such essen-
ces. But if we consider this critique in abstraction from 
its intended object, or from Locke's opinion of the impor-
tance in delivering it, then we are unah1e to explain his 
defense of a natural science based upon natural history or 
59According to this reading, Lock~,~ own intention 
comes fairly close to the epistemologiccu moderation that 
Wallin views as an anti-Lockean element iP the thought of 
Madison. Affirming according to Wallin tbe naturalness of 
error in the study of both nature and politics, Madison yet 
contents himself with proclaiming our ignorance of "only 
the precise delimitations of natural and human things," and 
thus disposes of "both naive certitude al'ld radical skepti-
cism, the theoretical antecedents of a politics of the 
will" (1984, 161-163). 
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of the credibility of probabilistic arguments from "the 
Nature of Things" other than by reference to his own confu-
sion or to a purely rhetorical intention on his part. The 
suggestion here, however, is that the ambiguities or even 
apparent inconsistencies in Locke's critique of natural 
science do not compel us to conclude either that he is 
simply confused in this matter or that he is an esoteric 
teacher of a radical epistemological conventionalism or 
willfulness. In this view his apparent inconsistency and 
radicalism are best explainable by reference to a third 
alternative, namely that they actually proceed from a con-
sistent, moderate and constructive intention that appears 
most clearly in the light of his objections to the perni-
cious consequences of the methods and doctrines of scholas-
ticism. That Locke employs his apparently radical argu-
ments in the service of an overarching moderate intention 
appears most likely when we view those arguments in the 
context of his more general objection to the arbitrariness 
implicit in the scholastic doctrine of natural species and 
in its entire conception of natural science. 
Locke believes it important to discredit the scholas-
tic account of classification for much the same reason that 
he believes it important to reject their doctrines of in-
natism: the claim that nature authorizes as perfectly 
adequate our ideas of species, like the claim that it 
inscribes in our minds propositional knowledge at birth, 
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encourages us to hold those ideas dogmatically and arbi-
trarily, as though they were simply self-validating and 
required no empirical measurement. Given this belief, it 
would be obvious folly for Locke to argue for a radical 
disjunction between nominal essences and real essences, 
such that our construction of species ideas were wholly 
liberated from any empirical foundation. We contend that 
he does not so argue, and that recognizing the ultimate 
kinship between the extreme alternatives of the scholas-
tics' naive naturalism and a radical conventionalism, he 
seeks to clear a middle ground. Locke's rejection of 
certainty as the appropriate criterion of assent in the 
natural sciences implies a denial that the basis of classi-
fication is an all-or-nothing proposition. That we cannot 
be certain of the precise natural grounds for our classifi-
cations of substances does not compel us to embrace a 
thoroughgoing conventionalism. On the basis of his defense 
of probabilistic assent, Locke seeks to promote a more gen-
uinely empirical science of nature. He therefore fashions 
his critique of the doctrine of natural species so as to 
emphasize that such a science is both necessary and possi-
ble--necessary because nature's provision to the understan-
ding is imperfect, thus forcing us to labor to gain know-
ledge that is in the far greater part neither intuitive nor 
obvious, and possible because nature provides the founda-
tions for our efforts at classification, thus ensuring that 
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those efforts need not collapse into arbitrariness as a 
result of our ignorance of real essences. 
Central to the ambiguity in Locke's argument is his 
conception of the proper general basis of our classifica-
tions as partly natural and partly conventional. Species 
ideas, to repeat once more, are "the Workmanship of the 
Understanding, but have their foundation in the similitude 
of things" in nature (3.3.13; also 3.4.17; 3.6.30,36,37).60 
Given his apparent estimate of the influence of the uncrit-
ical naturalism that he opposes, it makes sense for Locke 
to emphasize strongly the element of conventionalism or 
laboring in the acquisition or construction of human know-
ledge.61 We can thus understand his insistence on the un-
derstanding's alienation from, or at best mediated acquain-
tance with the external world of nature; his insistence on 
the inadequacy of our nominal essences, based on natural, 
phenomenal likenesses, relative to real essences; and even 
his occasional denigrations of probabilistic assent, of 
even the results of "wary Observation" as more-or-less 
sophisticated guesswork, amounting "only to Opinion" and 
lacking that "certainty, which is requisite to Knowledge" 
60cf. Locke's more general observation that human 
knowledge is "neither wholly necessary. nor wholly volun-
ary" (4.13.1). 
61Yolton aptly observes that "So important was it for 
Locke to deny the possibility of a science of nature in the 
rational sense of 'science'--in order to show the need for 
a careful experimental science of nature--that he takes 
frequent opportunity of stressing the point" (1969, 189). 
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( 4. 6. 13; also 4. 2. 14, 4. 3. 14, 4. 12. 10, 4. 15. 4) . Acting on 
the principle that a sense of desire or uneasiness stimu-
lates industry (2.21.34; STCE 126), Locke seeks to unsettle 
our ideas in order to stimulate more careful inquiry. 
somewhat paradoxically, he occasionally denigrates proba-
bilism because his very defense of probabilism requires it; 
for in seeking to prevent the dogmatic reification of our 
ideas, to maintain the sense of their openness and incom-
pleteness that is necessary to any serious empirical in-
quiry, 62 it is important for Locke to maintain clearly in 
view both the requisites of perfect knowledge and the 
extent to which we fall short of attaining it. 63 
62 For this reason I believe that Ayers overstresses 
the significance of Locke's insistence on the precision of 
species boundaries as "an extremely important and explicit 
principle of his philosophy" (1981, 256). As we have seen, 
it is true that Locke cites nature's apparent imprecision 
in defining species boundaries as an important reason for 
doubting the doctrine of natural species; and it is also 
true that at several points he insists upon precision in 
defining such boundaries as a requisite of clarity in com-
munication. But just as Locke refuses simply to divorce 
nominal essences from real essences or from their patterns 
in nature, so he must also insist that we regard our nom-
inal species definitions as somewhat open-ended, balancing 
the desideratum of clear communication with that of scien-
tific advance. See ECHU 4.6.6-10. 
63 r am thus inclined to disagree mildly with the 
judgment of Margaret Osler, who sees in Locke's thought a 
reflection of the "crisis" in seventeenth-century 
philosophy of science, and more particularly an unresolved 
tension between its inheritances of Cartesian rationalism 
and the empiricism of Boyle and Newton among others. Thus 
according to Osler, Locke's "intellectual crisis" consists 
in the fact that though "he recognized that certainty was 
no longer a possible or appropriate ideal for empirical 
science," he nonetheless "continued to regard certainty as 
the earmark of genuine knowledge" ( 1962, 10-11) . My own 
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Moreover, Locke hopes by teaching us to "moderate our 
Perswasions" (1.1.3) not only to stimulate inquiry, but 
also to move us in our "fleeting state of Action and Blind-
ness ... (to) be less imposing on others" (4.16.4; also 
4. 14. 2) . He intends by his emphasis on the conventional 
element of our species constructions to provide a sobering 
reminder of the naturalness of human error, of the insuper-
able uncertainty that darkens so many of the objects of 
human inquiry, and therewith of the need for toleration and 
compromise in the pursuit of intellectual consensus. At 
the same time, he remains sensitive to the danger of over-
valuing consensus as such, at the cost of losing sight of 
the ultimate goal of rational consensus, and therefore does 
not in the final analysis espouse an extreme epistemolog-
ical conventionalism. In denying that natural science can 
be a strict demonstrative science and thus affirming its 
ultimately hypothetical character, Locke does not affirm 
the total arbitrariness of our conceptions of the world 
external to the mind, and does not deny that some hypoth-
eses or some conceptions of that world are truer, or more 
probably true, than others (4.12.13). One must "not make 
his own Hypothesis the Rule of Nature ... For no definitions, 
view is that while Locke does hold certainty superior to 
probability as a general mode of knowing, his intermittent 
application of it to natural science represents not a more-
or-less confused response to a surrounding crisis, but 
rather an intention to preserve the salutary modesty that 
accompanies a sense of the limits of a probabilistic 
natural science. 
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that I know, no Suppositions of any Sect, are of force 
enough to destroy constant Experience" (2 .1. 21, 19; also 
4.8.10). In espousing a qualified, moderate conventional-
ism, in insisting that our species ideas properly conceived 
do not represent perfectly definable real essences, but 
rather derive from the imperfect likenesses observable in 
nature, Locke seeks only to replace an abstract, hyper-
rationalist, barren natural science with one solidly groun-
ded in a genuine empiricism. He counsels not arbitrari-
ness, but to the contrary an unprecedentedly disciplined 
investigation of the "natural history" of things. He 
values most highly not consensus as such, but instead 
rational consensus based upon common sense observation 
refined by experimental science. He intends his moderate 
conventionalism not to promote peace at the price of truth, 
but rather to promote "Truth, Peace, and Learning" together 
(3.5.16). He destroys only in order better--less arbitrar-
ily--to construct. Having promised at the outset of the 
work to perform a critical, destructive, ground-clearing 
operation that would remove "the Rubbish, that lies in the 
way to Knowledge," Locke subsequently and less prominently 
declares it his intention "in the future part of this Dis-
course ... to raise an Edifice uniform, and consistent with 
it self, as far as my own Experience and Observation will 
assist me ... " (1.4.25; also 1.4.23). 
CHAPTER IV 
THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL SCIENCE II: 
THE CORPUSCULARIAN HYPOTHESIS 
It may seem consistent with the Essay's empiricist 
agnosticism concerning cause-effect relations in particular 
and natural science in general that Locke at several points 
renounces any intention to pursue "Physical Enquiries" into 
the natures of the mind, of the ideas in its perception, 
and by implication of the objects that those ideas repre-
sent (2.8.22; also 1.1.2, 2.8.4, 2.21.73). If we are cor-
rect, however, in attributing to Locke a relatively loose, 
permissive empiricism that recognizes the propensity of 
mere data-gathering to produce "nothing but a heap of 
crudities" (CU 13), and thus recognizes the legitimacy of 
probabilistic assent to experientially well grounded, par-
tial hypotheses concerning the natures of things that exist 
external to the mind, then there is in principle no reason 
for a strict renunciation of such inquiries. There is no 
reason, in other words, for Locke to insist upon a strict 
segregation between the "empirical" and the "rational," or 
more precisely between "the 'historical' (or descriptive) 
and the philosophical (or explicative)" in the study of 
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nature. 1 
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If Locke's defense of the historical study of 
nature encourages us to infer from the ordinarily observ-
able similarities among things their probable ontological 
kinship as members of the same species, then why would it 
not encourage us to go further, if we could, and to pursue 
hypotheses concerning the causal relations among things, in 
order to place our judgments on the firmest ground possi-
ble? 
In order to gain a full understanding of Locke's 
account of natural science, it is necessary for us to draw 
forth the affirmative implication that lies within his 
apparently modest.description of his own task as that of a 
mere "Under-Labourer." For it is clear that Locke's pro-
fessed modesty is the modesty of a fellow-traveler in an 
intellectual revolution, consisting only in an admiring 
acknowledgement that this revolution has been spearheaded 
by others, 2 that his role consists in consolidating its 
gains and perhaps in preparing its further advance. Both 
his professed preparatory intention and his acknowledgment 
of the "Builders" of the sciences imply a belief in the 
1Romanell 1958, 316, quoted approvingly by Givner 
1962, 345. Cf. the distinction between the problems of 
classification and of explanation in Woolhouse 1971, 81-95. 
2In addition to the corpuscularian masters to whom he 
refers in the Essay's dedication, Locke acknowledges the 
influence of the "justly admired" Descartes, to whom he 
bears "the great obligation of my first deliverance from 
the unintelligible way of talking of the philosophy in use 
in the schools in his time ... " (Works 1823, 4.48). 
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possibility and indeed at least the partial actuality of 
philosophy or philosophic knowledge. Thus Aaron holds that 
while Locke's own analytical work represents in itself no 
more than "a preliminary concern," it derives its justifi-
cation as a preparation for the advance of true philosophy, 
exemplified in Locke's view in the "synthetical" works of 
masters such as Newton, Boyle, and Sydenham (1955, 74-75). 
Yolton argues similarly that Locke's.main objective in the 
Essay is "not to extend our knowledge of things but to show 
us some of the ways of doing so, even to explain how Boyle, 
Newton, Sydenham were extending human knowledge." Locke's 
achievement is to give "a philosophical foundation for the 
new science" (1970, 16,75; also 1969, 183). Corroborating 
and lending focus to this reading is the fact that the 
Essay's treatment of explanatory natural science contains 
much more than exposures of errors and agnostic renuncia-
tions of the possibility of a complete, demonstrative 
science. In particular, and often with notable apparent 
confidence, Locke moves beyond his indefinite description 
of particular substances as something "supposed, I know not 
what" (2.23.15), permitting himself not only to suppose the 
existence of causally primary qualities that inhere in the 
real essences or internal constitutions of material sub-
stances, but also to offer somewhat more specific descrip-
tions of their natures as causal agents. In offering such 
descriptions, Locke endorses what he calls the "corpuscu-
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larian Hypothesis, as that which is thought to go farthest 
in an intelligible Explication of the Qualities of Bodies" 
(4.3.16; also STCE 193). Thus it is the view of numerous 
commentators that in his specific capacity as underlaborer, 
"Locke set himself the task of developing in a coherent, 
systematic and rational way what he took to be the funda-
mental tenets of the corpuscularian philosophy ... " (Harre 
1964, 93) . 3 
Those who adopt this view commonly hold also that 
Locke's endorsement of the corpuscularian hypothesis and 
his insistence on the historical method of natural science 
are of a piece, or more precisely that the latter derives 
from the former. 4 The question arises, however, as to 
whether these two elements of Locke's treatment of natural 
science are in the end mutually compatible. In the very 
process of facilitating his defense of the possibility of a 
partial science of nature against formidable epistemologic-
al objections, Locke's relatively permissive empiricism may 
3rn the words of Peter Alexander, "the 'lasting monu-
ment' of the master-builders which most impressed Locke was 
the corpuscular philosophy, " especially in the form in 
which Robert Boyle proposed it (1977, 63-64). Givner 
( 1962, 340-42, 346) and Mandelbaum ( 1964, 1-15) claim that 
Locke simply presupposed or accepted without questioning 
the truth of the corpuscular theory. Cf. in general Yolton 
1970, 5-43; Woolhouse 1971, 91-101, 111-114; Curley 1972; 
Laudan 1977. 
4Thus Givner claims that "Boyle's corpuscular hypo-
thesis was the assumption on which Locke based his belief 
that language cannot represent the real nature and struc-
ture of things ... " (1962, 340). Cf. Alexander 1977, 66. 
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open itself to at least equally formidable ontologically 
oriented objections. Can Locke espouse the corpuscularian 
hypothesis without thereby negating even the partial intel-
ligibility of nature upon which his defense of natural his-
tory and experimental philosophy depends? In the final ac-
counting, what is destroyed in the course of the revolution 
with which Locke associates himself, and what constructed? 
The purpose of the present chapter is to examine, 
again with particular reference to the problem of species, 
the relation between Locke's defense of the descriptive 
method of natural history and his apparent endorsement of 
the corpuscularian theory as the foundation of an explana-
tory science of nature. We will begin with a brief over-
view of that theory, and then present two arguments pur-
porting to show . that the consequence of assent to that 
hypothesis would be indeed to render impossible a consis-
tent, intelligible account of nature. Finally, in respond-
ing to these arguments, we will attempt to show that while 
Locke's apparent assent to this hypothesis is by no means 
free from difficulty, he does not endorse it in a manner 
that commits him to the ultimately nihilistic implications 
that some commentators find in it. 
The corpuscularian hypothesis as Locke employs it 
represents an attempt at explaining "the Nature of Sensa-
tion" ( 2. 8. 2 2) and therewith "the Qualities of Bodies" 
(4.3.16). Our perceptual experience contains a tremendous 
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diversity of ideas, of shapes, colors, sounds, tastes, 
odors, textures, motions, and so forth. In seeking an 
explanation of this experience, we wonder what real beings 
in nature correspond to these ideas. In Locke's formula-
tion, we wonder what qualities in nature produce these 
ideas; "Quality," as he defines it, refers generally to 
"the Power to produce any Idea in our mind" (2.8.8). Our 
natural or initial response to such wondering, according to 
Locke, is simply to posit a power or quality to correspond 
to each of our ideas; our idea of the shape of a red ball 
is then produced by its quality of roundness, for instance, 
as our idea of its color is produced by its quality of red-
ness. But this for Locke is merely to restate the ques-
tion, not to explain or render intelligible the nature of 
sensation or of bodies. When we consider further the ques-
tion concerning how bodies produce ideas in us, we must 
conclude that it is "manifestly by impulse, the only way 
which we can conceive Bodies operate in" (2. 8 .11). Our 
experience requires us to suppose the existence in nature 
of no more causal qualities than those necessary to a 
body's capacity to act by impulse, by direct physical con-
tact, on other bodies. 5 The corpuscularian theory holds 
that all material objects or "natural Things ... have a real, 
5cf. Mackie 1976, 18-20, on the economy of postulated 
qualities. According to Aaron, "primary qualities are just 
the concepts which the scientist of the seventeenth century 
found it necessary to presuppose if his science was to be 
possible" (1955, 125-126). 
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but unknown Constitution of their insensible Parts, from 
which flow those sensible Qualities, which serve us to dis-
tinguish them one from another" (3.3.17). These insensible 
parts or "Corpuscles," as the primary constituent parts of 
all externally existing objects or "Bodies," are "the ac-
tive parts of Matter, and the great Instruments of Nature" 
(4.3.25). When we perceive objects at a distance, accor-
ding to this theory, "'tis evident some singly impercepti-
ble Bodies must come from them to the Eyes, and thereby 
convey to the Brain some Motion, which produces these 
Ideas, which we have of them in us" (2.8.12). 
This corpuscularian hypothesis, by virtue of its 
explanation of the production of sensory ideas by impulse, 
yields a perplexing distinction between two kinds of quali-
ties or powers, which Locke designates "primary" and "sec-
ondary" qualities. 6 Corpuscles are "active," according to 
Locke, manifesting "active powers, 117 in that their "prima-
ry" or "real qualities" represent the causal bases of all 
the ideas that such objects present to our perceptions. In 
6A brief discussion of the history of these terms ap-
pears in Aaron 1955, 121ff. For a more extended discussion 
of the forms in which this distinction appears in the works 
of various early modern scientists, see Burtt 1932, 67-71, 
83-90, 115-121, 130-134, 180-184. 
7cf. 2.21.2: "Power thus considered is twofold, viz. 
as able to make, or able to receive any change: The one 
may be called Active, and the other Passive Power." But 
see 2.21.4,72, and 2.23.28, for the suggestion that active 
power may be an attribute only of "Spirits" or thinking 
beings, not of material substances. 
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the most fundamental sense, primary qualities are causally 
primary; and if (efficient) causation occurs by impulse, it 
follows that primary qualities "are utterly inseparable 
from the Body, in what estate soever it be" (2.8.9). They 
are qualities without which a thing could not conceivably 
have bodily existence, and therewith a capacity for commun-
icating motion by impulse. Hence the primary qualities 
include the "Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation ... Motion, or 
Rest," and "Texture" of objects or their constituent parts 
(2.23.28,10). 8 Secondary qualities are then causally sec-
ondary or epiphenomena!, and are qualities without which a 
thing could conceivably have bodily existence. Examples 
include colors, tastes, sounds, and odors (2.8.10,13, and 
passim). 
There is a certain ambiguity in Locke's description 
of secondary qualities. We have noticed his definition of 
qualities as powers, which would seem to imply a certain 
equivalence between secondary and primary qualities as 
merely different forms of quality or power. Yet he also at 
times implies a distinction between qualities and powers, 
such that only primary qualities exist as real qualities or· 
properties of things as they are in themselves, while sec-
ondary qualities are in strict usage not qualities at all, 
8Locke's specifications of the particular primary 
qualities tend to vary; I have here presented an inclusive 
listing of those qualities that he commonly, though not 
invariantly, refers to as "primary." Cf. especially 
2.8.9-26 and 2.23.8-19,30-32. 
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but only powers (2.8.10,13-17; 2.23.8-10; 2.31.2). 9 We 
will return to the significance of this ambiguity; but 
whatever the proper terminology, the basis of Locke's dis-
tinction seems to lie in his peculiar usage of the relative 
concept of resemblance (2.8.7,15,22,25). A thing or sub-
stance manifests a primary quality or power, according to 
Locke, when it produces an idea that resembles its causal 
ground, or that resembles a quality without which a thing 
cannot be conceived to have a material or bodily existence. 
A thing manifests a secondary quality when it produces, !2y 
virtue of its possession of primary qualities, an idea that 
does not resemble any primary quality. The significance of 
this usage of "resemblance" has provoked considerable con-
troversy among commentators; 10 but a few examples may pro-
9Jackson (1929; cf. Mandelbaum 1964, 19-20) thus 
regards the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities as a distinction between qualities and powers, 
while Curley (1972, 443-445, 450-454) explains it in terms 
of a difference between two forms of power. For Curley, 
Locke's ambiguity on this point proceeds from the genuine 
difficulty in rendering a precise definition of "quality." 
While I do not discount the difficulty Curley describes, I 
believe that this ambiguity reflects a more fundamental 
tension in Locke's thought, of which Locke is well aware, 
between natural science and common sense. See below, pp. 
179-186. 
lOThe following questions provide the substance of 
much of the controversy. Is Locke referring to the primary 
qualities of observable objects, or of insensible parti-
cles? Do the primary qualities in question resemble their 
ideas as "determinates" (e.g. a particular shape) or 
"determinables" (e.g. shape in general)? How, in any 
event, is it possible to compare an idea with a quality 
existing in nature, if only ideas are present to our minds? 
For various answers to such questions, see the discussions 
in Jackson 1929; Aaron 1955, 116-127; Mandelbaum 1964, 16-
vide sufficient clarification for present purposes. 
157 
Sup-
pose that the actual shape or texture of a thing were de-
cisive in determining our idea of its shape or texture; we 
could then say that there is a kind of family resemblance 
between an idea and its determining quality. Suppose, on 
the other hand, that by virtue of its shape or texture, a 
thing could produce in us an idea of its color or taste; we 
could then say that there is no such resemblance between 
the idea in question and its determining quality. Mackie's 
explanation perhaps provides as much clarity as Locke's 
discussion permits: 
Essentially what he must be claiming is that material 
things have, for example, shapes which are determina-
tions of the same determinable or category, shape in 
general, as are the shapes seen, felt, or thought 
of ... The contrast that Locke is drawing is with, for 
example, colors. It is not that we sometimes make mis-
takes about colors •.. but that even under ideal condi-
tions ... colors as we see them are totally different ... 
from the ground or basis of these ~owers in the things 
that we call coloured. (1976, 14) 1 
Locke readily acknowledges that however useful this 
account may be in resolving some of the apparently puzzling 
facts in our ordinary perceptual experience (2.8.19,20,21), 
the distinction between primary and secondary qualities 
remains in some sense unintelligible; in particular, "we 
can by no means conceive how any size, figure, or motion of 
28; Yolton 1970, 47-49, 130-131; Mackie 1976, 13-27. 
11similar explanations of Locke's concept of resem-
blance appear in Mandelbaum (1964, 16-30) and in Curley 
(1972, 450-454). 
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any Particles, can possibly produce in us the Idea of any 
colour, Taste, or sound whatsoever; there is no conceivable 
connexion betwixt the one and the other" ( 4. 3. 13 ; also 
2.8.14,25, 4.3.28) . 12 It is due to this inconceivability 
that we tend reflexively to posit real qualities in things 
that correspond directly to our ideas of secondary quali-
ties. The implication of Locke's distinction, however, is 
that the peculiar appearance of secondary qualities as 
somehow essentially or qualitatively distinct from ideas of 
primary qualities derives in the decisive respect not from 
the causally primary qualities themselves, but instead from 
the manner in which we experience them. As we experience 
them in the richness and diversity of their appearances, as 
we ordinarily conceive them by reference to the seemingly 
nonmaterial aspect of their existence, secondary qualities 
depend decisively upon a relation or interaction between 
object and perceiver (cf. 2.21.3), or between the minute, 
insensible parts of objects and our own sensory organs. 
The existence of such apparent "qualities" as sweetness as 
a particular taste or buzzing or ringing as a particular 
12Thus in Leibnitz' New Essays On Human Understanding, 
Theophilus suggests the replacement of the distinguishing 
criterion of resemblance with that of intelligibility: 
"when a power is intelligible and admits of being distinct-
ly explained, it should be included among the primary qual-
ities, but when it is merely sensible and yields only a 
confused idea it should be put among the secondary quali-
ties" (II.viii.lo). As we will see, however, even the 
relation between primary qualities and their corresponding 
ideas is scarcely more intelligible, according to Locke, 
than relations involving secondary qualities. 
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sound depends no less than the existence of pleasure or 
pain (2.8.16) upon the presence of a perceiver whose sense 
organs interact with certain primary qualities so as to 
produce the ideas in question. In the absence of such a 
perceiver, such "qualities" would exist not as the colors, 
sounds, tastes or smells proper to our ordinary sense 
experience, but instead only as the peculiar motions of 
variously constituted insensible corpuscles; they would 
"vanish and cease," as Locke puts it, "and [be] reduced to 
their Causes, i.e. Bulk, Figure, and Motion of Parts" 
(2.8.17; also 2.8.23, 2.23.11, 4.6.11). 
Locke's account of the corpuscularian theory and of 
its application to the process of perception has received 
considerable attention from professional philosophers in 
particular, many of whom have found it fraught with serious 
difficulties. Inasmuch as we too seek, like Locke, to 
avoid entanglement in extended "Physical Enquiries," howev-
er, it is beyond our present purposes to attempt to resolve 
or even to explicate all such difficulties. Our purpose in 
presenting this brief description is to provide the context 
for raising some very troubling questions concerning the 
apparently destructive implications of Locke's account of 
the relation of secondary to primary qualities. In either 
or both of two ways, assent to the corpuscularian theory 
might be destructive of the possibility of a coherent ac-
count of nature as an intelligible order: it might imply a 
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direct negation of nature itself as mere chaos or flux, and 
it might imply a more indirect negation of the human under-
standing's capacity to comprehend anything external to it-
self. We turn now to a more detailed consideration of each 
of these possible difficulties. 
CORPUSCULARIANISM AND COMMON SENSE 
Whatever their compatibility in other respects, it is 
possible to argue that there is at least in one important 
respect a kinship between Locke's empiricist critique of 
the doctrine of natural species and his employment of the 
corpuscularian distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities. According to Michael Zuckert, the common root 
of these two branches of Locke's thought is an intention to 
effect a "radical break with the common-sense understand-
ing" of the world, an understanding that was expressed and 
refined especially in traditional or premodern philosophy's 
doctrines of natural species and natural virtues and vices 
(1974, 562). Locke makes no attempt to deny that at least 
on one level, his doctrines must appear strange to people 
of ordinary common sense. After all, we do not commonly 
believe that we directly perceive only ideas of coexisting 
qualities and not things, or that the qualities that we 
observe in things are in reality no more than "mechanical 
Affections of the minute parts" of those things (4.3.26). 
But there is far more to it than this. Zuckert's conten-
tion is not merely that 
what all philosophizing 
accept uncritically the 
Lockean philosophizing requires 
requires, namely a refusal to 
reports of common sense or the 
opinions common (or for that matter not so common) to one's 
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society. 
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It is rather that Locke knowingly effects a rad-
ical and dangerous break with common sense. Zuckert holds 
for instance that Locke's corpuscularian teaching, in con-
ceiving of secondary qualities as perceiver-dependent, 
ultimately reduces them to a status of unreality or mere 
subjectivity. As opposed to primary qualities, which in-
here necessarily in the "internal Constitution, and true 
Nature of Things" (2.23.32; also 2.8.9,15,17,23), secondary 
qualities are merely relational or "imputed," but not in 
the things themselves (2.8.22; also 14,18,19). 13 And given 
that in our ordinary experience, secondary qualities are 
nonetheless "those, which ... serve principally to distin-
guish Substances one from another, and commonly make a 
considerable part of the Idea of the several sorts of them" 
(2.23.8; also 2.8.22,26), it follows, according to Zuckert, 
that the doctrine of the unreality of secondary qualities 
must have a radically unsettling effect. Whatever the 
mischiefs generated by the abusive subtlety of scholastic 
13zuckert's reading is similar to that of Gibson on 
this point: "Behind the theory, as Locke understood it, 
lay the metaphysical assumption that the qualities which 
really belong to a substance must belong to it 'in itself,' 
apart from any relation in which it stands to anything 
else, including our organs of sense and the perceptions 
which are mediated by them ... On the other hand, any appar-
ent characteristics of a thing, which it possesses at one 
time but not at another, cannot be attributed to the thing 
as it is 'in itself,' but are merely indications of acci-
dental and temporary relations in which it stands to other 
things, or to our minds" ( 191 7, 1 O 1) . Cf. Mandelbaum: 
" .. ordinary perceptual experience, while useful in all the 
concerns of life, does not for Locke reveal the nature of 
material objects as they are in themselves" (1964, 40). 
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philosophers who "proved," as Locke charges, that snow was 
black (3.10.10), they did not go so far as did Locke him-
self, "who proved not that snow was black but that it has 
no color at all" {1974, 562). In overreaction against the 
dogmatic naturalism of the scholastics, Locke seeks in this 
view not to refine or to deepen the ordinary, reflexive way 
in which we experience the world, but instead to discredit 
it as fundamentally misleading or illusory. The ambigui-
ties that mark so much of Locke's presentation should not 
surprise us, inasmuch as they proceed from an awareness 
that such a fundamental break effected overtly and unambig-
uously would tend to be destructive of the ends of civil 
society (ibid., 563). 
But why, we might ask, would the undermining of this 
understanding of common sense and its doctrines of natural 
virtues and vices have such an effect? Could not the tran-
scending of common sense thus understood prepare the acqui-
sition of a new, more adequate, more critical or scientific 
understanding of an essentially orderly natural world, one 
that contained its own doctrine of natural virtues and 
vices? The radicalism that zuckert finds in Locke's most 
serious teaching consists in its capacity to undermine not 
merely our ordinary conception of the world, but in fact 
any possible conception of an orderly natural world. In 
order to see the depth of the question raised here concern-
ing the relation of Lockean philosophy or science and com-
164 
mon sense, therefore, it is necessary for us to consider a 
bit further the implications of Locke's apparent conception 
of the world that lies behind what is present in our ordi-
nary experience. 
Writing with a more immediate concern for the prob-
lems of technical philosophy than for those of morality or 
politics, Michael Ayers nonetheless implicitly supports 
zuckert' s contention. Ayers indeed pushes the thesis of 
Lockean radicalism nearly to its limits, arguing that Locke 
at least at times is willing to carry the principle of the 
natural fluidity or anarchy of species boundaries to truly 
nihilistic extremes. He argues more specifically that 
Locke's rejection of the doctrine of natural species or 
kinds is "much more metaphysical, and less dependent on any 
assumption about meaning, than modern writers suggest" 
(1981, 249). Locke's rejection of that doctrine follows 
directly, in other words, from his acceptance of the cor-
puscularian ontology. The crucial premise of Ayers' read-
ing is that in seeking an explanation of natural phenomena 
in terms of material and efficient causation, Locke adopts 
the mechanistic conception of matter characteristic of the 
seventeenth century's "New Philosophy," and thus holds that 
matter is the only universal nature: "there are no specif-
ic or substantial forms, only the different shapes, sizes, 
motions, etc. of particular quantities of matter ... " In 
this mechanistic world, there really is no great chain of 
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being, for there are no 1 inks to compose such a chain; 
nature's production must be anarchic not only across spe-
cies, but even over time for particular individuals. 
Locke's reduction of nature to its causal core means not 
only the banishment of secondary qualities from the realm 
of nature, but also the discrediting of the fundamental 
commonsense notion of a plurality of natures: "all differ-
ences are differences of degree, and everything is in prin-
ciple indefinitely mutable" (1981, 250,258,255, also 263). 
In the 1 ight of this assumption regarding the nature of 
matter appears the true, radical significance of Locke's 
observation that 
All Things that exist, besides their Author, are all 
[sic) liable to change; especially those Things we are 
acquainted with, and have ranked into Bands, under 
distinct Names or Ensigns. Thus that, which was Grass 
to Day, is to Morrow the flesh of a Sheep; and within a 
few days after, becomes part of a Man ... " (3.3.19; also 
2.26.1). 
According to Ayers' reading, Locke holds that change 
is the pervasive, predominant fact of natural existence. 
The natural chaos manifests itself in the fact of mortality 
or perishability--and this means not only in the fact that 
natural beings, living beings in particular, are subject to 
regular cycles of generation and decay, but most clearly 
and powerfully in the fact of natural predation. What is 
normal, in this view, what best indicates the character of 
the natural condition, is that natural beings metabolize 
one another. For what reason can we hold it any more nat-
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ural, any more in accordance with nature's intention, that 
the stuff of which we are made should exist in the form of 
speaking, rational beings, rather than, say, as minerals in 
the soil or as flesh in the teeth of some other predatory 
animal?14 
This understanding of the significance of the fact of 
change or perishability becomes more accessible when we 
view it, once again, in the context of Locke's critique of 
scholasticism. For the scholastic or premodern doctrine, 
the fact of material things' perishability need not pose 
much of a difficulty. By explaining that things possess a 
common species membership by virtue of partaking somehow in 
a common "substantial form, 11 the adherents of this view 
could conceive of the essential change or perishing of a 
thing as a transformation, as a cessation of its partaking 
in its previous form, without considering such change a 
danger to the existence of the form or the principle of 
classification itself. But upon rejecting as "wholly 
unintelligible" this appeal to some mysterious formal 
cause, Locke reasons that we could gain a clearer under-
standing of the question of species distinctions in nature 
by recasting it in terms of material and efficient causa-
tion: What material and efficient causes make it necessary 
that certain qualities constantly coexist--to the extent 
14 As Locke makes clear, we should count our. fell ow 
humans among the natural predators, in the most literal 
way. See TT I.56-59; ECHU 1.3.9. 
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that they do--or that nature regularly produces certain 
distinguishable forms or kinds of things? The essences of 
things are to be conceived not as ideal forms, but instead 
as "internal constitutions," as physical and probably cor-
puscularian entities. 15 The fact of physical change or 
perishability therefore creates a difficulty for this con-
ception in that it seems to imply that the essences them-
selves are perishable. The fact that such physical consti-
tutions are subject to change would seem to imply that the 
observable coexistence of qualities is not strictly neces-
sary at all, and therefore that there are no real essences 
in nature, neither of species nor of individuals. 
According to other commentators, a still more general 
observation subsequently confirms the nihilistic implica-
tion of Locke's view of natural science. The preceding 
examples of natural flux can be taken also to illustrate 
more generally the principle of the ultimately contingent 
existence of all natural or nondivine beings, or of their 
dependence for the integrity of their beings upon myriad 
environmental conditions that are wholly or mainly beyond 
their own control. "For we are wont," observes Locke, 
to consider the Substances we meet with, each of them, 
as an entire thing by it self, having all its Qualities 
in it self, and independent of other Things; overlook-
ing, for the most part, the Operations of those invisi-
ble Fluids, they are encompassed with; and upon whose 
15on the distinction between real essences as 
substantial forms and real essences as corpuscularian 
constitutions, see Woolhouse 1971, 91-98, 101-114. 
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Motions and operations depend the greatest part of 
those qualities which are taken notice of in them ... 
Things, however absolute and entire they seem in them-
selves, are but Retainers to other parts of Nature, for 
that which they are most taken notice of by us. 
(4.6.11) 
Gibson comments that "Such reflections clearly require the 
rejection of the conception of material things as self-
contained substances, each with an essence from which all 
its properties and operations flow ... " (1917, 199) . 16 The 
contingent character of our natural condition as Locke here 
describes it is perhaps more pervasive and profound than we 
are capable of realizing. For we depend for the integrity 
of our being not merely on our freedom from the earthly 
dangers of starvation, exposure, disease, and predation of 
one sort or another, but more radically upon cosmic condi-
tions such as the relative positions and motions of the 
earth and the sun, and perhaps others of which we are una-
ware.17 How would the material or chemical constitution of 
16Gibson goes on to observe that "Locke refrains from 
drawing so revolutionary a conclusion," explaining that the 
"conception of essence, like that of substance ... is clearly 
a presupposition which Locke has never thought of calling 
in question" ( 1917, 199,198) . Aaron notes "the curious 
relativism" of ECHU 4. 6 .11-12, but does not elaborate his 
view of the significance of these passages (1955, 204). 
Cf. also Von Leyden (1968, 159): Although "advanced by 
Locke almost as an afterthought," the doctrine in question 
is "remarkable" in that it draws very near "to Spinoza's 
doctrine of God or Nature as the only substance of which 
all particular things or persons are modifications." 
17 Cf. again 4. 6. 11: " ... perhaps, Things in this our 
Mansion, would put on quite another face, and cease to be 
what they are, if some one of the Stars, or great Bodies 
incomprehensibly remote from us, should cease to be, or 
move as it does." 
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human beings behave, what "powers" it would manifest, given 
a radically altered cosmic environment? From the perspec-
tive of this principle of contingency, it would appear at 
least probable that there are as many "human natures" as 
there are possible environments for them, or alternatively, 
that our experience of a finite plurality of stable natures 
rests ultimately upon a mere prejudice, a groundless faith 
that those earthly and cosmic conditions favorable to their 
existence are somehow more "natural" than those unfavora-
ble. And if we take into consideration the fact that these 
conditions too "are all liable to Change"--that there have 
been, and for all We know could be again, very long periods 
of time in which no life at all, let alone intelligent life 
existed on earth or perhaps anywhere else in the universe--
then we must raise the question of flux or mutability from 
the earthly to the universal level. Taking a general view 
of things, perhaps we should simply say then that nature 
itself is nothing other than a ceaseless, aimless, univer-
sal process of creation and destruction. 18 
Far from placing it on a firmer foundation, there-
fore, according to this reading Locke's adoption of the 
corpuscularian or mechanist principle compels him to dis-
pense entirely with the supposition of the existence of a 
plurality of real natural essences and to conceive of an 
utterly chaotic natural world, a world radically in flux in 
18cf. Nietzsche, The Will To Power aph. 1067. 
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which any of a virtually infinite number of possible con-
figurations of matter or energy could become actual at any 
moment. In this view, in the wake of his adoption of the 
corpuscularian hypothesis, Locke's professed intention to 
advance the experimental improvement of our knowledge of 
nature must ultimately collapse into absurdity. Whatever 
order or lawfulness nature may manifest to our unimproved 
senses is ultimately a mere semblance, an illusion that 
serves at best to conceal the dangerous truth about the 
human condition. The human race is by nature no more than 
another link in an unbroken food chain; or, truer still, 
human beings are as all other natural beings, no more than 
accidental and fleeting configurations of matter-in-motion, 
doomed to a fate of endless, meaningless mutation. Nature 
thus understood can no more provide guidance for us in our 
search for moral principles or valuations than it provides, 
absent any improvement by human labor, for our safety and 
comfort. The ontologically oriented critique thus returns 
us in the end to the conclusion of the epistemologically 
oriented critique: the idea of "nature" as a governing 
order, however necessary to our well-being, represents at 
bottom an act of self-deception, a projection of the human 
will. 19 
It seems, therefore, that in considering the implica-
19cf. 1. 3 .14: "Morality and Mechanism," Locke remarks 
somewhat cryptically, "are not very easy to be reconciled, 
or made consistent." 
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tions of Locke's employment of the corpuscularian theory, 
we come to face a by-now familiar alternative. If we con-
cede that the fact of change or mutability does indeed pose 
a genuine difficulty for Locke's attempt at reformulating 
the problem of classification in corpuscularian or mechan-
istic terms, must we then concede too that Locke's employ-
ment of that theory admits of no moderate treatment of the 
problem? Does Locke's employment of the corpuscularian 
hypothesis commit him to accept the nihilistic conclusion 
we have described? If he refuses to accept that conclu-
sion, must we conclude that Locke's thinking on the crucial 
question of natural science is ultimately incoherent? 
With respect first to the question of Locke's inten-
tions, it is worthwhile once again to take note of the 
strangeness of the implications of the doctrine his critics 
ascribe to him. "There is no doubt something wrong with 
Locke's view," Ayers observes, "since there does seem to be 
something more than physically odd in the supposition that 
a horse should become a cow" (1981, 270). To this we might 
add that something seems at least equally wrong with the 
proposition that only imperishable, indestructible things 
can have natures. We do not suggest that proving a given 
doctrine "strange" or contrary to common sense can suffice 
to prove that Locke could not espouse it; Locke repeatedly 
acknowledges that some of his doctrines must appear strange 
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or contrary to ordinary habits of thinking. 20 But the fact 
remains that Locke himself does not explicitly draw the 
nihilistic conclusion from his discussion of natural sci-
ence. We have noted in the previous chapter his acknow-
ledgments of the possible existence of real natural essen-
ces (3.6.30,36,37), his affirmative references to the 
"ordinary course of Nature" (4.16.6; also 2.26.2,4; 4.6.13; 
4.3.28; TT II.60), and to the possibility of gaining par-
tial but reliable knowledge of "the Reality of Things" or 
of "the several sorts of natural Bodies" through a careful 
accounting of their observable characteristics ( 3 .10. 25; 
3.11.25; also 2.11.15; 3.10.22; 3.11.5,24; 4.4.16,18; 
4.8.10). To these we now add the fact that not even from 
his discussions of the fact of change and the principle of 
contingency does Locke explicitly derive the extreme con-
clusions that some commentators find implicit in them. 
From his discussion of change, for instance, Locke 
explicitly derives only the somewhat ambiguous conclusion 
that the "Doctrine of the Immutability of Essences, proves 
them to be only abstract Ideas" (3.3.19). The fact of 
change may mean no more than that real, corpuscularian con-
stitutions or essences cannot be "ingenerable, and incor-
ruptible." As Locke presents it here, it need not mean 
20 In addition to the passages discussed above concern-
ing the intuitive difficulty of the distinction of primary 
from secondary qualities, see ECHU 2.27.27; 3.6.38; also TT 
II.9,13,180. 
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that there are no real essences, or that the existence of 
the internal constitutions of things is so unstable as to 
afford no legitimate basis for our constructions of essence 
and species ideas. His explanation of the significance of 
the principle of contingency is similarly restrained. 
Stated somewhat reducti vely, that principle amounts to a 
reminder that in conceiving of the natures of humans and 
other earthly beings, we must take as a premise the pre-
sence of certain environmental conditions that bring forth 
and sustain those natures in their ordinarily observable 
modes of existence, growth and development. Our ideas of 
nature thus proceed from a perspective--anthropocentric in 
its focus on those qualities accessible to our sensory 
capacities, geocentric in its presumption of the normality 
of the present material, climatic and atmospheric condi-
tions of the earth, and perhaps as well comprehending the 
present constitution of the whole solar system or even the 
galaxy in which the earth is situated. Given the limits 
inherent in any perspective however broadly conceived, it 
follows that our knowledge of the natures of things is very 
incomplete, "that we have very imperfect Ideas of Substan-
ces." This is the conclusion Locke draws from his discus-
sion of contingency: We should "put an end to all our 
hopes of ever having the Ideas of their real Essences" 
(4.6.12). He never states or implies that our environment 
really is radically unstable or mutable--that there is any 
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significant likelihood that the atmosphere could suddenly 
become unbreathable, for instance, or that there could 
occur a sudden alteration in the proximity of the earth to 
the sun. In accordance with this apparent confidence in 
the regularity of the course of nature, he affirms the 
reasonableness of experimentally framing our conceptions of 
earthly natures by reference to those forms of being that 
the earth's normal environmental conditions bring forth. 
As we will see still more clearly in the following 
chapter, Locke indeed holds that the natural condition is 
in very important respects one of unprovidedness for human 
beings. Our intent here is only to point out that he does 
not claim that this natural unprovidedness is so extreme as 
to negate the legitimacy of conceiving of normal conditions 
for the existence, growth and development of natural be-
ings. But if Locke himself does not draw the extreme con-
clusions that some commentators draw from his employment of 
the corpuscularian theory, then it becomes necessary for us 
to reconsider the manner and degree of his assent to that 
theory. 
We recall that Locke claims to find the corpusculari-
an account useful for explicating the "Nature of Sensation" 
(2.8.22)" and the Qualities of Bodies" (4.3.16). It is 
quite clear, however, that he does not believe that that 
theory in the form in which he finds it contains any 
finally adequate explanation of these phenomena, and there-
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fore that his assent to it in its present form is at best 
provisional; for him it is merely that theory "which is 
thought to go farthest" toward an adequate account.21 
Locke's assent rests to a considerable extent upon the fact 
that we can only conceive of bodies operating on us, or 
presenting to us ideas of their qualities, "l2Y impulse" 
(2.8.11). He never attempts a corpuscularian explanation 
of the real essence of any particular substance, subse-
quently acknowledging not only that we have no comprehen-
sion of the the specific processes in which primary quali-
ties produce secondary qualities (4.3.12ff), 22 but also 
21cf. STCE 193: " ... the Modern Corpuscularians talk, 
in most Things, more intelligibly than the Peripateticks, 
who possessed the Schools immediately before them. " We 
should not disregard the context of this remark, i.e. a 
discussion of what should be "taught a Young Man as a 
Science," inasmuch as Locke may be especially concerned to 
stress the limitations of materialist explanations to a 
youthful (or parental) audience. He does take care, albeit 
briefly, to recommend the study of "Metaphysicks" or 
"Spirits," to be gleaned from "a good History of the Bible" 
(190), as a preface to the study of natural philosophy. 
Cf. Bluhm et al. 1980, 437. Nonetheless I believe that the 
evidence present in works intended for more learned audien-
ces, notably the Essay. conf inns that the opinion Locke 
expresses here concerning the adequacy of the corpusculari-
an theory reflects his most serious thinking. My own dis-
cussion of the limits of his assent to that theory draws 
heavily from the discussions in Yol ton 1970, 56-64, and 
Wilson 1979. 
22 rn his "Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of 
Seeing All Things in God," Locke reiterates his opinion of 
our ultimate ignorance of the process of perception: "Im-
pressions made on the retina by rays of light, I think I 
understand; and motions from thence continued to the brain 
may be conceived, and that these produce ideas in our 
minds, I am persuaded, but in a manner to me incomprehensi-
ble ... The ideas it is certain I have ... but the manner how I 
come by them, how it is that I perceive, I confess I under-
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that even the manner in which bodies communicate motion to 
each other is wholly mysterious to us (2. 23. 28). 23 Most 
important, however, is the consideration that in order for 
it to be truly useful in explaining the qualities and prop-
rties of both individual substances and species essences, 
the corpuscularian theory would have to provide an explana-
tion not only of the causal relations between primary and 
secondary qualities, but also of the coherence, or the 
relatively stable union, of the insensible particles that 
constitute observable bodies. And here again, the corpus-
cularian theory notwithstanding, we "can as little under-
stand how the parts of Body cohere, as how we our selves 
perceive, or move" (2.23.25; cf. 2.23.23-27). Locke thus 
summarizes the natural phenomena that resist any corpuscu-
larian explanation: 
... the coherence and continuity of the parts of Matter; 
the production of Sensation in us of Colours and 
Sounds, etc. by impulse and motion; nay, the original 
Rules and Communication of Motion being such, wherein 
we can discover no natural connexion with any Ideas we 
stand not" (Works 1877, II.421-422). 
23 In connection with the claim that a nonimpulsive 
sensation is inconceivable to us, it is therefore useful to 
bear in mind Locke's denial that the inconceivability of a 
given proposition can in itself justify assent to its con-
trary (4.3.6, 4.10.19). Indeed this is especially perti-
nent for the inconceivability of action at a distance, in 
view of the fact that the phenomenon of gravity seems pre-
cisely to contradict this principle. Locke holds the cor-
puscularian hypothesis useless for explaining gravity (STCE 
192; "Elements of Natural Philosophy," Works 1877, II.474), 
and admits in his controversy with Stillingfleet that New-
ton's work has convinced him to discard the opinion that 
bodies can operate only by impulse (Works 1823, 4.467-8). 
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have, we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary Will 
and good Pleasure of the Wise Architect. (4.3.29) 
Locke's failure to endorse the more extreme implica-
tions of a strict reading of the corpuscularian theory 
appears directly related to his estimate of its limited 
explanatory power. Most fundamentally, his merely quali-
fied assent to that theory is consistent with his professed 
openness to the possibility that real species essences 
exist in nature. The key to this openness is his agnostic 
reserve in conceiving of the nature of matter. He does 
concede that in "speaking of Matter, we speak of it always 
as one, because in truth, it expresly contains nothing but 
the Idea of a solid Substance, which is every where the 
same, every where uniform. 11 But this does not entitle us 
to make inferences about the real world of nature, because 
it merely means that matter as we thus conceive it is a 
pure abstraction: " ... since Solidity cannot exist without 
Extension, the taking Matter to be the name of something 
really existing under that Precision" can produce nothing 
but disputation and obscurity (3.10.15). 24 In Locke's 
conjecture, al though "our general or specif ick conception 
of Matter makes us speak of it as one thing, yet really all 
24The difficulty in conceiving of matter as a pure 
abstraction may account for the differences between the 
Essay's definition and the following, with which Locke 
begins his more introductory "Elements of Natural Philoso-
phy": "Matter is an extended solid substance; which being 
comprehended under distinct surfaces, makes so many partic-
ular distinct bodies" (Works 1877, II.472). 
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Matter is not one individual thing" (4.10.10); matter 
exists in the world only in particularized parcels that 
combine and recombine with one another in mysterious ways 
to produce an enormous diversity of transient yet relative-
ly stable and regular forms of existence. The abstract 
conception of the unity or sameness of matter may enable us 
easily enough to account for the element of flux or muta-
bility in the physical world; but so long as we cannot ac-
count as well for the facts of cohesion and continuity, for 
the order and stability amid the flux, we will remain ig-
norant of "the Substance of Body" (2.23.30; also 4.3.22). 25 
It appears then that Locke draws no sweeping con-
clusions concerning the degree of mutability in physical 
bodies or the existence or nonexistence of real essences in 
nature, because in his view we simply do not know enough 
about whatever is the fundamental stuff of which natural 
bodies are composed to infer with any reliability its 
capacity to assume an infinite diversity of forms or con-
25Ayers agrees that in contrast to Descartes, Hobbes, 
and Boyle, Locke is agnostic concerning the nature of mat-
ter, yet remains convinced of its reality: "Hence material 
substance is extension for Descartes, but something we know 
not what for Locke" (1981, 250). It seems to me that since 
the notion of substance-in-general, unlike that of particu-
lar substances, is necessarily a pure abstraction, the 
reasoning that Ayers attributes to the "New Philosophers" 
and to Locke amounts to this: Suppose the fundamental 
sameness of things in the world, and the conclusion of rad-
ical mutability is inescapable. But for Locke the funda-
mental sameness or difference of things is precisely what 
is in question; the procedure that Ayers attributes to 
Locke amounts to simply supposing a problem out of exis-
tence. 
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figurations, let alone its likelihood at any given moment 
to undergo spontaneous, radical mutation. The most we can 
say is that we are ignorant of anything that necessarily 
prevents natural beings from undergoing such mutations 
(3.6.22; 4.3.10). Locke does not assume the truth of the 
corpuscularian theory in its current form and then inf er 
from it the nonexistence of real essences in nature, nor 
does he employ it to absolutize the sway of change or tran-
sience, to the dogmatic exclusion of the phenomena that 
indicate a degree of order in the world. Contrary to the 
imputation of an nihilistic ontology, it seems to be the 
case that its incapacity to explain the degree of observa-
ble order in nature, most clearly represented by the rela-
tive cohesion and continuity of things, 26 is of major 
importance in preventing Locke's assent to the corpuscular-
ian theory in more than a qualified and provisional manner. 
One further clarification is required. We have ar-
gued that Locke's assent to the corpuscularian theory does 
26cf. Yolton 1970, 85: "Cohesion seems to have held 
the secret of nature for Locke, in the sense that only with 
that could our knowledge of body cease in any way to be 
observational and become conceptual. " It seems doubtful 
that knowledge of cohesion in itself could facilitate the 
method of "deducing from essences" that Yolton is here 
concerned to explicate. However that may be, my own 
suggestion is that knowledge of cohesion does hold an 
important part of the secret of nature for Locke, but in 
the sense that it could lay bare the ground of the fact 
that things are manifestly not so radically mutable as the 
mechanist thesis narrowly conceived would lead us to 
expect; that Locke regards such knowledge as a desideratum 
indicates that he takes seriously the degree of stability 
or order that is manifest in our ordinary observation. 
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not compel him simply to assume a natural chaos, but in-
stead is qualified in a manner that permits him to retain 
an openness to the existence of a ground for whatever de-
gree of orderliness his inquiries into natural history may 
reveal to him. The fact remains, however, that even thus 
qualified, his assent commits him to the view that, whether 
the basic causal entities are the corpuscles that he de-
scribes or instead "something yet more remote from our 
Comprehension" (4. 3 .11), the causal ground for whatever 
order exists among natural bodies must lie in their inter-
nal, physical constitutions. He must then accept some form 
of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. 
What requires clarification is the status of the secondary 
qualities. In what sense does Locke assert the unreality 
of such qualities, in contrast to primary qualities? If 
the real essences or internal constitutions of things are 
in principle inaccessible to the human understanding, and 
if the secondary qualities of observable objects provide 
the basis of our ordinary classifications of such objects, 
then does Locke's assertion of the unreality of such qual-
ities imply that in his view we are radically alienated 
from the truth about the natural or external world? Does 
Locke indeed hold, as we have seen some commentators 
charge, that whatever order may exist in the real world, 
the world of secondary qualities that appears to our common 
senses or to our prescientific understandings is essential-
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ly subjective or illusory? 
Occasionally though not consistently, Locke does 
identify the "true Nature of Things" with their "internal 
constitution" or causal core (2.23.32; also 2.23.29). If 
this internal constitution consists in those qualities 
"which every Thing has within it self, without any relation 
to any thing without it" ( 3. 6. 6) , then it would seem to 
follow that secondary qualities, which depend for their 
peculiar existence upon the presence of a perceiver, con-
stitute no part of the real nature of things. Yet in his 
description of secondary qualities, Locke does not simply 
deny their reality or assert their mere subjectivity, nor 
does his notion of the nature of a thing as the nonrela-
tional "thing in itself" strictly require it of him. He 
says that secondary qualities "in truth are nothing in the 
Objects themselves, but Powers to produce various Sensa-
tions in us ... " (2.8.10, 14-24; emphasis supplied). Leav-
ing aside the question whether primary qualities, which are 
after all themselves powers as well, are by nature any less 
relational than secondary qualities, we need only reformu-
late the status of secondary qualities in order to show 
that they too can be thought of as nonrelationally, con-
stantly present in bodies. If we conceive of secondary 
qualities as powers or dispositions in things to produce 
certain sensations in beings like us, i.e. beings possess-
ing certain sensory organs, then we can think of such pow-
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ers or dispositions as constantly present in things even in 
the absence of any particular perceiver. Thus Curley holds 
that although Locke has not achieved a sufficiently sophis-
ticated dispositional theory, his occasional apparent sug-
gestions of the unreality of secondary qualities represent 
inconsistencies that are not essential to his doctrine 
(1972, 464,440) _27 
In fact such a conception seems implicit in Locke's 
frequent references to the possibility and necessity of 
gaining some partial acquaintance with the natures of 
things through a careful accounting of their observable 
characteristics. As Yol ton observes, the "phrase, 'the 
nature of things themselves, ' which runs throughout the 
Essay, almost never means 'the internal cons ti tut ion of 
objects' ... It refers to the objects of observation" (1970, 
124) . Observable properties or secondary qualities can 
then be included in the nature of things as well as the 
primary qualities of insensible corpuscles. But if Locke's 
27curley distinguishes "individual" powers, or "the 
capacities of individual objects, or classes of objects, to 
affect or be affected by a given individual object, " from 
"sortal" powers, or the powers of individuals or classes of 
objects "to affect or be affected by all individual objects 
of a certain kind." Sortal powers, unlike individual pow-
ers, can be regarded as intrinsic to their objects (447-
449). My argument is that without naming it, Locke does in 
fact make use of the distinction Curley describes; the 
ambiguity in his usage of it derives not from his failure 
to grasp it, but rather from his awareness of the difficul-
ty involved in employing a concept of dispositional quali-
ties for the purpose of defining precisely a given sub-
stance or kind. 
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corpuscularianism permits him to distinguish the nature of 
an object from the causal ground of its properties, then 
why does he sometimes identify the two? 
With this question we return to the fundamental pur-
pose of Locke's account of natural science. By occasion-
ally identifying the "true Nature" of a thing with only its 
internal constitution and primary qualities, and therewith 
calling attention to the (merely) dispositional reality of 
its secondary qualities, Locke calls attention to the fact 
that the secondary qualities or observable properties of 
things are in principle infinite in number. For this 
reason it is not possible to define a natural substance 
with perfect adequacy and precision by reference only to 
its observable properties, and therefore it would seem to 
make sense for Locke to restrict his conception of the 
nature of a thing to the finite number of qualities inher-
ing in its causal core. But the fact that according to 
Locke the knowledge of the causal core required for a per-
fect definition is inaccessible to us implies that there 
must be a further reason for him to make this identifica-
tion. We concluded the preceding chapter with the observa-
tion that Locke's intention to defend the historical, 
probabilistic study of nature against the arid, dogmatic 
rationalism of the scholastics requires him not only to 
defend the possibility of empirically based judgments con-
cerning the natures of things, but also to maintain in view 
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the requirements of a strict, demonstrative science of 
nature in order to preserve a salutary sense of the neces-
sary imperfection of our knowledge. The ambiguity under 
present consideration appears to proceed in part from the 
same design; Locke's hypothetical description of a real 
corpuscularian essence from which we could deduce a thing's 
properties (4.3.25) represents an elaboration of the 
unattainable requisites of a perfect, demonstrative science 
of nature. The fact that knowledge of this "true Nature" 
is in principle unattainable compels us to classify things 
historically or descriptively rather than scientifically, 
while the recognition that only such knowledge is perfect 
prevents us from reifying our own classifications as 
finally adequate. A single principle seems to govern the 
major ambiguities of both Locke's epistemology and his 
ontology: Only through a sense of the ultimate hiddenness 
of nature can we gain what knowledge of nature we are 
capable of. 28 
But this application of the corpuscularian theory 
does not simply reiterate Locke's epistemological argument 
for a sense of openness with respect to our classifications 
of things in nature; it carries a further implication for 
the manner in which we should pursue our historical inqui-
ries. If secondary qualities do not inhere "in" things as 
a fixed number of constantly manifest, wholly nondisposi-
28cf. LN I.111; II.135; CU 3. 
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tional or nonrelational qualities, then their number and 
character must be functions of changing environmental con-
ditions (4.6.11). Moreover, if they are epiphenomena of 
the primary qualities that Locke describes, it would follow 
that their number and character are functions especially of 
changes in their physical environments. We can then under-
stand Locke's identification of the true natures of things 
with their corpuscularian constitutions as primarily inten-
ded not to call into question the reality or naturalness of 
secondary qualities, but rather to stimulate active exper-
imentation aimed at the discovery of new properties in 
things as the most productive mode of historical inquiry. 
The attitude of openness he recommends toward our classifi-
cations reflects not only our merely probabilistic know-
ledge of the relation between observed properties and real 
essences, but also a conception of natural things as 
harboring undiscovered powers whose discovery, like those 
of "that one contemptible mineral" iron, must bring us 
closer to the truth of nature, and for all we know may 
produce in the process incalculable practical or material 
benefits. By encouraging us continually to expand the 
sphere of the observable, as it were to force to the sur-
face qualities hidden by nature from our unimproved senses, 
the corpuscularian hypothesis facilitates the simultaneous 
improvement of "Knowledge and Plenty, " that is, of know-
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ledge and power (4.12~11).2 9 
29Thus it seems to me to miss the point to object, as 
Yost does, that Locke is uninterested in hypotheses con-
cerning sub-microscopic events because he holds that we can 
only classify things and formulate hypotheses of causal 
relations by reference to observables (1951, especially 
120-130) . The very concept "sub-microscopic" is relative 
to the power of our instruments of observation; without 
hypotheses concerning originally sub-microscopic events, 
there could have been no reason to attempt to bring some of 
those events into the sphere of human observation and con-
trol. Yelton similarly stresses the "middle path" that 
Locke follows in his estimate of the utility of hypotheses, 
arguing that Locke conceives of the specific value of hypo-
theses only as means of explanation, not of discovery 
(1970, 68,57-75). Contrast Laudan 1977. 
THE FREEDOM OF THE MIND 
To this point we have conceived of the danger that 
Locke's reductionistic corpuscularianism poses for the 
commonsense intelligibility of nature as lying in the 
doctrine of the uniformity of matter and the illusory or 
radically mutable character of its modifications. But it 
is possible to begin by acknowledging the relative stabil-
ity of natural beings and yet discover a similar potential 
danger in the principle of reductionism itself. Let us 
take Locke at his word, and accept as genuine his professed 
admiration for the accomplishments of the corpuscularian 
"Master-Builders" in advancing the natural sciences. Let 
us thus attribute to him the belief that nature is ulti-
mately lawful and intelligible, and that its physical oper-
ations can best be discovered through historical inquiry, 
complemented or completed by experiments designed to bring 
us closer to the primary qualities of its primary constit-
uents, whatever they might be. As we have noted, Locke 
appears to express enthusiasm about such a conception in 
the anticipation that it will facilitate advances not only 
in knowledge as such, but also in "profitable Knowledge" or 
technology (4.12.12). It is not difficult to see how a 
conception of physical nature as matter-in-motion, as a 
realm of sheer determinacy ruled solely by laws of mater-
187 
188 
ial and efficient causation, can facilitate great advances 
in human power over nature, by enabling human beings to 
manipulate nature's processes of material and efficient 
causation. By conceiving of the properties of things as 
"powers II and testing hypotheses concerning their causal 
bases, we are able to make nature's powers our own. But we 
might well wonder whether this is not ultimately a Faustian 
bargain. For questions inevitably arise concerning the 
status of human beings in the corpuscularian theory. Are 
human beings to be included among the "bodies" whose behav-
ior that theory seeks to explain? If so, can we conceive 
of other natural bodies as mere manipulable matter-in-
motion without thus conceiving of ourselves as well? Must 
we conceive as mere powers, as epiphenomena of the primary 
qualities of our own insensible constituent particles, not 
only those qualities whereby we are perceptible to others, 
but also the powers whereby we ourselves perceive and re-
flect upon ideas? Can we adequately explain the human phe-
nomena of consciousness, of reason and volition, merely by 
reference to material and efficient causation? 
At this point the ontological and epistemological 
questions merge. To assert that the mind itself is a mere 
epiphenomenon of the material or bio-chemical structure of 
the brain would be to imply that thought can be determined 
decisively only by its internal conditions, by the material 
constitution of the brain, and not by the external reality 
that it attempts to comprehend. 
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This would indeed be to 
imply that all thought is subjective, or in other words 
that we are incapable of genuine knowledge of any kind, 
whether of secondary or of primary qualities. It would be 
to imply that we are inescapably imprisoned in a kind of 
perceptual solitary confinement, in a condition of solip-
sism or privacy such that there is no common world intelli-
gible to our common senses. It would then be beside the 
point to protest that the epiphenomenal character of secon-
dary qualities does not in itself imply their unreality or 
subjectivity; asserted in this comprehensive manner, the 
principle of reductionism inherent in the corpuscularian 
theory would ultimately efface the distinction between 
subjectivity and objectivity, and therewith render wholly 
unintelligible its own foundation and that of any other 
theory as well. 
The ultimate question raised by Locke's employment of 
the corpuscularian hypothesis concerns the freedom of the 
mind. In keeping with what Aaron calls the Essay's "se-
verely practical" orientation (1955, 77), or its aspira-
tion to serve at once the causes of "Truth and Usefulness" 
(ECHU "Epistle to the Reader," Nidditch ed. 1975, 9), Locke 
expresses an interest in the freedom of the mind less for 
its own sake than for its function in facilitating freedom 
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of action, 30 and, as we will see, for its relevance to im-
portant theological issues. Notwithstanding the fact that 
his extended treatment of this issue does not appear in the 
context of an explicit discussion of morality--to repeat, 
no chapter title in the entire Essay announces a direct 
concern with morality--it is clear that Locke regards the 
issue as fundamental to morality. It can suffice for the 
moment to recall that the vital connection of freedom of 
thought and moral action is already manifest in his working 
definition of "moral Man," of the proper subject of law or 
morality, as "a corporeal rational Creature" ( 3. 11. 16) . 
What we seek, therefore, is Locke's explication of this 
concept of "moral man," or of the relation between our cor-
poreal and rational qualities. We need to know how or to 
what extent we can explain our mental experiences of think-
ing and willing by reference to the nature of the mind, or 
30cf. 2.22.10: "For Action being the great Business 
of Mankind, and the whole matter about which all Laws are 
conversant, it is no wonder, that the several Modes of 
Thinking and Motion, should be taken notice of ... " We 
have noted above (chapter III, p. 99 n.17) the complaints 
of some scholars concerning a general scholarly tendency to 
devote insufficient attention to the moral-practical sig-
nificance of the Essay. Pang.le agrees that the Essay is of 
great political importance in its own right, and even ar-
gues that in a sense its major defect consists in its in-
sufficiently philosophic orientation; Locke's apparent 
emphasis of the primacy of action to thought signifies a 
failure or refusal to account for the specifically philo-
sophic eros (1988, 212ff). In this and the following chap-
ters, I will argue that though Locke evidently refuses in 
public to elevate philosophizing to the summit of human 
experience, he does not deny in principle the possibility 
of a truly free mind or a pure desire for truth. 
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of the substance in which those powers inhere. 
Present purposes do not require a complete elabora-
tion of Locke's account of these mental phenomena; the fol-
lowing chapter will include a more detailed discussion in 
particular of his account of volition. Here it is essen-
tial only to indicate briefly Locke's view that we do not 
experience our mental faculties as epiphenomena of any 
prior or more fundamental cause. There are two genef:-al 
data of common experience that cast doubt on this applica-
tion of the doctrine of epiphenomenalism. The first con-
sists in the fact that however hidden to us may be the 
comprehensive truth concerning the order of nature, and 
however natural among human beings may be. a condition of 
dissensus on many issues, our fundamental epistemological 
experience is not one of solipsism or privacy. The clear-
est indication of this lies in the fact that we "seldom 
mistake ... the Use and Signification of the names of simple 
Ideas," which "carry a very obvious meaning with them, 
which every one precisely comprehends, or easily perceives 
he is ignorant of ... " ( 3. 9. 18) . 31 
31cf. 2.32.15: "I am nevertheless very apt to think, 
that the sensible Ideas, produced by any Object in differ-
ent Men's Minds, are most commonly very near and undiscern-
ibly alike." Moreover, on this opinion of the objectivity 
of secondary qualities depends to a considerable extent 
Locke's strong suspicion that "the greatest part of the 
Disputes in the World, are ... meerly Verbal, and about the 
Signification of Words" (3.11.7; also 3.9.16ff). As Wood 
observes, according to Locke "Conflict among men comes not 
so much from the contradictory testimony of the senses as 
it does from the fictional fabrications of the intellect" 
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The second of these data consists in our more direct 
experience of mental faculties as the conditions of agency. 
Near the beginning of the Essay's longest chapter, Locke 
explains his twofold conception of power: "Active" power, 
"which is the more proper signification of the word Power," 
is the power to effect change, and "passive" power is the 
power to receive it (2.21.2,3,4). Through sensation well 
considered, we can gain clear and abundant ideas of passive 
powers. Given, on the other hand, that there are "but two 
sorts of Action, whereof we have any Idea, viz. Thinking 
and Motion," ideas of active powers seem to derive mainly 
if not exclusively, and much more clearly, from "reflection 
on the Operations of our Minds" (2.21.4; 2.23.28ff.). Re-
flecting on our mental experience, we find more particu-
larly that we have a power to abstract from our present 
concerns, enabling us to frame general conceptions of happy 
or well-lived lives (2.11.11, 2.21.51,56,61); that we have 
a power to suspend the present determination of our wills 
in order to consider present alternatives in relation to 
our general conceptions of happiness (2.21.47,52,71); and 
that we have a power to reflect on and to adjust these 
conceptions of happiness, even self-consciously to refocus 
our desires, in accordance with new thoughts or experiences 
(2.21.45,46,53,69). By these means we can guide our voli-
(1975, 68). In the following chapter, we shall discuss in 
more detail Locke's doctrine of the naturalness of dissen-
sus among human beings. 
193 
tions by thought, and can therefore begin sequences of 
events ( 2 . 21 . 5 , 7) . We thus experience ourselves as free, 
self-mastering, self-determining beings, the owners of our 
actions (2.21.15,48ff.,53). 
Locke appeals repeatedly to our ordinary reflective 
experience, to "every one to observe in himself" (2. 21. 38; 
also 2.21.7,32,35,36,44,47,53,69) to see whether his ac-
count is accurate. He remains, that is, more-or-less on 
the level of commonsense experience; nowhere in this dis-
cussion does he attempt a corpuscularian explanation of 
volition or of the thought that guides it. We need to 
determine why this is so. Perhaps he simply excludes such 
an attempt from the subject matter of the Essay; we have 
seen that Locke at times disclaims any concern with onto-
logical issues. In the Essay's introductory chapter, he 
declares more specifically that he 
shall not at present meddle with the Physical Consider-
ation of the Mind; or trouble my self to examine, 
wherein its Essence consists, or by what Motions of our 
Spirits, or Alterations of our Bodies, we come to have 
any Sensation by our Organs, or any Ideas in our Under-
standings; and whether those Ideas do in their Forma-
tion, any, or all of them, depend on Matter, or no. 
These are Speculations, which, however curious and 
entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my Way, 
in the Design I am now upon. (1.1.2) 
It would seem that we should look upon such disclaimers 
with considerable suspicion, however, in view of the per-
fectly obvious faQt (which he readily acknowledges) that in 
elaborating the corpuscularian hypothesis and the distinc-
tion between primary and secondary qualities, Locke does to 
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some extent engage in "Physical Enquiries" and thus vio-
lates his stated delimitation. The exception is necessary, 
as we have seen, in order for Locke to render somewhat more 
intelligible the nature of sensation and the qualities of 
bodies. Why then could not a similar exception be made in 
order to clarify the nature or qualities of the mind? Just 
as Locke employs the corpuscularian hypothesis as the most 
plausible interpretation of the nature or cause of ideas 
that we experience in sensation, why does he not employ it 
to provide a similar interpretation of ideas that we exper-
ience in reflection? Why or in what sense does he find it 
necessary to distinguish between material and spiritual 
substances (2.23.5,23-32,36)? 
In fact Locke does at several points consider the 
propositions that the soul could be a material entity and 
that thought could be a power or attribute of matter. On 
the basis of these considerations, it is perhaps safest for 
us to conclude that in the end he gently urges upon his 
readers a position of agnosticism on the issue of the 
nature of the mind, as in his suggestion that whoever will 
"look into the dark and intricate part of each Hypothesis, 
will scarce find his Reason able to determine him fixedly 
for, or against the Soul's Materiality" (4.3.6; also 
2.23.28ff., 2.27.17,27).32 Such agnosticism may not be 
32such remarks would appear to complicate Aaron's 
opinion that Locke simply "accepts the usual dualism, the 
'two parts of nature,' active immaterial substance and 
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altogether evenhanded, however, inasmuch as Locke does not 
seem to believe that his audience most urgently requires an 
openness to the possible truth of the immaterialist thesis; 
to advance the position of agnosticism on this issue re-
quires him first and foremost to show the nonabsurdity of 
the materialist view. It is not impossible then that this 
profession agnosticism is merely provisional, that Locke is 
actually a materialist of a certain sort. In any event, in 
order to facilitate such a spirit of openness, he proposes 
to replace the distinction between material and immaterial 
beings with that between cogitative and incogitative beings 
(4.10.9) . 33 
passive material substance" (1955, 142; also 104-105, 143). 
Still, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Locke 
accepts some kind of dualism, reflecting a qualitative dif-
ference between cogitative and incogitative natures. Gib-
son holds that although Locke "begins by taking for granted 
the current categories for interpreting the real," he 
employs them less rigidly than does Descartes: "In place 
of two substances from whose clearly defined essences the 
whole of the ii:; further determinations are conceived as 
deducible, body and mind are only knowable as objects of a 
partial and therefore imperfect existence" (1917, 226,224-
5). Cf. Alexander 1977, 75-76. 
33wilson argues that Locke offers no good reason for 
adopting even as a matter of probability the opinion of the 
immateriality of the mind or the soul: "Locke does ascribe 
sensation and even 'thought' to animals; yet he shows no 
inclination to attribute immaterial souls to them. It 
seems to follow that on Locke's principles thought not only 
can inhere in a corporeal subject but in many cases actual-
ly does" ( 1979, 145; also 150) . Similarly, Ayers attrib-
utes to Locke the opinion that thought is a "perfection" no 
different in kind from animal or vegetable life ( 1977, 
247); Pangle suspects, along with Locke's vigilant contem-
porary the Reverend Edmund Stillingfleet, that Locke denies 
the existence of any noncorporeal substance ( 1988, 209; 
Works 1823, 4.5ff., and passim). The fundamental distinc-
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Adopting the latter distinction would carry the 
benefit of directing our attention to what seems to be the 
real issue for Locke, which is not the substantive nature 
of the soul, but rather the status of its power of thought. 
And on this issue Locke seems to speak more definitely. He 
claims to accept the possibility that the soul or the mind 
could be a material substance, only on the assumption that 
the power of thinking could inhere in matter by virtue of a 
divine superaddition; matter "is evidently in its own 
nature void of sense and thought" (4.3.6). 34 Thus reject-
ing the possibility that thinking could be a natural power 
of or could arise as it were spontaneously from "senseless 
Matter" (4.10.5), he rejects with some emphasis the rele-
vance of the corpuscularian hypothesis for explaining 
mental phenomena. 
For it is as impossible to conceive, that ever bare 
tion would then seem to be not between cogitative and in-
cogitative, nor even between animate and inanimate, but 
simply between living and nonliving beings. 
34The notion of superaddition in the Essay seems to 
correspond to the Second Treatise' notion of an "appeal to 
heaven," in its application to cases beyond rational deci-
sion. In attempting to explain how the motions and colli-
sions of bodies can produce perceptions, e.g. of pleasure 
or pain, "we are fain to quit our Reason, go beyond our 
Ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good Pleasure of our 
Maker" (4.3.6; also 2.8.13, 4.3.28,29, 4.10.10, STCE 192). 
Cf. Bluhm et al.: The notion of 'God' for Locke simply 
"refers to natural causes as yet unknown to science" (1980, 
437). In what follows, however, I shall argue that what-
ever Locke seriously thinks of the principle of superaddi-
tion, it is most likely that he doubts the capacity of 
human science ever to explain materially or reductionistic-
ally the phenomena of the mind. 
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incogitative Matter should produce a thinking intelli-
gent Being, as that nothing should of it self produce 
Matter ... Divide Matter into as minute parts as you 
will ... vary the Figure and Motion of it as much as you 
please ... and you may as rationally expect to produce 
Sense, Thought, and Knowledge, by putting together in a 
certain Figure and Motion, gross particles of Matter, 
as by those that are the very minutest, that do any 
where exist ... So that if we will suppose nothing first, 
or eternal; Matter can never begin to be: If we sup-
pose bare Matter, without Motion, eternal; Motion can 
never begin to be: If we suppose only Matter and 
Motion first, or eternal; Thought can never begin to 
be. (4.10.10; also 16) 
It is true that even this apparently definitive 
statement, occurring in the midst of a discussion "Of Our 
Knowledge of the Existence of a GOD, " comes not without a 
measure of Locke's characteristic ambiguity. He argues in 
effect that matter could not of its own power generate in-
telligence, because it is impossible for us to conceive how 
matter could generate intelligence. But at the close of 
the discussion, he raises and does not directly answer an 
objection to this mode of inference. "We cannot conceive 
how any thing but impulse of Body can move Body," he ob-
serves, "and yet that is not a Reason sufficient to make us 
deny it possible, against the constant Experience, we have 
of it in our selves, in all our voluntary Motions, which 
are produced in us only by the free Action or Thought of 
our own Minds" (4.10.19; also 4.3.6). We cannot infer from 
the inconceivability of a proposition either its falseness 
or the truth of the contrary proposition. So it would 
seem, then, that we cannot infer the immateriality of the 
soul from the fact that we cannot conceive of its material-
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ity, nor can we infer the impossibility of matter naturally 
generating thought from the fact that we cannot conceive of 
its possibility.35 
Upon considering the implications of this denial of 
the legitimacy of inferences from the principle of incon-
ceivability, therefore, we come to confront the possibility 
that our experience of mental freedom or agency, however 
"constant," may be nonetheless illusory. Why is it legiti-
mate for us to interpret volition as an active, initiating 
power, as a capacity to interrupt a causal sequence of 
events and begin a new one? If it is possible that our 
thinking and volition are reducible to materialist causes, 
then how do we know that a self or a unitary source of our 
actions even exists? How do we know, that is, that the 
claim of self-dominion does not represent at bottom an act 
of usurpation or covetousness on the part of whichever of a 
number of competing wills or desires happens to gain a kind 
of mental hegemony, thus producing a mere illusion of free-
dom or personhood similar to our uncritical attribution of 
ontological primacy to secondary qualities? 36 In the pen-
35Bluhm et al. argue that this rejection of inferences 
from the principle of inconceivability constitutes one 
among several indications that Locke intends the argument 
in ECHU 4.10 to serve a merely exoteric purpose (1980, es-
pecially 419-423). This may well be the case; but on this 
principle, we might also infer the nonphilosophic character 
of Locke's corpuscularian explanation of sensation. 
36cf. Nietzsche's conception of the "'soul as social 
structure of the drives and affects' ... Willing seems to me 
above all something complicated, something that is a unit 
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ultimate section of the chapter "Of Power, " immediately 
following the close of his discussion of human liberty, 
Locke remarks that "Grammar, and the common frame of Lan-
guages" may lead us sometimes to mistake for active powers 
what are really passive powers, as in the case, for in-
stance, of a so-called "act" of perception (2.21.72). What 
justifies the opinion that these mistakes are limited in 
number, or that not all of our "actions" ordinarily con-
ceived are really semblances of passions? 
It may seem at times that despite the fact that his 
own arguments give rise to them, Locke's response to such 
questions is simply dismissive. With respect to the fun-
damental question of our knowledge of our own existence, he 
repeats the Cartesian argument that "If I doubt of all 
other Things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own 
Existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that," and 
adds that "He that can doubt, whether he be any thing, or 
no, I speak not to, no more than I would argue with pure 
nothing, or endeavour to convince Non-entity, that it were 
something" ( 4. 9. 3, 4. 10. 2; also 4. 3. 6) . But in fact Locke 
does have something more to say to the skeptic on this 
point. His argument against the reduction of intelligence 
to purely materialist causes derives not simply from the 
commonness of our apparent experience to the contrary, nor 
only as a word ... " 
19) • 
(Beyond Good and Evil, aphorisms 12, 
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from the inconceivability of a reductionistic materialism, 
but more compellingly from the absurdity of its consequen-
ces. Locke recognizes that among the consequences of a 
conception of thought as an epiphenomenon of "the acciden-
tal unguided Motions of blind Matter" would be that "Free-
dom, Power, Choice, and all rational and wise thinking or 
acting will be quite taken away" ( 4 .10 .17), would be re-
vealed as merely illusory. A comprehensively reductionist 
materialism would thus yield the opinion that certain con-
figurations of matter-in-motion produce by their very mo-
tions a process of conscious cognition that somehow con-
tains an illusory experience of its own independence. The 
fact that an epiphenomena! or caused process could somehow 
come to consider itself as a self, as an agent or active 
power independent of any causation, must then signify that 
it is ignorant or oblivious of its own causal bases. The 
absurdity in this appears upon consideration of the impli-
cation that this ignorance or obliviousness is necessary. 
that it cannot be overcome. Let "this thinking System be 
all, or a part of the Matter of the Universe," reasons 
Locke, "it is impossible that any one Particle, should 
either know its own, or the motion of any other Particle, 
or the Whole know the Motion of every Particular; and so 
regulate its own Thoughts or Motions, or indeed have any 
Thought resulting from such Motion" (ibid.). Let us sup-
pose that thought does thus reduce to the motion of parti-
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cles, and suppose further that it presently achieves self-
consciousness, such that it loses its semblance of indepen-
dence and becomes aware of its material bases. It would 
thus become aware not only that those material bases had 
hitherto produced an illusion of independence, but that 
they are also producing the present reductionist proposi-
tion. On what grounds could we conclude that the content 
of the present thought is any less illusory? 37 Unless we 
wished simply to assume that the present moment were some-
how privileged to provide a revelation of the true grounds 
of intelligence--unless, that is, we wished to make a pure 
leap of faith, utterly without rational or experiential 
foundation--we would have to concede that the present 
thought could be no less illusory than its predecessors, 
that for all we know there may be some other causal entity 
producing the illusion of material or corpuscularian caus-
ality, and so forth in an infinite regress. To become con-
scious of a possible causal ground of thought is necessar-
ily to doubt not only the possibility of any correspondence 
between mind and world, but also the reality of that ground 
itself; to attempt to explain thought or intelligence as a 
mere accidental effect or epiphenomenon of nonintelligent 
37Locke raises a similar question at ECHU 4.11.8: 
"But yet, if any one will be so sceptical, as to distrust 
his senses ... and therefore will question the Existence of 
all Things, or our Knowledge of any thing: I must desire 
him to consider, that if all be a Dream, then he doth but 
dream, that he makes the Question; and so it is not much 
matter, that a waking Man should answer him." 
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causes is to commit oneself to an endless search for the 
ever-elusive nature of those causes (cf. 4.10.19). To 
embrace such an explanation and all its consequences would 
therefore present the remarkable spectacle of thought 
denying its own possibility, by tracing its existence to a 
nonintelligent cause whose existence as cause remains at 
bottom purely conjectural. 38 Than this, Locke maintains, 
"there can be nothing more absurd" (4.10.16). 39 
Granting the extreme unlikelihood that a seventeenth-
century writer with Locke's sensitivity to the prevailing 
climate of opinion would openly and straightforwardly pub-
38In this respect Locke's argument can be viewed as a 
continuation of his rejection of the theory of innatism, 
present here in a much more radical form. Just as he ob-
jects to the notion of dispositional innatism that certain 
principles or propositions can be naturally inscribed in 
our minds of which we are yet unaware, so too he objects to 
the more radical notion that our thought can be determined 
by principles or causes of which we can never be adequately 
aware (cf ECHU 1.2). 
39 I believe that Locke is in this decisive respect in 
agreement with the following statement by Harry V. Jaffa: 
"While plants, and animals other than man, may without 
self-contradiction be conceived as forms which are epiphe-
nomena of some more fundamental sub-human reality, man 
cannot be so conceived. Intelligence cannot be regarded as 
a by-product of unintelligence. The 'what' of man, his 
self-consciousness ... cannot be conceived as the effect of 
an unintelligent cause. For in that case man's intelli-
gence would, like the secondary qualities, be regarded as 
an illusion, corresponding as it would to nothing in a 
reality outside man's brain. But the doctrine of an unin-
telligent primary reality, being itself a product of man's 
brain, would also have to be regarded as an illusion. The 
doctrine that man, the intelligent being, is 'caused' by an 
unintelligent first principle, cannot then escape self-
contradiction. Intelligence is an irreducible reality" 
(1957, 61). Cf. Lowenthal 1978, 96. 
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lish arguments certain to provoke accusations of material-
ism or atheism, we have attempted to remain open to the 
possibility that Locke's rejection in this context of a 
materialist explanation of thought does not represent his 
most serious thinking on this issue. Having thus consid-
ered the relevant evidence, however, we conclude nonethe-
less that Locke fails to present a corpuscularian explana-
tion of mental phenomena not out of considerations of mere 
prudence, but instead because he believes that no such 
attempted 
phenomena 
explanation could succeed in 
intelligible. Whatever his 
rendering those 
ultimate opinion 
concerning the substantial nature of the mind or soul, or 
concerning the reality of the distinction between material 
and spiritual substances, Locke does not go so far as to 
counsel an openness to the question of the reduction of 
thought to material and efficient causation. Indeed he 
believes that he can safely counsel an openness with 
respect to the former question precisely because neither 
possible resolution need carry the destructive consequences 
of the reductionist principle. It is "not of such mighty 
necessity to determine one way or t'other" the question of 
the substantial nature of the mind ( and is therefore a 
waste of intellectual labor to try), according to Locke, 
because "All the great ends of Morality and Religion, are 
well enough secured, without philosophical Proofs of the 
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Soul's Immateriality" (ibid.; also 2.27.17) . 40 
The corpuscularian hypothesis may very well be the 
basis of a true explanation of the behavior of bodies, 
Locke seems to hold, but if it is to be usefully applied to 
the thoughts and actions of human beings, it must be able 
to account for the facts that we do not experience the 
world as solipsists and that we are able somehow to reflect 
upon and therefore to exercise influence over the condi-
tions of our own thinking and action. If the corpusculari-
an hypothesis or something like it is to be comprehensively 
true, in other words, it must be true in such a way as to 
respect the essentially irreducible character of the powers 
of the mind. Locke declines to offer a corpuscularian 
explanation of thinking and volition because he simply has 
no clear idea of what such an explanation might involve; 
mind and body do not necessarily belong to two separate or 
wholly distinct worlds, but are related and conjoined in 
some mysterious way that defies any simple reduction of one 
40It is true that in the immediate context Locke is 
concerned to show that one can discard this doctrine of 
immateriality without thereby discarding the doctrine of 
the soul's immortality, which supports our sense of moral 
obligation by placing before us the prospect of reward or 
punishment in an afterlife. (Cf. 1.3.6: " ... the true 
ground of Morality .. .-can only be the Will and Law of a God, 
who sees Men in the dark, has in his Hand Rewards and 
Punishments, and Power enough to call to account the Proud-
est Offender.") But in referring not merely to one, but to 
all the great ends of morality, he implies that the notion 
of human agency, indispensable for any notion of obliga-
tion, would be similarly undisturbed by the doctrine of the 
materiality of the soul or the mind. 
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to the other (2.23.28). We can proceed best in this area, 
Locke implies, by simply analyzing and attempting to render 
an internally consistent account of our own and others' 
mental experiences, not by attempting to force such experi-
ences into conformity with a preconceived hypothesis. 
There can be no doubt that as a problem, the problem of the 
relation between mind and body or between the cogitative 
and incogitative parts of nature survives Locke's philoso-
phizing. The point here is not to suggest that he succeeds 
in resolving the issue, but rather that there is virtue in 
his agnosticism. In respecting the legitimacy of the prob-
lem in this relation, Locke refuses to reduce matter to 
mind or vice versa, and refuses also to posit their radical 
separation; rather he simply insists that a successful 
resolution must account satisfactorily for all the relevant 
phenomena present in our common experience. 
CONCLUSION: NATURAL SCIENCE AND NATURAL HISTORY 
We have seen in these past two chapters that Locke's 
conception of the proper method for the study of nature is 
twofold. Against the scholastics' abstract rationalism, he 
insists strongly on a historical or descriptive approach, 
while in his awareness of the uselessness or even absurdity 
of a totally naive empiricism, he retains a clear interest 
in explanatory hypotheses. We have been concerned in the 
present chapter to ascertain whether Locke's employment of 
one such hypothesis, the corpuscularian hypothesis, has the 
effect of undermining the possibility of a genuinely 
historical approach to the phenomena, or to "the nature of 
things themselves." We have found that while he seems to 
view corpuscularianism as the most intelligible account 
available of certain kinds of natural phenomena, he is 
clearly aware of its deficiencies; as Margaret Wilson puts 
it, Locke's various qualifications of his assent amount to 
an acknowledgement "that most of what goes on in the world 
is incomprehensible from the point of view of Boylean mech-
anism" (1979, 149). He does not believe it capable of 
fully explaining the natures of material substances or 
bodies, nor does he find in it any justification for con-
ceiving of nature comprehensively in terms of matter- or 
bodies-in-motion. Therefore his employment of it does not 
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commit him to an endorsement of the extreme and even dan-
gerous implications that some commentators allege. That he 
assents to it at all proceeds in large part from his gener-
al sense of the superior intelligibility of explaining the 
behavior of observable bodies by reference to the motions 
of their fundamental constituents, 41 rather than by obscure 
references to their substantial forms or occult qualities. 
But the point is that Locke neither offers nor endorses any 
systematic, comprehensive explanation of natural phenomena; 
he employs the corpuscularian theory in a moderate, some-
what pragmatic manner, as a hypothesis useful both in pro-
viding partial explanations of the phenomena gathered in 
natural histories and in suggesting promising directions 
for further experimentation. By this we do not mean to 
suggest that Locke's qualified assent to a corpuscular ian 
or mechanistic natural science is perfectly benign, carry-
ing no dangers whatsoever. We mean to suggest only that 
such dangers as this assent may carry do not proceed from 
dogmatism, or from any procedure of excluding g priori 
certain phenomena from consideration. 
The moderate manner in which Locke employs the cor-
41Locke's assent to the corpuscularian theory seems to 
involve less an acceptance of its details than an agreement 
with the general principle of explaining physical events by 
the motions of insensible particles. The spirit in which 
Locke accepts the corpuscularian account of perception ap-
pears in his confession that "I understand not" how we 
perceive, "though it be plain motion has to do in the pro-
ducing" of sensory ideas (Works 1877, II.10; also 14). 
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puscularian hypothesis, and in addition his assessment of 
both the promise and the essential danger of the new nat-
ural science are rather strikingly illustrated in a remark-
able digression occurring within his discussion "Of our 
Complex Ideas of Substances." Having elaborated again the 
hypothesis that the observable qualities of material sub-
stances have their causal bases in the primary qualities of 
the insensible corpuscularian constituents of those sub-
stances, Locke digresses, apparently to sound a note of 
reassurance. The corpuscularian theory calls to our atten-
tion the inadequacy of our fa cul ties for the genuinely 
scientific study of nature, insofar as we would require 
"Microscopical Eyes" or senses "much quicker and acuter" 
than those naturally given us, in order to "penetrate ... 
into the secret Composition, and radical Texture of Bodies" 
( 2. 2 3. 12) • But perhaps we should not lament our deficien-
cies in this respect; Locke seems to reassure us that the 
possession of senses improved in the manner he describes 
would be "inconsistent with our Being, or at least well-
being in this part of the Universe," in that in all prob-
ability it would overwhelm us with sensory minutiae, under-
mining our capacity to make the ordinary identifications 
and distinctions whereby we order our daily lives. We 
should therefore rest secure in the belief that the "infi-
nite wise Contriver of us ... hath fitted our Senses, Facul-
ties, and Organs, to the conveniences of Life, and the 
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Business we have to do here" (ibid.). 
Yet in the immediate sequel he cleverly qualifies 
this affirmation of the providedness of our natural mental 
condition, proposing now that only "in our present State," 
i.e. one wherein we possess "unalterable Organs," would the 
possession of sense organs thus improved be of no advantage 
to us. What we would find disorienting would not be our 
perception or knowledge of ordinarily insensible particles 
as such, but rather a condition in which we could perceive 
only the primary qualities of microscopic bodies, without 
any conception of them as constituents of the larger bodies 
manifest in the world of common or unimproved sense experi-
ence. Faced with the choice of living exclusively either 
in the world of improved or the world of unimproved sense 
experience, it would therefore be rational for us to choose 
the latter. But Locke is not content simply to let the 
matter rest here. Immediately after illustrating the 
disadvantages of living exclusively in a world of improved 
sense experience, he proposes an "extravagant conjecture" 
according to which, like angels assuming bodies, we could 
alter our organs of perception so as "to suit them to (our] 
present Design." What wonders might we discover, he con-
tinues enthusiastically, if we could view at our pleasure 
"the Figure and Motion in the minute Particles of the 
Blood, and other juices of Animals, as distinctly as ... at 
other times, the shape and motion of the Animals them-
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selves"--if we could pass at pleasure between the worlds of 
minute particles and of observable objects, or between the 
worlds revealed to our improved and to our unimproved 
senses (2.23.13)? Now, however "wild a Fancy" it may be 
with respect to the "Beings above us," Locke's conjecture 
is clearly not at all extravagant as applied to human 
beings. The microscopes of the late seventeenth century 
were already capable of "augmenting the acuteness of our 
Senses" to a degree sufficient to bring to sight a world of 
ordinarily hidden phenomena, often strange or incongruous 
from the perspective of the unimproved senses; and Locke 
explicitly imagines the advent of far more powerful micro-
scopes, and perhaps by implication also that of similarly 
powerful instruments for the augmentation of other senses 
(2.23.11,12) . 42 In such means we already possess to a 
considerable extent the power of "Spirits" to alter our 
perceptive organs, and thereby, so it would seem, to pass 
at pleasure to and from the worlds of improved and unim-
42 Locke seems thus to believe it in principle possible 
for us actually to observe the basic constituents of phy-
sical reality: 11 ••• if that most instructive of our Senses, 
Seeing, were in any Man 1000, or 100000 times more acute 
than it is now by the best Microscope ... he would come 
nearer the Discovery of the Texture and Motion of the mi-
nute Parts of corporeal things; and in many of them, prob-
ably get Ideas of their internal Constitutions" (2.23.12). 
Cf. Yolton 1970, 45-46. We should note that this does not 
necessarily contradict his denials of our capacity for 
knowledge of real essences; the decisive distinction is 
between observing the constituent corpuscles of a given 
internal constitution and being able to deduce observable 
properties from their qualities. 
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proved sense experience. 
In thus referring to the wonders that artificially 
improved perceptions might manifest to us, and by implica-
tion to the greater comprehension of nature that they might 
facilitate, Locke expresses clearly the promise that his 
"extravagant conjecture" holds forth. We might complete 
this expression by recalling his emphasis of the close 
relation between "Knowledge and Plenty," or of the tech-
nological dimension of the promise of modern science 
(4.12.11). What we should not overlook in this, however, 
is the significance of his acknowledgment of the danger. 
Because nature reveals itself at best only partially to our 
unimproved senses, the task of the natural historian must 
involve not simply the faithful recording of experiences, 
but further the augmentation of our senses, in order to 
raise to the level of phenomena things or events that lie 
beneath or beyond those ordinarily perceptible. In order 
to expand our knowledge of nature, we must to some extent 
transcend our commonsense experience. For Locke the danger 
lies in the fact that an attempt to do so completely, to 
live exclusively in a world of microscopic corpuscles or 
perhaps things "yet more remote from our Comprehension" 
(4.3.11), would be an attempt to live "in a quite different 
World from other People" (2.23.12), and would be wholly 
disorienting. Locke's hopefulness concerning the sci en-
tific value of enlarging our sensory capacities and gaining 
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admittance into a world of hitherto hidden phenomena is 
anchored by a recognition that at the close of the day, as 
it were, we must return home to live in the prescientific 
world of common sense experience. It is anchored, in other 
words, by an acknowledgment of the reality of the prescien-
tific world. The possession of the unalterably acute sen-
ses in Locke's digression is the equivalent of the hypo-
thetical supposition of the exclusive reality of insensible 
corpuscles and their primary qualities. To make this sup-
position is in effect to suppose the banishment of human 
beings with their ordinary sensory organs from the real 
world. 43 But natural science in Locke's view must be nat-
ural science for human beings, for beings constituted as we 
are; our artificial enhancements of our sensory endowments 
and our hypotheses concerning insensible corpuscles are 
useful insofar as they render the natural world, the world 
in which we must live, more intelligible to us and there-
with more manipulable by us. There can be no doubt that 
Locke finds the corpuscularian hypothesis partially useful, 
perhaps necessary but not sufficient, for the achievement 
of these aims; but it is crucial that having once resolved 
the ordinarily observable bodies of the universe into 
minute particles, the modern scientist must somehow put 
43cf. Hannah Arendt's description of the demand of 
modern science for "the renunciation of an anthropocentric 
or geocentric world view." The "miracle of modern science" 
consists in the fact that "the purging was done by men" 
(1968, 265,269). Cf. Burtt 1932, 89-90. 
them back together. 
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The physicist's concern with explana-
tion must somehow be reconciled with the concern of the 
taxonomist. 44 Once again, in maintaining that the proper 
basis of natural science lies in natural history or in a 
careful observation of "the nature of things themselves, " 
Locke urges observation at both levels of reality; he does 
not imply that nature appears exclusively at the corpuscu-
lar level. 
In this respect Locke's critics on this issue may 
well be justified in finding a danger to common sense 
implicit in this conception of natural science. For the 
simple reason that so much of the relevant data lie outside 
the realm of our ordinary experience, inherent almost by 
definition in Locke's "extravagant conjecture" or in the 
modern enterprise of experimental natural science is the 
unpredictability of its results; no matter how sound the 
hypothesis, surely the attempt at observing hitherto unob-
servable data must with some frequency produce surprises, 
thereby generating further questions and directions for 
further research, calling forth the invention of ever-more 
powerful instruments of observation and measurement, enab-
ling scientists in turn to uncover further surprises, with 
the whole process continuing ad infinitum. It is diffi-
44whitehead implies that in his greater empirical con-
cern for issues of classification over mathematical explan-
ation, Locke stands in relation to Descartes and Newton 
roughly as Aristotle stands in relation to Pythagoras and 
Plato (1925, 43-44). Cf. Givner 1962. 
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cult to say how seriously Locke regards the possibility 
that the discoveries of the new natural science could ulti-
mately render our ordinary experiences, and in particular 
those responsible for our belief in the natural foundations 
of our species classifications, less rather than more 
intelligible. In suggesting our ability to imitate the 
"Spirits" who can pass at pleasure between the worlds of 
science and common sense, he seems to assume that whatever 
we discover through, the augmentation of our natural senses 
will be compatible with what we know through ordinary ex-
perience, will leave our ordinary world intact. Viewing 
this suggestion from a contemporary perspective, surveying 
the yield of the intervening three hundred years of intel-
lectual laboring, we might perceive in Locke's enthusiasm a 
measure of naivety, in proportion to the difficulties in-
volved in reconciling with common sense experience the many 
perplexing and paradoxical discoveries of contemporary nat-
ural science.45 
45Thus Arendt writes concerning the contemporary 
consequences of this enterprise that scientists' "most 
cherished ideals of necessity and lawfulness ..• were lost 
when the scientists discovered that there is nothing 
indivisible in matter, no a-tomos, that we live in an 
expanding, non-limited universe, and that chance seems to 
rule supreme wherever this 'true reality,' the physical 
world, has receded entirely from the range of human senses 
and from the range of all instruments whereby their coarse-
ness was refined. From this, it seems to follow that caus-
ality, necessity and lawfulness are categories inherent in 
the human brain and applicable only to the common-sense 
experiences of earth-bound creatures" (1968, 273). It is 
certainly fair to wonder whether Locke could have conceived 
in such terms the "quite different World" that he believed 
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The danger thus inheres in the possibility that, 
Locke's apparent confidence to the contrary, we may not be 
able to regain our commonsense orientation, once we begin 
to ponder the significance of the discoveries we make by 
adopting the perspective of the microscope or telescope or 
any other instrument for detecting things ordinarily imper-
ceptible. This danger is not a peculiar product of Locke's 
philosophy, and in struggling with the specific contempo-
rary instances of the problematic relation between natural 
science and common sense experience, we can expect little 
assistance from Locke's texts. But the purpose here is not 
to suggest that Locke is capable of resolving the problem 
inherent in this relation, but instead to emphasize more 
fundamentally the significance of his insistence on the 
necessity of reconciling the findings of natural science 
with the reality of the commonsense, prescientific world. 
If Locke suggests no resolution of this difficult relation, 
neither does he adopt g priori any set of explanatory prin-
ciples that would render such a resolution impossible. 
Locke explains as follows his understanding of the 
proper employment of hypotheses: 
.•. my Meaning is, that we should not take yp_ any one 
too hastily ••• till we have very well examined Particu-
lars, and made several Experiments, in that thing which 
we would explain by our Hypothesis, and see whether it 
will agree to them all; whether our Principles will 
carry us quite through, and not be as inconsistent with 
one Phenomenon of Nature, as they seem to accommodate, 
we would gain access to through modern natural science. 
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and explain another. And at least, that we take care, 
that the name of Principles deceive us not, nor impose 
on us, by making us receive that for an unquestionable 
Truth, which is really, at best, but a very doubtful 
conjecture, such as are most (I had almost said all) of 
the Hypotheses in natural Philosophy. (4.12.13) 46 
Locke's extravagant conjecture indicates that he employs 
the corpuscularian hypothesis not as a dogma but as a gen-
uine hypothesis, to be assented to or rejected in propor-
tion to its usefulness in explaining, not explaining away, 
the data of our ordinary experience. Within the perspec-
tive of that hypothesis as Locke understands it, it would 
appear that the natural facts of intelligence and of the 
plurality of natures must either be denied or accepted as 
simply inexplicable. It is to Locke's credit that he 
chooses the latter, although his apparently pragmatic dis-
trust of comprehensive, systematic explanations of the nat-
ural world may not be itself entirely free of difficulty. 
What is essential is that hypothetical or explanatory nat-
ural science for Locke must aspire to be the completion of 
natural history, or of certain fields of natural history. 
It cannot be its replacement. 
Finally, having thus elaborated Locke's defense of an 
experimental, probabilistic natural science rooted in a 
"historical, plain method" of studying nature, we can 
reformulate the question of ultimate interest for our study 
46For a still more emphatic condemnation of the 
misuse of hypotheses in natural philosophy, see Locke's 
fragment "De Arte Medica," in Fox Bourne 1876, I. 222-
227. 
217 
as a whole. Of what relevance is this defense of a natural 
science grounded in natural history to Locke's teaching 
concerning morality and justice? The argument in defense 
of Locke's epistemological moderation remains inconsequen-
tial in the most important respect, at least until we have 
gained a clearer idea of the relation between the abstract 
idea of "moral man" and actual, natural human beings as 
Locke is able to observe them in the course of his own 
natural-historical inquiry. If Locke holds that partial 
but reliable knowledge of nature is indeed accessible to 
the human understanding, to what extent does he hold that 
such knowledge can be enlisted in support of a teaching of 
morality or justice? What remains, therefore, for us to 
consider are the relations between the Essay's account of 
natural science and its proposed demonstrative science of 
ethics, and between each of these and the Two Treatises' 
theory of natural rights. 
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